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ABSTRACT 
Power, and how it is exercised within social relations is pivotal in explaining policy change. 
Hence, this dissertation explores policy change in Kenya by examining the transfer and 
subsequent adoption of social protection policies in the form of cash transfer schemes. Instead 
of the current analytical frameworks drawing from political settlements, political institutions, 
and ideational approaches in explaining policy uptake, the research studies policy making from 
a policy transfer and power nexus. The study examines power relations among multiple actors 
in the national context to explain the adoption of social protection policies. Hence this 
dissertation articulates power dynamics and asymmetries inherent in policy-making involving 
national and transnational actors as underpinning policy transfer processes. The thesis is 
premised on the following interrelated arguments; firstly, I show how transnational actors 
created and manipulated interests and incentives based on their resource base in three 
significant ways: controlling the policy agenda, constraining the agency of other actors and 
influencing the preferences of actors in the policy space. The interaction of interests and 
resources – financial, and ideas and knowledge – converged to bring about policy change. 
Secondly, I focus on the role of ideas and knowledge within policy space to show how the 
creation of a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge, social construction and policy 
narratives played a significant role in shaping learning and influencing national actors. Thirdly, 
I argue that transnational actors used structural mechanisms based on financing and coerced 
government to adopt social protection policies through a catalysing mechanism and imposition 
of conditionalities. The study depicts how transnational actors conditioned and manipulated 
national context and institutions to align with the idea of cash transfers. This thesis employs a 
qualitative approach to study policy transfer and subsequent adoption of two cases of transfer 
schemes in Kenya, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and the 
Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP).  
 
Key words: Kenya, social policy, cash transfers, social protection, CT-OVC, HSNP, policy 
transfer, actors, ideas, knowledge, interests, incentives, transnational actors, international 
organisation 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the dynamics of the process of transfer and the subsequent adoption of 
social protection policies in Kenya. Social protection programmes have expanded rapidly in 
low-income countries over the past two decades (World Bank, 2015b).  In particular, the 
number of cash transfer programmes targeted at poor citizens has grown substantially, with 
studies indicating that almost all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a scheme under 
implementation. The current wave of cash transfers originated from Latin America in the late 
1990s, where they were domestically driven as a response to poverty and the social and political 
threats presented by rising inequality. The subsequent success witnessed in a decrease in 
poverty and inequality levels drew international attention and the same programmes have been 
transported to Africa (Costa Leite, Suyama and Pomeroy, 2013). 
 
International organisations have played a key role in diffusing the idea of cash transfers as 
instruments of poverty reduction, resulting in a change in social policy paradigms across 
countries in Africa. Kwon, Cook and Kim (2015, p. 127) suggest that changes in social policies 
can come from one of two sources: “… one that emphasises global influence on national social 
policymaking while the other sees national initiatives as the main driver of social policy”. The 
former has characterised the experience of social protection policymaking in Africa, where 
external factors and pressures have driven policy adoption. Unlike Latin America, where social 
protection was locally initiated, except for a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa, notably, 
South Africa, donors and international organisations have been on the forefront of initiating 
cash transfer policies (Devereux 2011; Barrientos & Villa 2015). Besides the transfer of the 
policies, international donors and organisations continue to shape financing and 
implementation of the programmes. 
 
Social protection policies constitute part of the global social policy agenda. Social policy plays 
a wide range of roles in development, ranging from poverty reduction and redistribution to 
enhancement of national cohesion and building solidarity (Aina, 2004; Mkandawire, 2005; 
Adésínà, 2007). Divergent views emerge on the rise of cash transfers as the social policy option 
in Africa. Some scholars decry the narrowing of social policy to cash transfers and as 
inadequate transformational instruments to meet the multiple functions of social policy 
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(Mkandawire, 2010a; Adésínà, 2011). Proponents agree with the view but argue that the 
programmes form a foundation of the development of broader welfare regimes where 
governments are reluctant to invest in social policy, and that cash transfer programmes provide 
relief in instances of high unemployment (Ferguson, 2015). To support arguments for cash 
transfers, scholars have carried out impact assessment studies with studies highlighting the 
positive effect of the programmes. Evidence gathered indicates increased enrolment in schools, 
reduction in early marriages and pregnancies among girls, and improved nutritional status of 
households among other micro-level benefits for households receiving cash benefits (Levine, 
van der Berg and Yu, 2011; Pettifor et al., 2012; Barrientos et al., 2013; Ayuku et al., 2014; 
Zembe-Mkabile et al., 2015).  
 
Due to the globalised nature of the world, international policy initiatives like social protection 
cannot be ignored by nation-states. Global agendas easily permeate national plans through 
transfer, diffusion and policy learning. With most action on the transfer of cash transfer 
happening in the last 15 years, Kenya is viewed as an early adopter, starting the first 
programme, the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), in 2004. The 
policy adoption process was however complex. Policy transfer processes are complicated due 
to an array of variables arising out of multiple actors, multisitedness and multiple interests in 
the policy space. The complexity of the process is evident from the initial phase of defining the 
policy problem, setting the agenda for the policy solution through to decision-making and 
implementation. Political processes, divergent interests and knowledge, and intricate power 
relations with the policy space further complicate the transfer and adoption mechanisms.  
 
The focus of this thesis is therefore on the dynamics of the policy processes leading to the 
adoption of cash transfer policies in Kenya, with a focus on the mechanisms of transfer and the 
dynamics around adoption. Key themes of the study evolve around power relations, 
knowledge, ideas and structural approaches. The study is therefore relevant to a broad range of 
scholarship in developing parts of the world and in Kenya.  
 
1.2 Problem Definition and Research Questions 
Whilst there is a large body of research on the impacts of social protection programmes there 
have been few empirical investigations of the processes by which social protection policies 
have been transferred to developing countries (de Haan 2011). Questions arising from literature 
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on the transfer of the policies include those about the donor-driven nature of the policies 
(Howarth, 2010; Adésínà, 2011),  and the role of external agencies in the promotion of the 
policies in aid-dependent countries (Peck, 2011; Tambulasi, 2013; Güleç, 2014). In view of 
these questions, the thesis seeks to examine how international power structures conditioned the 
transfer and adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.  
Some studies on the adoption of policies emanating from transfer processes in Africa focus on 
structural forces and conditionalities as the main transfer mechanism. For instance, studies on 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) consider how international organisations, among 
others the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), pursued coercive instruments of conditionalities to enforce the ideas of 
the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and 1990s in developing countries (Jones, 2014; 
Gumede, 2017). Provision of aid and loans would be offered if and when governments accepted 
the stipulated prescriptions. The same mechanisms the international organisations employed to 
enforce market liberalisation and fiscal discipline persist today. This study demonstrates the 
use of similar mechanisms in the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya.   
Three broad bodies of research emerge in recent debates on social protection policies and cash 
transfer programmes. First are discussions focussed on structural pressures (Mkandawire, 
2010a; Adésínà, 2011; Abdulai, 2019) similar to those employed by international organisations 
during the era of SAPs. The argument is that international organisations imposed the adoption 
of cash transfer policies. Second are studies that argue that ideational mechanisms were the 
key variables facilitating the adoption of social protection policies. In these discussions, the 
adoption of cash transfers is considered to have been a result of norm-sharing where 
transnational actors used social learning approaches as the key mechanism  to shape the policy 
preferences of national policymakers (Foli, 2015). Third is the focus on national political 
settlements and domestic politics as explanatory variables and key determinants in the adoption 
of cash transfer programmes (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Wanyama 
and McCord, 2017; Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016). Here, attention shifts from the influence of 
international actors to domestic processes as the key accelerators to the adoption of cash 
transfers. An in-depth discussion of the explanatory variables is offered Chapter three of the 
thesis.  
While these frameworks are important in understanding the rapid uptake of cash transfer 
programmes in Africa, this study posits that the policy process is much more complicated and 
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cannot be explained with one variable without considering the multiple dynamics in the policy 
process. In addition, apart from the first body of knowledge which considers aspects of 
dominance of international organisations in the transfer process, the other two are silent on 
issues of power in the policymaking process. This study therefore discusses empirical evidence 
of the multiple mechanisms of policy transfer with consideration to power relations as they 
relate to the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya. 
This study seeks to examine the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya drawing from 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s policy transfer framework. Policy transfer encompasses ideas of policy 
diffusion, lesson-drawing and policy learning. Dolowitz and Marsh in their seminal work 
define policy transfer as the “… process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another 
political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344). Learning “occurs when policy-makers 
adjust their cognitive understanding of policy development and modify policy in the light of 
knowledge gained from past policy experience” (Stone, 2004, p. 548). Learning involves a 
transfer of norms and knowledge through ideational mechanisms, and while necessary for 
policy adoption, it is not sufficient  by itself to bring about change. Obinger, Schmitt and Starke 
(2013, p. 113), in quoting Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009, describe policy diffusion as a “process 
by which policy choices in one country affect the policy choices of other countries.” Policy 
diffusion involves processes where countries borrow policies from others in similar 
geographical spaces, leading to a convergence of similar policies. Convergence though is not 
often the result of diffusion. Recent convergence of social protection programmes in the form 
of cash transfer programmes for instance cannot be explained as an outcome of policy 
diffusion. Rather it is a consequence of structural determinants driven by the same global forces 
and  policy networks through either economic or ideational mechanisms leading to patterns of 
similar ideas across a geographical space (Stone, 2004). 
Previous studies employing policy transfer in Africa centred on public management to explain 
policy uptake and the implementation of structural adjustment prescriptions. In studies of social 
protection, recent studies consider policy diffusion in the spread of social pensions within 
Southern Africa. An example is the diffusion of social pensions in Lesotho (Granvik, 2015). 
By drawing on cash transfer programmes, this study seeks to extend the literature on social 
policy, social protection policies and cash transfers in Africa. Touted as the poverty reduction 
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strategy for the moment, cash transfers offer an ideal topic of study following their rapid 
expansion and adoption on the continent. The study however seeks to go beyond studies 
associated with the programmes as poverty reduction strategies. The study views the 
programmes within social policy studies and the broader context of social welfare instruments 
rather than their present conflation as social policy. Convergence of opinion among scholars 
indicates that international organisations have been at the forefront of driving the adoption of 
the policies through various mechanisms. In explaining the adoption of the two programmes in 
Kenya, this study therefore pays attention to the nexus of power, politics, knowledge, and 
structural determinants to explain the uptake of cash transfer policies and schemes in Kenya. 
The focus is on the role of international organisations within the national policy space. The 
study therefore seeks to examine the policy process within this dynamic interconnection of 
mechanisms using the case of two cash transfer schemes – Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) and Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). 
The main objective of this study is to examine the dynamics of adoption of cash transfer 
policies in Kenya from a policy transfer perspective. Kenya represents an early “adopter” of 
the policies with the implementation of the CT-OVC in 2004 followed by that of four other 
cash transfer programmes between 2007 and 2009. Besides being an early adopter, Kenya has 
had a long relationship with international organisations since independence with a large 
number of international organisations and non-governmental organisations having their 
regional hub in the capital city, Nairobi. Government partnership with financial institutions, 
including the IMF and the World Bank, spans an extended period cutting across many sectors, 
including poverty reduction strategies. Thus, this proximity to international organisations in 
relation to policymaking processes is worth studying as it shapes policymaking processes. 
Kenya continues to receive a huge amount of financial resources and the prevailing dependency 
on aid cannot be ignored when studying policy uptake. Governments with a reliance on 
financial aid often have few alternatives in the adoption of policies advocated by aid agencies. 
For aid dependent countries, structural pressures in policy transfer processes cannot be ignored. 
Coupled with the persistent poverty characteristic of many African countries and with the 
increased focus on poverty highlighted by the Poverty Reduction Strategies programmes, 
Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals, Kenya provides 
an archetype for understanding policymaking for poverty reduction. In addition to these factors, 
political processes shape policymaking and with Kenya having transitioned to a new political 
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dispensation since 2010, the political influences on policy uptake are worth examining. Bearing 
in mind these factors, Kenya provides an ideal case for studying social protection policy uptake. 
The following objectives and research questions guided the study:  
 
1.2.1 Research Objectives 
a) Investigate the role of actors, ideas, incentives and interests in the development and 
promotion of the CT-OVC and HSNP as social protection instruments in Kenya.  
b) Analyse the context – institutional, social, political and economic factors mediating the 
policy transfer process. 
 
To adequately achieve the objectives, the study was guided by the following research 
questions: 
1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and 
adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP?  
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained 
the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya?  
3. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer 
programmes in Kenya?  
 
1.3 Scholarly Context of the Study 
Social Policy Studies 
Recent interest in studies of social policy in Africa by scholars across the globe provides the 
basis for the literature from which this study draws. With the persistence of poverty, despite 
various global and domestic initiatives, the adoption of social protection policies in Africa has 
created new interest in studies of social welfare and social policy in general. Though studies 
have centred on the impact and technical aspects of programmes, recent research, albeit not 
numerous, seeks to situate the programmes within the wider debate on social policy and welfare 
regimes. This study situates cash transfer programmes within the idea of transformative social 
policy, where social policy is envisaged broadly with the functions of enhancing “production, 
protection, reproduction, redistribution and social cohesion or nation building”  (Adésínà, 
2011, p. 455). The literature focuses on understanding broader social policy in developing 
countries.  
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Policy Studies 
By drawing from literature on policy studies, the research situates itself within two themes: 
policy transfer and policymaking processes, and related literature. Debates on policy transfer 
have focussed on voluntary mechanisms as the basis of transfer, and north to north learning 
with little focus on policy transfer in developing countries and among developing countries 
themselves. Policy transfer in this study draws from various literature, including but not limited 
to mechanisms of transfer, agency of actors, incentives, power, ideas and institutions in the 
policy space (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Weyland, 2007; Béland, 2009; Marsh and Sharman, 
2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2012; Kingdon, 2013). However, studies 
on the politics of social policymaking in Africa remains scant. Studies on political processes 
in policymaking processes are limited too. With the resurgence of poverty reduction and new 
focus on social protection policies as tools for poverty reduction, recent debate is emerging 
focussed on the politics of policymaking of social policy and social protection. The current 
literature on social protection uptake and social policymaking processes focuses on the 
neopatrimonialism in African states and political settlements as key determinants for uptake 
(see Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Lavers, 2016; Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 
2017). However, these views do not constitute sufficient explanations of the politics of 
policymaking and social protection uptake in Africa.  
 
A number of important contributions have been made recently in studying the role of 
international organisations - a factor that remains dominant in policymaking in Africa. While 
social protection programmes emanated from the South, specifically from Latin America, and 
transferred to developing countries in Africa, the agents of transfer are international 
organisations and epistemic communities. The study therefore is situated within international 
relations studies as it examines the roles of international organisations and transnational actors 
within the policy space in view of existing social relations and power relations. The present 
research builds upon studies of the role of international organisations in policymaking. We 
examine various mechanisms, including coercion and voluntary processes, and the persisting 
influence of international organisations in public and social policy. A number of research 
studies make a contribution to understanding the uptake of various social and public policy in 
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developing countries (Kpessa, 2010; Tambulasi, 2013; Güleç, 2014; Foli, 2015) and it is from 
this literature among others that this study draws.  
 
1.4 Contribution of the Thesis 
The thesis makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing literature. 
Besides situating the study of social policy in Africa into global welfare literature, the thesis 
contributes to literature on social protection and policy transfer. First, existing literature 
explains the adoption of social protection policies from a political settlement approach and 
therefore as driven by national interests. I provide an alternative integrated explanation 
demonstrating that the adoption of cash transfer policies in developing countries was 
underpinned by power, based on asymmetrical relations between the promoters and the 
adopting country. This analysis recognises voluntary mechanisms of policy change and social 
learning but illustrates that even voluntary mechanisms can be imbued by power and soft 
coercion. As I will demonstrate in this thesis, even when international organisations used 
ideational mechanisms and social learning, there were underlying aspects of power through a 
discursive hegemony based on who produced the knowledge and how it shaped the preferences 
of domestic actors.  
Second, this study contributes to the theoretical study of policy transfer in Africa. Through the 
employment of policy transfer in social policy I demonstrate that as depicted by Dolowitz and 
Marsh in their theoretical framework, international organisations used a combination of 
mechanisms in policy transfer. I demonstrate that it is difficult to achieve policy transfer 
through one mechanism. Mechanisms of transfer, ranging from voluntary to coercive, are often 
intertwined, making it difficult to neatly separate them from each other. It is difficult to explain 
policy transfer based on one variable as there are multiple variables at play concurrently. 
Finally, the thesis contributes to literature on social policy in Kenya. The case studies of the 
CT-OVC and HSNP have generated data and information which relate to policymaking 
processes in Kenya in light of transnational influence. External influence is demonstrated by 
historicising social policy choices since independence. Second, the research forms part of 
studies that consider the process, dynamics and the politics of social protection adoption in 
Kenya within policy transfer studies. In addition, the study contributes to the broad study of 
social policy by situating cash transfers within the current discourse on social protection in 
Kenya and on the continent.  
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1.5 General Background of Social Protection in Kenya  
Implementation of cash transfer schemes in Kenya began in 2004 with the CT-OVC 
programme. Following on this, four other programmes – the Older Persons Cash Transfer 
(OPCT), the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), Persons with Severe Disability Cash 
Transfer Programme (PWSD-CT) and the Urban Food Subsidy (UFS)– were started by the 
Government of Kenya and international organisations. The Urban Food Subsidy has since been 
discontinued. Following the uncoordinated process of adoption and implementation, the 
government with international organisations developed the National Safety Net Programme in 
2013, as an initiative bringing the four cash transfer programmes under one umbrella to 
improve and enhance interventions. Set out as a coordination body, the National Safety Net 
Programme (NSNP) aims to harmonise and bring coherence to the programmes to “increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of the programmes ……. under one common framework” 
(Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. iii). Accordingly, the NSNP is described as:  
A mechanism to (i) coordinate fragmented programming; (ii) strengthen 
implementation systems; and (iii) finance the scaling of these [sic] programmes to 
ensure greater coverage (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. v). 
The implementation of the various cash transfers schemes began before policy development. 
However, the programmes are aligned with the National Social Protection Policy and the 
Constitution upon which they draw their mandate. The “Constitution aims to move Kenya 
towards a more equitable and inclusive future” (Government of Kenya, 2016b, p. 1). 
Specifically, Article 43(1)e states; “every person has a right to social security …. [and] the 
state shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves 
and their dependents” (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31). The operationalisation of this 
section of the Constitution is provided for, from among others, the implementation of the four 
cash transfer programmes.  
 
1.5.1 General Background of the CT-OVC  
UNICEF, in partnership with the Ministry of Home Affairs, started the CT-OVC programme 
in 2004 to respond to increased child vulnerability brought about by HIV and AIDS, rising 
orphanhood and a breakdown of family support structures (Bosworth et al., 2016). The broad 
objective of the CT-OVC was retention of children in their communities with the specific 
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objectives of enhancing health and educational outcomes through provision of monthly cash 
payments to households taking care of orphans. Equally, the programme is a response to 
persistent poverty among orphaned and vulnerable children which was at 54.1% against the 
national average of 46.6% (Government of Kenya, 2007b).  
 
The growth of the CT-OVC scheme is envisaged in three phases. In the first phase (2004-2006) 
described as the pre-pilot phase, UNICEF financed the programme through its own funding 
and financing from the Swedish International Development Agency in three locations to 500 
households receiving KES 500 (USD 6) per month (Bosworth et al., 2016). The second phase 
of the programme (2007-2009), involved setting up technical structures for implementation 
and a gradual increase in numbers of beneficiary households following increased financing 
from the World Bank, Department for International Development (DFID) and Government of 
Kenya (GOK). The period involves intense training for government officials within the 
implementing ministries and the Ministries of Finance and Planning, and contact with the 
political class leading to “political acceptability” of the programme. The current phase, from 
2009 to present, has involved the expansion of the programme following increased government 
spending on social protection programmes, and a World Bank credit facility to GOK.   
 
Out of 8,767,954 households in the Kenya the current reach for the CT-OVC is 240,000 
households in all the 47 counties in Kenya (World Bank, 2015a) representing 2.7 per cent of 
the households. Management of the programme is by the Department of Children’s Services in 
the Ministry of Labour and East African Affairs. The CT-OVC programme currently 
constitutes the largest cash transfer programme in geographical and beneficiary reach and 
represents the highest national expenditure on cash transfers. In the 2015/2016 fiscal year 
Government of Kenya financing towards the programme was KES 9 billion (USD 83.8 
million), representing 0.4 per cent of total government expenditure in the fiscal year   
(Government of Kenya, 2015b).  
 
1.5.2 General Background of the HSNP 
The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) started in 2008 following a bilateral agreement 
between the Government of Kenya and the UK Government with the aim of reducing poverty 
in Northern Kenya by delivering cash transfers to households in four counties – Mandera, 
Wajir, Turkana and Marsabit (Government of Kenya, 2012). The unconditional social 
protection programme is poverty-targeted to the poorest and the most vulnerable in these four 
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counties. Drought and famine exacerbate chronic poverty levels which stand at 94% in Turkana 
and Marsabit, 88% in Mandera, and 84% in Wajir (Government of Kenya, 2007a).  
  
The programme is managed through the Programme Implementation and Learning Unit 
situated within the National Drought Management Authority under the Ministry of Devolution 
and Planning and delivered by contracted service providers. The current programme reach for 
the HSNP in the four counties is approximately 100,000 households out of 394,203 households 
in the 4 counties. The programme therefore covers about 25% of the households in the 4 
counties  (Government of Kenya, 2016b). The DFID constitutes the largest financier with other 
funding coming from the Government of Kenya and the Australian Department for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. While the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) funding 
grant for the programme is £85.59 million for 10 years to 2017 (DFID, 2013), government 
funding and ownership has been minimal, though this is changing with 2016 budgetary 
allocation at KES 1.4 billion (Government of Kenya, 2016a) – less than 0.1% of government 
expenditure in the financial year  .  
 
One of the objectives of the HSNP is to “implement a scaled-up, integrated, effective, 
government-led and financed safety net programme” (PILU and NDMA, 2018, p. 1). The 
programme aims at improving the welfare and the social economic indicators among 
households in the targeted districts. In addition, it seeks to build resilience in the communities 
and among households to cope with shocks.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This study focused on social policy and social protection and in particular the process of 
transfer and adoption of cash transfer policies in Kenya. This chapter has introduced and 
provided the background information on the research, and laid out the rationale of the study 
and the problem statement of the research.  
 
Following the introduction, Chapter two presents a review of literature informing the study. 
This chapter is a review of literature on global social welfare and social policy formation, as 
well as a review of trends and influences on social policy in Africa and the genealogy of cash 
transfer and its rise within social policy. In Chapter three I review the recent theoretical 
perspectives explaining the current adoption of social protection and cash transfer policies. The 
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chapter goes further and highlights the limitations of the approaches. Reviewing the different 
approaches helps to situate this study within the existing approaches. In this chapter, I explain 
the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding this, drawing from policy transfer and power 
perspectives.  
 
Chapter four outlines the methodology employed in the study by drawing on a social 
constructivist approach to explaining the transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. 
Studies related to policy transfer are dominated by positivist approaches with large “N” and in 
studies where case studies are adopted, one case is often employed in explaining policy 
transfer. However, this study research draws on the study of multiple cash programmes to 
maximise the explanations of policy transfer. 
 
In Chapter five I provide a history of social policy in Kenya. This chapter probes Kenya’s post-
independence social policy choices as taken by the post-independence Government of Kenya. 
In this discussion, three determinants are examined: the persistent colonial legacy, market-
driven development model, and the influence of international organisations. In this chapter I 
discuss the political context which has determined social policy options in Kenya since 
independence. The persistent nature of the three determinants is discussed within the periods 
of economic and political change. The chapter demonstrates the effect of the three influences 
through the four post-independence political regimes as demonstrated through the oscillation 
of government support towards social policy.  
 
In Chapter six, I examine how different social actors exercised power within the social 
protection policy arena to influence the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. The 
conclusion is that power deriving from the asymmetrical resource base of the international 
organisations underpinned the uptake of the programmes. In addition, in the chapter, I 
demonstrate that domestic actors in their agency reacted to and resisted the exercise of power 
by international organisations to some extent.  
 
Building on this analysis of power relations, in Chapter seven, I examine ideational 
mechanisms and social learning as key mechanisms of influencing preferences and beliefs in 
the policy transfer process. The chapter goes beyond explanations of the key mechanisms, and 
discusses how proponents of cash transfers created a discursive hegemony based on how 
knowledge was produced, by whom and for what purposes. In addition, the chapter considers 
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how knowledge and learning was made powerful through social re-construction of populations 
groups, and the power of policy narratives.  
 
In Chapter eight is an examination of financing as a structural mechanism in the policy transfer 
process. I demonstrate how international organisations catalysed the adoption of the two 
programmes through financing of pilot programmes to drive up their adoption. The chapter 
also examines the Programme for Results (P4R) model adopted by donors in financing social 
protection in Kenya as a soft coercive mechanism aimed at incentivising the government to 
increase financing for the programmes.  
 
Chapter nine considers the role of national institutions and domestic politics as facilitative and 
mediating factors in the adoption process. The analysis highlights domestic contextual social, 
political and economic factors facilitating the adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP. In doing 
so, the chapter shows the critical junctures and the windows of opportunity that international 
organisations capitalised upon in the policy transfer process. In the chapter I highlight how 
promoters of cash transfers policies manipulated and sometimes created opportunities to align 
their agenda to new or existing processes. In addition, there is a discussion on the constraining 
factors to adoption and expansion.  
 
Following this is the concluding chapter where I present the conclusions and the policy 
implications that emerge from the study. The chapter highlights the gaps in the research and 
offers suggestions upon which studies on social protection and policy transfer may be based.  
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CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE AND CASH TRANSFERS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As one of its objectives, this study sought to establish the change in the social policy regime of 
Kenya following the adoption of cash transfer schemes. For this reason, it was necessary to go 
beyond a review of the current knowledge and literature on policy transfer as the theoretical 
foundations for the study, but also to survey the literature on the history of the welfare states 
and on social policy and development in Africa. To this end, literature review focussed on two 
major areas: firstly on the emergence of social policy and the history of welfare states in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and secondly 
on the historical ideology behind the idea of cash transfers and the rise of cash transfers in 
developing countries in particular across Africa. The literature on social policy and welfare 
states provides an understanding of the global and domestic context of social protection and 
social provisioning. In addition, review of literature provides a conceptual clarification of 
terms, thereby situating cash transfers within the social protection discourse and subsequently, 
social policy.  
 
Part of this chapter has been published as: Ouma, M. and Adésínà, J. (2018) ‘Solutions, 
exclusion and influence: Exploring power relations in the adoption of social protection policies 
in Kenya’, Critical Social Policy, pp. 1–20. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: First is the historical background of the development of 
welfare states in Europe. Then is a discussion of social policy in post-independence Africa. 
The section traces the historical development of social policy to establish the impetus and 
imperatives that led to their growth, dismantling and changes. Further, the section provides a 
background to Africa’s attempt at building welfare states after independence. Here, I situate 
the discussions on social protection and cash transfers within the broader social development 
debates. This is followed by a section tracing the neo-liberal ideology behind cash transfers. 
The historical analysis aims at situating cash transfers within the current social protection 
paradigm and largely provides evidence of how ideas become hegemonic and are 
transnationalised beyond their sites of origin. In addition, the historical tracing of the idea aims 
to demonstrate cash transfers as a neo-liberal agenda that departs from the philosophical ideas 
espoused by earlier welfare regimes, particularly in Nordic countries. The following section 
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examines the rapid rise of cash transfers in the social protection agenda in Africa over the last 
two decades. Here I attribute the adoption of cash transfers to international agencies and I 
discuss from literature criticisms proffered by scholars on the current social protection agenda. 
I conclude the chapter by providing an assessment of literature on an alternative paradigm to 
the cash transfer agenda in the form of transformative social policy.  
 
2.2 History of Welfare States in Europe 
Several authors have attempted to define the various terms and concepts related to social policy 
and social welfare. With the emergence of other terms, such as social protection and cash 
transfers, the landscape becomes confusing conceptually, and consequently in practice. Social 
policy is defined as “collective public efforts aimed at affecting and protecting the social 
wellbeing of people in a given territory” (Adésínà, 2009, p. S38). Meanwhile, Alcock et al. 
describe a welfare state as “… one that comprises income maintenance and social security, 
health policy and services, and personal social services, education and training policy and 
employment and housing policy”  (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000, p. 1). The development 
of welfare states aimed to help mitigate the effects of market forces “by guaranteeing 
individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of market values, by minimising the 
extent of insecurity, by enabling individuals and households to meet social risks and 
contingencies like sickness, old age and unemployment and by ensuring that all citizens 
regardless of state are offered the best standard available of social services” (Briggs, 1961, p. 
288). 
Going beyond the conceptual definition of terms, Titmuss (1974) provides a description of 
three “contrasting models or functions of social policy.” First is the “residual welfare model of 
social policy.” In this model, emphasis is placed upon the market and family and kin as the key 
providers for social policy benefits. Government intervention is provided only when there is 
failure of the market and family. Government support is therefore often temporary, serving as 
a safety net until the person is able to get back on his/her feet (Titmuss, 1974). Support in this 
case is likely to be highly targeted and aimed at the “deserving poor”. In the second model 
which he refers to as the industrial achievement-performance model, social benefits are related 
and fixed to one’s productivity, employment and performance in the market place. Those in 
the informal sector and the jobless therefore face exclusion based on the prescriptions of the 
model. Last is the institutional redistributive model where social welfare is considered part of 
the society, is universalistic and grounded on the norms of solidarity and social equality.  
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Current discussion on social policy focusses on government investment in terms of budgetary 
allocation to categorise welfare states. A look at the current classification of social policy 
provisioning in Africa reveals this fixation with measurements based on expenditure on cash 
transfer programmes. However, as Esping-Andersen notes, when considering welfare states, 
government commitment ought to go beyond expenditure as the parameter for measurement of 
its commitment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In his typology of welfare regimes, he makes three 
classifications of northern states based on the principles of rights and stratification. Similar to 
Titmuss’ residual welfare model are the liberal welfare states which are marked by inadequate 
means-tested benefits. Often this leads to stigmatisation of those receiving the benefits. 
Essentially, through the residual model, the state encourages market provision. Second is the 
corporatist welfare states, which comprise regimes that were mostly shaped by provision from 
the church. Rights and benefits are attached to class and status. The state only intervenes when 
the family’s capacity to provide failed. In such welfare regimes, preservation of family values 
was paramount and therefore there was exclusion of non-working wives. Family benefits were 
provided to encourage motherhood. Esping-Andersen’s third classification in the typology is 
the social-democratic welfare states typical of Scandinavian countries. Welfare here is 
provided on a universal basis with the universal insurance benefits graduated according to 
one’s earnings. The model promotes solidarity and since all benefit, all feel obliged to pay. 
This model has however faced the criticism of crowding out markets. 
Welfare states in European countries have their origin before World War 1. Rapid 
unprecedented and consensual growth occurred in the post-war period following the expansion 
of democracies (Korpi, 2006). Literature shows four main approaches to explain welfare state 
development in the North. First is the theory that focuses on economic development and 
industrialisation. As the model suggests, capitalist development produced certain forms of 
social policy (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). According to accounts, due 
to movement of people, the need to provide social provision arose, leading to the creation and 
the development of the welfare state. The early welfare state was therefore functionalist and an 
outcome of the “needs” of industrial society, with economic development and the changes in 
demographics and organisations prompting government to respond to growing social needs 
(Huber and Stephens, 2012; Schmitt et al., 2015). Governments needed to respond to growing 
social needs. In quoting critical scholars, (Tillin and Duckett, 2017, p. 256) indicate that  that 
social policy in the North came as a “corrective to economic dislocations, rather than as a form 
of collective public action to improve well-being.” 
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Second is the approach which perceives the development of the welfare state as emanating out 
of class struggles and political mobilisation (Korpi, 1985; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1986; 
Huber and Stephens, 2012). Drawing from power resources theory, proponents of this approach 
contend that redistribution is a function of working-class mobilisation and the more the 
working class organises, in other words, the more political resources they can accumulate, the 
more generous and extensive the welfare state will become (Korpi, 2006). With the advent of 
democracy in Europe, workers were able to organise and make demands on the state. The 
welfare state therefore emerged from democratic class struggle as trade unions, interest groups 
and left-wing parties sought to influence policy (Schmitt et al., 2015). This approach identifies 
the distribution of power based on organisation or property between labour organisations and 
“left parties on the one hand, and centre and right-wing political forces on the other as the 
primary determinants of the differences in the size and distributive impact to the welfare state 
across countries” (Huber and Stephens, 2012, p. 14). Welfare policy development arises out of 
“the struggle between different classes over who stands to benefit from welfare policies” 
(Ulriksen, 2012, p. 1486), thereby producing a distinct set of choices about social policy. The 
power resources theory ties in with the Marxist approach, where welfare states developed partly 
to head off revolution or instability caused by mass revolt as the working class demanded more 
rights (Rothstein, Samanni and Teorell, 2012). The theory is useful as it provides an 
explanation for the variation of systems of social protection across similar industrialised 
economies (Ibid).  
 
The third explanation derives from the nature of political institutions (Tillin and Pereira, 2017). 
Explanations on the welfare states by institutionalists focus on the role of democratic political 
institutions in fostering the growth of the welfare state. Institutions include electoral systems, 
plural party systems, executive and legislative relations, and the judiciary and government 
structure which produce sequencing and path dependency tendencies (Chandhoke, 2005). 
Though formal institutions of democracy, including “free and competitive elections, are 
necessary, they are not sufficient conditions to generate enough pressure for redistribution” 
(Myles and Quadagno, 2002, p. 37). Pressure groups like trade unions and citizen movements 
through their disruptive power are the key force of change (Mati, 2013b).The final explanation 
sees the growth of welfare states arising out of international influences as a result of diffusion 
and transfer, with countries emulating or learning from other countries (Schmitt et al., 2015).  
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2.2.1 Explaining Variation in Welfare States 
In Germany, the Bismarckian reforms of the 1880s represented an early model for social 
insurance and security (Briggs, 1961). The reforms required mandatory insurance against 
sickness and calamities, provision of a pension upon retirement and in cases of disability. 
Before this period, provision of social protection was through voluntary associations, kin, 
churches and guilds (Schmitt et al., 2015). The Bismarckian system and social protection was 
based on the conservative corporations’ type of welfare capitalisms with the “main aim and 
emphasis to provide job and income security for male workers” (Palier and Martin, 2007, p. 
536). The pensions systems were based on intergenerational transfers, relying exclusively on a 
pay-as-you-go system, meaning benefits were tied to employment (Bonoli and Palier, 2007). 
Security was the main focus of the Bismarckian model, rather than poverty alleviation, and 
therefore this model was lacking in norms related to equality. For this reason, social insurance 
provision played a lesser role in “economic and political concerns, rather than placing 
importance on the concept of social right and equity” (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, 
p. 53). Bismarckian models were therefore based on industrialisation with the level of social 
protection dependent on one’s employment situation. The social security scheme in Germany 
created immense interest among other European countries, leading to diffusion where similar 
reforms were adapted in Denmark, prompting the early formation of welfare state building in 
the Nordic countries. In examining social security legislation between 1820 to 2013, (Schmitt 
et al., 2015) find that in the 19th century the role of the state in providing welfare had started to 
emerge in developed countries and by the 20th century as a core task of emerging nations.  
 
Uptake and the spread of social security was however slow. By the 19th century, welfare in the 
form of universal provisions in Europe was provided to only a few needy people. In Britain 
social provision was based on the Poor Law, administered by parishes and provided on the 
basis of need with a distinction between the deserving and underserving poor. The Poor Law 
intended to encourage work and discourage dependency. Pursuant to that, it employed stringent 
targeting criteria (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000). By the 20th century there was a shift in 
the attitude towards poverty. Based on poverty surveys by Booth and Rowntree, the economic 
logic of the British Poor Law of 1834 was disputed as being impractical to implement in 
democratic societies, and on the basis that the poor were not poor as a result of their own fault 
but due to social and market factors (Briggs, 1961). Moreover, “the Poor Law treated the claims 
of the poor not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen but as an alternative to it” (Marshall, 
2014, p. 33). In 1909, the government in Britain introduced non-contributory pensions targeting 
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those aged 70 and older and later on social insurance based on a tripartite arrangement between 
workers, the employer and the state (Alcock, Payne and Sullivan, 2000). The period between 
the first and the second world wars provided room for the growth of the welfare state, 
particularly in Britain where destitution and poverty had become prevalent. The Beveridge 
Report of 1942 was influential in the formation of the British welfare regime as it advocated 
universalism of social policy (Beveridge, 1942). The thrust of the report was a recommendation 
to the government to tackle the five giants: “want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness”, 
and called for adequate income, health care, education, housing and employment.  
 
While acknowledging the importance of social insurance, the report highlighted that “social 
insurance was only one part of a comprehensive policy of social progress” (Beveridge, 1942). 
Though social insurance may provide income security, it could only address the aspect of 
“want” but not the other four giants. The way to freedom from “want”, according to the report, 
included the improvement of state insurance to mitigate interruption and loss of earning power 
due to old age or disability, adjustment of income to smooth consumption, and in terms of child 
allowances, among other benefits. The plan proposed to cover all citizens with regard to 
consideration to the different cycles of life with the objective to protect all individuals from all 
social risks. In addition, the plan envisaged the state as the centre in social policy provision.  
 
Compared to the other countries in the North, Nordic countries are considered later adopters of 
social policy, as the social-democratic welfare state took off post-industrial era (Palier and 
Martin, 2007; Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009). Even though initial forms of the welfare 
model were borrowed from the Bismarckian model, the state remained a player in expanding  
social welfare provisions in the Nordic countries (Kuhnle, 2011). The Nordic welfare regime 
is a political construction whose successful development is attributed to the policies of the 
social democrats. Within the social-democratic welfare state, it was the “coalition of the social-
democratic party and working class” which led to the development of social policy (Kwon, 
Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, p. S3). The form of welfare state adopted was characterised by 
inclusivity. Though the Nordic welfare states were selective at the beginning with minimum  
“coverage because of the emphasis on economic development”, with the need to industrialise, 
“soon social policy became couched in universalism and democratic governance” (Kwon, 
Mkandawire and Palme, 2009, p. S9).  
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Shaped by the ideas of Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish welfare model was built on the 
construction of social policy as an investment and not a cost, thereby providing the imperative 
for government to finance economic support to families and households through cash transfers 
and other policies. Myrdal coined the term “productive social policy”, where social policy was 
valued as an avenue to increase production (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The Swedish model 
aimed at universal social and economic security, and access to education and healthcare for all. 
The Nordic model paid equal attention and emphasis to both social policy and economic 
development. An advantage the Nordic countries had as late industrialisers was the benefit of 
learning from those who had gone before them. Indicative of most of the countries in Europe, 
especially the Scandinavian countries, was the commitment to provision of broad-based social 
protection measures aimed at production and redistribution. 
 
Changes have occurred over the years to the Bismarckian model with incremental and 
progressive reforms. Some of these changes relate to governments’ adoption of non-
contributory pensions and voluntary private pension funds. Most of these reforms have not 
been abrupt but have involved negotiation with social partners. In European democracies, due 
to the nature of welfare state development, welfare state programmes have strengthened citizen 
loyalty to national institutions, enhancing bottom-up legitimacy. Welfare programmes have 
operated as anchors that political institutions have used to secure allegiance (Ferrera, 2005), 
thereby bringing about socio-political stabilisation.  
 
Though different countries in Europe have taken different times and paths in adoption of social 
protection benefits, social pensions represent the most common form of provision in terms of 
coverage. In their empirical work, Schmitt et al. (2015) find that the adoption of social 
protection in both the North and South is a result of diffusion through transnational forces – 
witnessed a convergence of social protection schemes in the same region, though timing and 
scope vary. In Latin American countries, theoretical approaches explaining the growth of 
welfare states include elite responses as a result of pressures from politically influential or 
militant groups. As electoral competition increased following democratisation, the political 
elite’s response to the pressures reflected elite attempts to co-opt and integrate previously 
exempted groups. In Latin American countries several factors led to improvement of social 
welfare, including a militant labour movement, mobilisational activities of the leftist political 
parties and a functioning electoral system, together with welfare capitalism (Teichman, 2008; 
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Tillin and Pereira, 2017). In growing democracies new social programmes may be driven by 
electoral impetus. In the next section, I consider attempts at welfare state building in Africa. 
 
2.3 Historical Perspective on Social Policy Choices in Africa 
Contemporary social policy in Africa needs to be studied within the historical perspectives that 
have shaped it. The colonial heritage has been significant in shaping the nature of social policy 
in Africa. The different social policy periods, colonial, pre-independence and present, as 
Mkandawire points out, have been “… shaped by ideas, interests, path dependence and 
international norms” (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 592). This is unlike Europe, where the welfare 
state emerged as a drive from trade unions and political parties representing the “working class, 
middle class and in some cases rural populations demanding redistribution” (Lavers and 
Hickey, 2016, p. 4), social policymaking in Africa has been largely determined by exogenous 
factors. The exception is the period after independence when social policy was led by the 
imperatives of a better life for all as governments endeavoured to extend social development 
to previously excluded Africans. 
Social protection is not new to Africa. Though touted as a new concept in global policies, the 
practice has been evident across the continent. Through mutual support and informal 
mechanisms, Africans have practiced social protection activities based on the normative values 
of altruism, reciprocity and solidarity, with kinship and family constituting the main sources 
of support (Surender, 2013). Across Africa, there existed and still exist informal mechanisms 
of social protection which include funeral and burial societies, taking in of orphans and 
communal ploughing to ensure that all are adequately protected from idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks. Such mechanisms ensure material and economic provision for all, including 
the poor and vulnerable. However, there has been little systematic recording of these forms of 
traditional social protection. Myrdal (1981) extends the thought, stating that there was little 
attempt at studying or gathering data to understand what counted as important in the African 
way of life. Unfortunately, some of the traditional mechanisms of social protection have been 
eroded due to globalisation, breakdown of the family structure and urbanisation. Osei-Hwedie 
(1998, p. 6) conceptualises social policies “as formal and informal rule and guidelines 
underlying the organised efforts of society to meet the need of its members and ameliorate the 
problems confronting them on individual, group and community bases.” From this definition, 
one can infer that social policy existed in all societies and in Africa before colonialism. Social 
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policy and social provision then recognised “individual needs as part of wider societal needs”, 
unlike the current paradigm steeped in individualism and individual rights (Lavinas, 2013). 
Individualism as a criterion for provision was minimum as “kinship ties and networks provided 
strong bases for social provisioning” (Osei-Hwedie, 1998, p. 6). 
Noticeable growth of poverty started during the colonial period, a factor that Bevan attributes 
partly to the movement into cities by able-bodied men for work (forced or wage labour) and 
the introduction of cash and markets (Bevan, 2004). During this period, state provision was 
meant to address the needs of the colonisers; it was therefore characterised by discrimination 
and exclusions (Aina, 2004). Social policy provisions for the colonised, in terms of education 
and health, were provided by missionaries and religious institutions. These were the first 
institutionalised groups providing care for those unable to fend for themselves. No distinctions 
were made of the deserving and undeserving poor. Investments aimed at improving the 
economic status of the Africans during this period was minimal as the colonial government 
regarded the native population as inferior (Myrdal, 1967). There was a lack of deliberate 
investment aimed at improving the economic status of Africans by the colonial regime. Due to 
industrialisation and migration to urban areas for labour, initial forms of formal social security 
(borrowed from Britain) based on employment, started to emerge (Bevan, 2004). Social 
security was later extended to Africans after independence though the social insurance 
provision in the form of pension, which favoured the relatively small population in formal 
private employment (Brooks, 2015).  
Drawing from the periodisation provided by Shivji (2009), the growth of social development 
in Africa post-independence can be divided into three stages: first, the age of developmentalism 
(1960-1970), when “development was a process of class struggle” (Shivji, 2009, p. 7); second, 
Africa’s lost decade in the 1980s, when the neo-liberal agenda determined the social policy 
demands and preferences for countries across Africa, and third, the current dispensation, which 
he terms the age of globalisation. After independence, African countries adopted what could 
be interpreted as welfare developmentalism as they sought to change the conditions created 
under colonialism (Osei-Hwedie, 1998; Adésínà, 2009; Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009; 
Shivji, 2009). This followed a period of European rule where almost all economic and social 
activities benefitted a small non-indigenous group of people (Osei-Hwedie, 1998). Various 
imperatives led to the form of developmentalist states adopted, but most paramount was the 
link to the struggle for independence as “an assertion or the humanness of the African people” 
  
 
23 
(Shivji, 2009, p. 2). In terms of the ideological orientation towards provision, “African 
socialisms” emphasised the equality of all people, promoted “equality of access to resources 
and opportunities with structural transformation based on the notions of social justice and 
egalitarian redistribution” (Osei-Hwedie, 1998, p. 10). During the period there was modest 
growth in African economies. The investment translated into the expansion of primary and 
secondary schools, introduction of tertiary education and improvement in medical and health 
statistics marking a period of improvement for many Africans (Osei-Hwedie, 1998). Among 
other imperatives was the need for national development to fulfil expectations, which involved 
the double tasks of developing the economy and building the nation (Shivji, 2009). But Cheru 
(1992) argues that the post-independence development model was not a departure from the 
colonial development model but that the “age of developmentalism” was characterised by 
developmental concerns, top-down and statist social development practices (Cheru, 1992; 
Shivji, 2009).  
Post-independence social policy in Africa was state-led and anchored on the norms of nation-
building and solidarity (Aina, 2004; Garba, 2007; Adésínà, 2009). Illustrating from the case of 
Ghana, Tanzania and Western Nigeria, Adésínà (2015) validates the deliberate trajectory 
adopted towards economic and social development, albeit following different development 
models. In Western Nigeria, for example, a combined route of agriculture and an industrial 
development model was adopted while Tanzania’s path hinged on Ujamaa, a “peasant-based” 
development strategy (Adésínà, 2015). Through most post-independence countries, the period 
was marked by deliberate state-funded investment in social subsidies and social programmes 
like education and health (Aina, 2004; Chachage, 2007) based on values of equity and people-
centeredness (Garba, 2007). Guided by a genuine desire to improve the social welfare of 
citizens and promote social cohesion, social expenditure grew especially towards education. 
As a result, there was marked growth in the sector as education was perceived to enhance social 
and economic growth and a personal avenue for getting out of poverty. Investments in health 
paid off by drops in levels of mortality and increased literacy levels (Chachage, 2007; Adésínà, 
2009). 
The period was however short-lived as the political elite started draining surplus from the 
peasants as the state became a site of accumulation with state power used for private 
accumulation – a regressive and destructive policy pursued by the ruling African elite (Mafeje, 
1997; Fanon, 2005). But as argued elsewhere, the view that ‘bad policies’ by African leaders 
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led to the deterioration of development including human development outcomes like health, 
literacy and mortality needs to be juxtaposed within the global context of the rise of capitalism, 
and external shocks arising from unfair trading practices (Arrighi, 2002). Moreover, the 
development period was interrupted by structural adjustment programme and political 
mismanagement of power, leading to an oscillation of the state’s role in economic and social 
development for the next four decades (Kwon, Mkandawire and Palme, 2009). 
In the 1980s, the dualism between economic development and social development began to 
emerge as government and international funding was channelled towards infrastructural 
development. The international financial institutions (IFIs) forced governments to adopt the 
recommendations of the Washington Consensus, focussed on effecting liberalisation of 
markets, adoption of macro-economic policies and rolling back the role of government. 
Expenditure in social policy began to drop. Structural adjustment policies, promoted  by the 
IMF and World Bank, aimed at restoring macro-economic balance were presented as urgent 
and inevitable (Diagne, 2011). First to be targeted for retrenchment were state-led social 
provisions considered wasteful, requiring governments to cut down in line with the adjustment 
prescriptions (Aina, 2004). By the 1980s, state financing for health and education significantly 
reduced to comply with Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) conditions. To further 
make the case for cuts in social spending, it was argued that Western countries had established 
their welfare states at a higher level of economic development which developing countries had 
not attained yet. The urgency was for governments to grow their economic base before 
investing in social development.  
As expenditure in social policy shrunk, some interventions were altogether abandoned 
(Mkandawire, 2013) as countries forged ahead to attain “economic development”. But as 
Myrdal (1974, p. 729) postulates, development is “the movement upward of the entire social 
system”, therefore the social system encompasses the economic and all non-economic factors 
(including consumption through education and health). Consequently, the failure to invest in 
what is considered non-economic domains affects the whole system and may lead to stagnation 
of development and growth. Mkandawire (2011) in addition argues that economic and social 
development are inseparable and therefore the failure to invest in one ultimately impacts on the 
other.  
SAPs basically required governments to limit their direct participation in provision of social 
services and instead encourage market forces to play a bigger role. SAPs led to the loss of a 
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long-term perspective of social development in particular. A result of SAPs was that social 
services – “education, health, nutrition, rates of literacy and life expectancy” – declined 
(Adésínà, 2009; Shivji, 2009) as national liberation ideologies were rubbished (Shivji, 2009). 
Poverty numbers rose and poverty deepened as the poor could not afford to pay for basic 
services (Adésínà, 2009; Surender, 2013). The retrenchments in social spending coupled with 
the political trajectory – one-party, authoritarian, clientelistic politics – adopted by some 
nationalists states led to disintegration in development in a number of countries, Kenya 
included (Aina, 2004). The number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) grew 
following the failure of the state and markets in provision of services, while unemployment 
spiked due to job cuts, leading to the growth of the informal sector (Surender, 2013). Following 
the neo-liberal prescriptions, some form of palliatives were offered to remedy the devastation 
of SAPs (Shivji, 2009), among them targeted social protection schemes. But targeting in itself 
rather than universal provisions is regressive (Korpi and Palme, 1998) as it leads to high 
poverty and inequality. A clear demonstration is evident in South Africa where inequality has 
risen over the years due to the occupation of targeting means of provision to poor people 
(Adésínà, 2014). Targeting also creates stigma, leading to an erosion of self-respect and dignity 
among the poor and therefore low uptake of services. 
In what he terms “contradictory advocacy”, Adejumobi (2004), notes that whereas African 
states were compelled to cut down on social spending, these constituted the very areas where 
countries in the North were increasing spending. Reports indicate that since “1980 public social 
spending has increased by more than 20% across the OECD with variation across countries” 
(Adema, Fron and Ladaique, 2011, p. 9). The same sentiments can be argued today of cash 
transfers in Africa in comparison to the European conceptualisation of social policy. In Europe 
social policy encompasses more than cash transfers and includes housing, universal health care 
and education unlike the single advocacy for cash transfers in Africa. Following on this 
discussion, the next section traces the path leading to introduction of cash transfers in social 
policy.  
 
2.4 Neo-liberalism: The Genealogy of the Ideology 
The emergence and spread of cash transfers across developing countries is usually attributed 
to Latin America, Brazil and Mexico in particular. Ideologically, though, the roots and the idea 
of cash transfers have their antecedents in the North (Lavinas, 2013). The formation of the neo-
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liberal agenda bringing about the idea of cash transfers as welfare solutions can be traced in 
three phases. The first phase involves the foundational aspects in Europe with Friedrich Hayek, 
the Austrian-British economist, to the second phase, which involved the spread of neo-liberal 
ideas to America, and lastly their expansion to the developing world through the Washington 
Consensus.  
 
2.4.1 Phase I: Founding of Neo-liberalism 
Neo-liberalism sprang up as a reaction to the New Liberalisation, Progressive and New Deal 
before World War II. With the first meeting of like-minded persons, Austrian born economist 
Fredrich Hayek, established and spread the idea through the Mont Pelerin Society meeting in 
1947 based on the ensuing social, political and economic events. Emerging in the period 
between the two wars, neo-liberal economists proposed a doctrine centred on the promotion of 
free markets, deregulation and limited government participation in the economy as a response 
to the New Deal. The ideas of neo-liberalism were a battle of ideas against those who believed 
government has a “responsibility to intervene in the market to soften the sharp edges” (Klein, 
2007, p. 17). The Mont Pelerin Society, as it later came to be known, depicted the New Deal 
and the development of the British welfare state as communism. Hayek’s ideas, which started 
as an intellectual exercise, later permeating politics, were against an expanded state in 
managing the economy (Thorsen, 2010). In his book The Road to Serfdom, he stated: 
 
“This argument is twofold: the first is economic and can only briefly be stated: The 
state should confine itself to establishing rules applying to general types of situation 
and should allow individual’s freedom in everything which depends on the 
circumstances of time and place because only the individual concerned in each instance 
can fully know these circumstances and adapt their actions to them. If individuals are 
able to use their knowledge effectively in making plans, they must be able to predict 
actions of the state which may affect these plans. But if the actions of the state are to 
be predictable, they must be determined by rules fixed independently of the concrete 
circumstances which can be neither foreseen nor taken into account beforehand; and 
the particular effect of such action will be unpredictable. If, on the other hand, the state 
were to direct the individual’s actions so as to achieve a particular end, its action would 
have to be decided on the basis of the full circumstances of the moment and would 
therefore be unpredictable. Hence, the familiar fact that the more the state “plans”, the 
more difficult planning becomes for the individual” (Hayek, 2007, p. 114). 
 
After the Second World War, the ideas spread as opposition to Keynesian economic policies, 
which aimed at increasing and promoting the necessity of the welfare state in response to the 
excesses of capitalism. Keynesianism prescribed an active state, in maintaining the economy 
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through the provision of full employment (Jones, 2014). Other measures promoted by Keynes 
centred on the relief from poverty with high levels of public spending by government on 
welfare programmes and public services. Following the market crash of 1929, there was 
“consensus that laissez-faire had failed and that government intervention was necessary to 
redistribute wealth and regulate corporations” (Klein, 2007, p. 17). In what she describes as “a 
time of unabashed faire,” in the period between the 1930s and 1950s governments launched 
public works programmes to create much-needed jobs and unveiled the new social programme. 
The period can be described as a time of compromise between the left and the market for 
“avoidance of depression and the prevention of unemployment.”  
 
Keynes’ proposition was of a mixed regulated economy, which was considered a revolution in 
public policy in the form of the New Deal (Klein, 2007). Keynes proposed a system of 
compromises, checks and balances with a coexistence between a free market with free public 
health care, public school, decent wages by corporations and respect for workers’ right to form 
unions. In addition, he proposed taxation and redistribution of wealth to mitigate inequalities 
brought about by the market (Stiglitz, 1994; Klein, 2007). Keynes argued that markets were 
not self-regulating and that unemployment would persist following the Great Depression unless 
government intervened (Stiglitz, 1994). Policies to create jobs and rescue the suffering from 
the collapse of the economy were therefore necessary through government intervention. During 
the period of laissez-faire, the welfare state was embraced by the West (Klein, 2007). 
 
Hayek’s idea however, and that of other proponents, placed the market at the centre of the 
economy with the definition of neoliberalism premised on individuals as consumers who ought 
to be left to make choices by themselves through markets. Markets offered greater freedom 
from government interference and according to liberal thought were more efficient in 
distribution of goods (Hayek, 2007). The efficiency of markets, according to Hayek, promoted 
the power of human initiatives for innovation, including self-interest and individual pursuit for 
happiness. The efficiency of markets in distribution of services was alleged to be less costly 
and provide better social outcomes. The proponents therefore promoted markets as the best 
providers of even basic goods and needs like housing, health care, education and pensions. 
Markets were promoted as superior to government in dealing with and addressing policy issues.  
However, by the 1970s, the ideas of Keynes started to fall apart following crises in the North, 
which resulted in a rise in inflation leading to a recession and rising unemployment. The crisis 
provided room for the revival of the doctrine of free markets. Neo-liberalism emerged as a 
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critique to Keynesianism spearheaded by Milton Friedman, an American who critiqued state 
involvement in the economy (Gamble, 2001). Neo-liberal economists asserted that government 
was wrong to follow the prescriptions offered by Keynes, “the architect of the New Deal and 
modern welfare state” (Klein, 2007, p. 17).  
 
Defenders of “Classical Liberalism,” Hayek and those in Europe and in the early Chicago 
School had in mind a strong but limited state. The role of the state they prescribed was macro-
economic, as the policing and controlling of monopoly, supervision of monetary policy and 
addressing the social question of safety nets meant protecting the vulnerable from the harsh 
effects of market capitalism. And all this government was to do within the framework that 
enhanced the protection of private property rights. The idea of a strong but limited state were 
pushed by the thoughts and pressure of the Chicago School comprising among others Milton 
Friedman who argued that market mechanisms ought to be employed in broader policy spheres. 
This resulted in for instance, the increasing prominence for proposals for voucher schemes for 
education or social security and privatisation in the US, and the internal market of the National 
Health Security introduced by Thatcher’s government in the UK.  
 
2.4.2 Phase II: Transnationalisation of the Ideology 
The second phase marked the growth of neo-liberalism beyond scholars to include think tanks, 
businessmen, academics, journalists and politicians (Jones, 2014). This period was marked by 
policy actions of other ideological entrepreneurs. Think tanks particularly played a key role in 
promoting and carrying out research for free-market neo-liberal ideas, connecting them with 
the political class and political problems. The idea grew to become a transatlantic network 
beyond its root in Europe from Vienna and London. It comprised the establishment of think 
tanks first in Britain and the US after the post-war period which later expanded. The think tanks 
were funded by American businesses like General Electric and General Motors. Think tanks 
became the preferred mode of transmitting neo-liberal thinking, as those who ran them were 
able to influence politicians and decision makers. The main way in which think tanks did this 
was (a) communication of messages (b) by generating innovative policy ideas (c) by creating 
databases of contacts and connections to increase influence of the movement. The 
heterogeneity of the think tanks enabled their flexibility and intellectual dexterity to the 
armoury of neo-liberalism as it was an elite-driven movement whose proponents include 
academics, politicians and journalists funded and financed by rich business enterprise and 
foundations (Jones, 2014). 
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Focus shifted from the anti-New Deal roots with a simple message: “the superiority of markets 
over all forms of government intervention or collections” (Jones, 2014, p. 562), moving from 
an intellectual movement to a “global hegemonic force”. Friedman’s radical ideas were that 
government spending on social service education was inefficient and instead government 
should provide families with vouchers to access services at private institutions – not just as a 
stopgap measure but as a permanent reform (Klein, 2007). With this message, new neo-liberal 
politics gained ground as a response to the social and economic problems with the markets 
depicted as more efficient in allocating resources than governments. Efficiencies, as argued, 
could only be achieved through incentives which were seen to be inherent in market 
mechanisms. Therefore, markets were promoted as best in delivery of public goods. These 
utopian beliefs in markets gained ground in Britain, the United States and globally from the 
1970s.  
 
With these ideas taking root across the Atlantic, change in policies became inevitable as the 
ideology moved to the political sphere. The propagation of neo-liberal ideas for example 
resulted in the US adopting a different kind of micro-economic management with 
experimentation of the private sector in housing and urban policy. In what he calls “neo-liberal 
theory of the state,” Jones (2014) outlines some implications for government in the public 
sphere. Keynesianism ran into the problem of stagflation – high inflation and unemployment – 
leading to the loss of trust in politicians and political institutions. This led to tax revolts in the 
US in the 1970s, the collapse of industrial relations in Britain, and urban unrest and violence 
following the break and belief in the superiority of government and in collective action. This 
situation allowed libertarians and Classic Liberals space to offer ideas of neo-liberalism as the 
policy alternative for the fightback by the super-elite forces in North America and Europe.  
Neo-liberal ideas undermined and strengthened the belief and led to the election of Thatcher 
as prime minister in the UK in 1979 and Reagan as president of the US in 1980. Following, a 
major shift occurred towards the adoption of the neo-liberal faith in free markets and by the 
1980s neoliberalism became an alternative for shaping all policies (Gamble, 2001). Reagan 
and Thatcher represented the political arm of the neo-liberal ideology, with both considered by 
their promoters as political leaders with the courage to implement free markets in the real world 
(Klein, 2007). With cuts in welfare and the renewed emphasis on the markets, the intentions of 
the conservative and Republican policymakers coupled with the unhindered rise of the neo-
liberal ideas brought a situation of winners and losers. The poor and disadvantaged lost out due 
  
 
30 
to cuts in welfare, the middle class was squeezed while upper tier gained through lower income 
taxes and personal subsidies in mortgages, tax relief, the privatisation of state assets and 
nationalised industries and through the trickle-down effect (Jones, 2014).  
 
The adoption by the state of neo-liberal ideas led to some negative consequences. First was the 
rise of inequality as middle and upper earners benefitted more from state subsidies than the 
poor. Second was the rollback of the public provision and a reduction of public services 
provision, and the squeeze in collective industrial action. Third was the cutback of provisions 
of assistance to the poorest based on arguments of rising costs of welfare. The general 
consequence was that neo-liberal policies hurt the most vulnerable members of society.  
 
Beyond promoting the ideology by think tanks and business enterprises, the key power of the 
idea was that it resonated with the moment as it promoted the idea of opportunity and free 
enterprises, which converged with American ideals of individualism. Two lessons on the 
diffusion of ideas emerge from the legacy of the transAtlantic neo-liberal politics. First the 
neo-liberal network is an example of a highly disciplined and effective political movement; 
second it is an illustration of the power of ideas in influencing political and social outcomes. 
Both characteristics, as will be demonstrated later in the thesis, have been emulated by 
transnational actors in promoting the institutionalisation of cash transfer and social protection 
schemes in developing countries. In addition, neo-liberal ideas have persisted with their 
tenacious tendencies seen in the promotion of safety nets and targeted cash transfers in Africa 
by a globalised transnational network of individuals and organisations away from the 
promotion of other social policy instruments.  
 
2.4.3 Phase III: Expansion of the Idea to Developing Countries 
The extension of neo-liberal ideas into the rest of the world, particularly developing countries, 
gained ground with the imposition of “structural adjustments” by the Bretton Wood Institutions 
and other regional and global institutions. SAPs were based on Friedman’s claims on the link 
between economic and political freedom. The language expertly developed by neo-liberal 
promoters and thinkers was based on freedom and economic opportunity. Globally, the neo-
liberal vision was grounded on the substitution for public funded education and healthcare 
systems for a free market which would be more efficient than the state. But markets are 
unreliable in distribution of public goods, as they create inequalities and leave the poor without 
support (Stiglitz, 1994). Governments therefore have a role in promoting stability.  
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Neo-liberal networks and promoters often took advantage of crises to impose the policies, as 
was the case in Latin American countries and across Africa (Stiglitz, 1994; Klein, 2007). By 
the 1990s neo-liberalism had entered the discussion on globalisation, becoming a hegemonic 
discourse promoted by powerful international actors. Its emphasis in developing countries 
focussed on market deregulation and “public sector reforms which aimed at making 
government agencies similar to private companies” (Thorsen, 2010, p. 189). Other 
requirements imposed by international organisations summarised as the “Washington 
Consensus” included proposals to reform the tax regime, for governments to liberalise trade, 
put in place strong property rights, privatisation of state enterprises, removal of trade barriers 
and drastic cuts in government spending (Klein, 2007; Jones, 2014). This list was considered 
the bare minimum for economic stabilisation of countries in the South. And whereas previously 
“the World Bank and the IMF had made policy recommendations when they handed out loans, 
emboldened by the desperation of developing countries, those recommendations morphed into 
radical free-market demands” (Klein, 2007, p. 163). The imposition led to the privatisation of 
services which had to be paid by individuals, resulting in the adoption of the policies 
constraining development in Africa. The effects of the policies in relation to Kenya are 
discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Debates about the precise role of government  in 
social provisioning abound, however, “there is a broad agreement that government has a role 
to play in making any society and any economy function efficiently and humanely” (Stiglitz, 
1994, p. 218). The fiscal and economic crisis in developing countries in the 1980s provided an 
opportunity for the implementation of safety nets. Following the devastation brought about by 
SAPs, there was urgent need to protect the vulnerable from the effects of liberalisation 
(Lavinas, 2013).  
 
The idea of cash transfers as safety nets is derived from Hayek’s leaning towards the 
provision of money as freedom. He thus stated: 
 
Strictly speaking, there is no “economic motive” but only economic factors 
conditioning our striving for other ends… If we strive for money, it is because it offers 
us the widest choice in enjoying the fruits of our efforts. Because in modern society it 
is through the limitation of our money incomes that we are made to feel the restrictions 
which our relative poverty still imposes upon us, many have come to hate money as a 
symbol of these restrictions. But this is to mistake for the cause the medium through 
which a force makes itself felt. It would be much truer to say that money is one to the 
greatest instruments of freedom ever invented by man. It is money which in existing 
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society opens an astounding range of choice to the poor man – a range greater than that 
which not many generations ago was open to the wealthy. We shall better understand 
the significant of this service of money if we consider what it would really mean if, as 
so many socialists characteristically propose, the “pecuniary motive” were largely 
displaced by “noneconomic incentives.” If all rewards, instead of being offered in 
money, were offered in the form of public distinction or privileges, position of power 
over other men, or better housing or better food, opportunities for travel or education, 
this would merely mean that the recipient would no longer be allowed to choose and 
that whoever fixed the reward determined not only its size but also the particular form 
in which it should be enjoyed” (Hayek, 2007, p. 125). 
 
Spreading the idea first in Latin America, the World Bank and other development agencies 
advocated safety nets through the “social risk management” strategy, offering a pro-market 
approach to combating poverty (Lavinas, 2013). The World Bank promoted cash transfers as 
interventions to assist individuals and households to manage risks.  
 
2.5 The Rise and Rise of Cash Transfers in Africa 
Following the harsh effects of the SAPs, Kenya, like other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
adopted the “government-led” Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP). The national PRSP 
(2001–2004), with the objectives of poverty reduction and economic growth, aimed to promote 
economic growth while ensuring poverty reduction. Despite these efforts, poverty and 
inequality have persisted (Atieno and Shem, 2007). Meanwhile continents like Latin America 
and Asia have made remarkable progress in poverty reduction largely as a result of reduction 
in unemployment, the impact of labour reforms including an increase in minimum wage, 
expanding access to education and economic growth (Higgins, 2012). Part of the contribution 
towards poverty reduction can be attributed to social protection programmes, in particular 
Bolsa Família (Barrientos, 2012). It is estimated that between 12 to 18 percent drops in levels 
of poverty in Brazil can be attributed to Bolsa Família (Higgins, 2012; Barrientos et al., 2013). 
The drop in poverty attributed to the cash transfer schemes is however marginal in comparison 
to the impact of labour income as a result of reduction in unemployment. Successful 
implementation and positive human development achievements witnessed through the Bolsa 
Família Programme have resulted in its diffusion to other developing countries. 
In realisation of the negative effects and the failure of SAPs, coupled with a focus on the 
Millennium Development Goals, the World Bank sought to mitigate the situation through what 
it termed social risk management (Brooks, 2015). Its focus was on cushioning the “deserving 
poor”. The idea of targeted safety nets towards the deserving poor, children, older persons and 
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those unable to work was promoted through international conferences with the aim of 
“producing new research on social investments to break the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty” (Brooks, 2015, p. 556). Implementation of cash transfers as social protection 
measures began to emerge. Different contextualised definitions of social protection exist. 
According to the Government of Kenya, the term refers to  
“… policies and actions, including legislative measures, that enhance the capacity of 
and opportunities for the poor and vulnerable to improve and sustain their lives, 
livelihoods, and welfare, that enable income-earners and their dependants to maintain 
a reasonable level of income through decent work, and that ensure access to affordable 
healthcare, social security, and social assistance” (Government of Kenya, 2011b).  
Cash transfers are considered part of social assistance programmes. Occasioned by the high 
foreign financial investment, the mercurial rise of cash transfers as a policy option has changed 
the social policy landscape in Africa (de Haan, 2011). The strong positive narrative 
surrounding cash transfers – the positive impacts on human development indicators – have also 
driven the rise of cash transfer programmes. It is recorded that 40 countries in Africa have a 
cash transfer programme of some sort, having risen from 21 in 2010 (World Bank, 2015b). The 
rise of social protection in Africa has also been propelled by the framing of social protection – 
though from a broader agenda - as a global social policy and driven by regional and 
international agendas like the African Union Social Policy Framework (AU-SPF) and the 
International Labour Organization Social Protection Floor Recommendations.  
However, there are aspects of this narrative that are open to critique. First, some discourse on 
this topic presents cash transfers as the main or even only antidote to poverty and vulnerability. 
Even when practitioners acknowledge that cash transfers might be one of many policy 
instruments used for social protection, they still dominate deliberations on the social protection 
agenda. There are also unanswered questions about the way the transfers are targeted, and 
whether social protection for one category of vulnerable people might come at the expense of 
other groups. Another concern rises from the fact that many cash transfer programs in Africa 
are largely funded and implemented by international organisations, such as NGOs and IFIs, 
often with little attention to local political and economic contexts. Critics of the single use of 
cash as a social policy instrument view it as a return to neo-liberal tendencies aimed at 
addressing market failures (Adésínà, 2014). The preoccupation and emphasis on cash is also 
viewed as a way of getting the poor to the markets, thereby reinforcing residualistic tendencies 
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of social provision (Lavinas, 2013). Furthermore, cash transfers offer simpler alternatives for 
governments than the seemingly more complicated avenues of addressing endemic poverty.  
Unfortunately the “aggressive policy merchandising” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 455) by international 
actors and the fixation on cash provisioning to the poor has led to a narrowing of social policy 
to social protection and further to cash transfers (Mkandawire, 2010). Unlike Europe, where 
broad-based social policy instruments were adopted to address need, cash transfers in Africa 
are seen to be the basis for poverty reduction. Mkandawire (2011) argues that the way poverty 
reduction and social policy is implemented in Africa now has the same characteristics as the 
Poor Law; the heavy targeting employed particularly in cash transfer programmes and the 
preoccupation with “graduating beneficiaries” out of programmes and not out of poverty are 
reminiscent of the characteristics on which the Poor Law was based. He draws attention to the 
under-theorisation of social policy in Africa by pointing to a couple of biases that have led to 
this state. He asserts that though the convergence on social concerns, economic welfare, equity 
and social justice in both developed and developing countries are now more than ever starkly 
visible, the purposes of social policy seem to diverge.  
Whereas the dualism of economic and social policy in Africa seems to be promoted against 
much broader universalistic welfare regimes, growing evidence from emerging democracies 
demonstrates that investment in social policy regimes indeed enhance productivism in 
capitalistic systems. African countries too can learn as they go along just as the developed 
countries did. Part of the attribution to the oversimplification of welfare regimes to social 
assistance tools of cash transfers, Adésínà (2015) argues, emanates from a conceptual 
misunderstanding and a lack of rigour in understanding the historical background on social 
policy and the welfare regime paradigm, a conceptual trap that both scholars and practitioners 
of social protection fall into. This calls for revisiting readings on the welfare regimes paradigm 
and social policy to bring clarity on the intended meaning of the two concepts in relation to 
addressing and “bringing a person to a full decent life”.  
A shift beyond the cash transfer narrative needs to occur if Africa is to attain “development”. 
Unfortunately, Africa has remained a laboratory of social policy instruments like cash transfers 
that do not fully serve the purpose of bringing about the gains that were achieved during the 
pre-1980 pre-colonial period (Adejumobi, 2004). As has been demonstrated there is a need to 
shift back to what has historically not only played a key role in poverty reduction but also 
towards encouraging national cohesion and equity. Transformative social policy therefore calls 
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for “a much broader vision…. multitasking for achieving multiple objectives such as 
production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 
455). This approach is formed around the ideas of “recognition of the multiple tasks of social 
policy... inherent interconnection of economic and social policies… diversity of instruments in 
the social policy repertoire… the wider vision of human well-being and capability” (Adésínà, 
2014, p. 3). 
 
2.6. Transformative Social Policy as an Alternative 
The transformative social policy approach describes social policy as “collective public efforts 
aimed at affecting and protecting the well-being of people in a given territory” (Adésínà, 2009 
p. 38). Transformative social policy envisages a non-residual approach, “unlike neo-liberal 
principles, which are based on the notions that the poor can be treated as a residual category 
targeted by specific programmes” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011a, p. 214). Targeted and residual 
programmes, unlike transformative social policy, “fail to link poverty to broader social, 
political and economic structures or shared interest with the non-poor groups and the middle 
class” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011 p.g.214). Furthermore programmes that take on universal 
approaches to provision can transform structures and forms of inequality and poverty and “raise 
human well-being as it can transform social institutions, social relations and the economy” 
(Adésínà, 2015, p. 113). Universal policy regimes enhance attainment of rights of the poor and 
provide better quality and accountability (Adésínà, 2011) as they can “build on shared interests 
between classes and social groups and create a foundation for solidarity and coalitions between 
classes and groups, re-embedding elements of the middle class and constructing universally 
accessible public infrastructure for health, education and employment promotion” (Haarstad 
and St Clair, 2011a, p. 215). 
Social rights, linked to the idea of citizenship, represent avenues through which provision of 
social protection and social policy are anchored (Marshall, 2014). One of the reasons for the 
loss of social rights is the residual role that was assigned to social policy during the period of 
SAPs (UNRISD, 2006). Social rights are therefore anchored in inclusivity “with shared rather 
than divergent interests between the poor and middle classes, and support for public 
infrastructure benefiting the poor” (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011a, p. 215). Social rights will be 
achieved with better “social compacts that bridge class and promote inter-class solidarities” 
(Ibid). Transformative social policy further offers the opportunity to reconcile the female role 
of reproduction, providing an engendered aspect to social protection. SAPs led to a 
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retrenchment of the state with the effects particularly pronounced on women as the burden of 
care, especially healthcare, fell on them – leading to a reversal of the achievement of social 
rights. The adoption of broad-based social protection instruments, with a focus on ex ante social 
protection instruments like land reforms, can offer this form of reconciliation. For instance, 
land reforms as social policy instruments not only dismantle inequalities in asset redistribution 
but increase per capita land holding among rural households, thereby ameliorating the problem 
of landlessness (Musavengana, 2017; Tekwa and Adésínà, 2018). The current paradigm with 
the fixation on cash transfers does not have legitimacy with the people and most of all the focus 
on individuals undermines the social norms of reciprocity. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Evidently, the (non-) growth of social policy in Africa has taken a different trajectory from that 
of early adopters of the welfare state and industrialisers. Although attempts were made post-
independence at expanding social development to the local population, the attempts were 
curtailed both by endogenous and external factors. Divergences in outcome are evident as 
social policy has been influenced by several external factors. Consequently, social policy 
across Africa, unlike that of OECD countries, remains residual, market-based and inadequate 
for the needs of a majority of the population. The current overreliance on cash transfers for the 
poor moreover is individualist, thereby eroding opportunities for solidarity and social cohesion 
for the wider societal good (Haarstad and St Clair, 2011b). The preoccupation with cash 
transfers further has the ability to draw attention from other social policy instruments like 
education, health or land reform that are needed in countries with large numbers of those living 
in poverty.  
 
In this chapter, I sought through a review of literature on the development and outcomes of the 
welfare state in Europe to provide a historical review of social policy in Africa to demonstrate 
how international influences permeated social policy in Africa, bringing about the idea of cash 
transfers. The chapter has also offered a critique of the current social protection paradigm and 
proffered an alternative framework as transformative social policy. In the next chapter, through 
a review of literature and empirical studies I examine various explanatory frameworks on the 
adoption of social protection and cash transfers on the continent after which, I develop the 
conceptual framework guiding this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Part of this chapter have been published as: Ouma, M. and Adésínà, J. (2018) ‘Solutions, 
exclusion and influence: Exploring power relations in the adoption of social protection policies 
in Kenya’, Critical Social Policy, pp. 1–20. 
 
This chapter maps out the existing knowledge from the literature on social protection 
promotion and advocacy and discusses the major explanations and weaknesses of the existing 
paradigms explaining the drivers of adoption of social protection policies. I then present an 
alternative analytical framework for understanding social protection uptake. The developed 
conceptual framework provided a guide for analysing, explaining and understanding the 
dynamics of policy transfer and the policymaking process leading to social protection adoption 
in Kenya. The literature review provided a clear connection between the theory, earlier findings 
on the adoption process of social protection policies, and the purpose of this study. Since the 
introduction of social protection policies in developing countries almost three decades ago, 
much of the literature on the policies has focused on technical issues and the impact of the 
programmes and policies on livelihoods (de Haan, 2011). Following the rapid adoption of these 
policies, particularly in the form of cash transfer schemes, attention by scholars has now turned 
to examining the policymaking process and the factors that drive adoption.  
 
Recent explanations of growth of the social protection policies in developing countries emanate 
from two theoretical perspectives. First are explanations focused on national politics based on 
political settlements as the analytical framework for explaining policy uptake. Arguments 
offered by scholars from the political settlement perspective suggest that the variations in 
adoption of social protection policies across Africa arise from the political contestations and 
negotiation between political elites, votes, bureaucrats and transnational actors (Hickey et al. 
2018). Besides the adoption of social protection policies, the political settlements approach has 
been used as an analytical framework to understand various economic and political processes 
in Africa (Behuria, Buur and Gray, 2017). Within studies of social protection adoption, 
scholars have developed explanatory variables emanating from the role of political institutions. 
The variables largely derive from the recent highly contested processes of democratisation that 
have characterised Africa in the past decades. Paying attention to institutions, including 
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political parties and elections, the argument raised by the scholars in relation to policy changes 
is that competitive elections shift incentives upon which the political elite leverage social 
protection as a resource to win or retain electoral support (Hickey et al., 2018). Both strands 
acknowledge the role of international organisations as drivers of social protection uptake but 
with a caveat. Further the studies pay little attention to international organisations’ 
relationships with the political elite, bureaucratic actors, members of epistemic communities 
among others within the policymaking space in the adoption process.  
 
Second, based on the role of international and donor organisations within the policymaking 
process, are explanations of social protection adoption deriving from ideational approaches. 
Scholars studying social protection adoption from this approach argue that the diffusion of 
ideas from early adopters is the driver of policy change. They consider learning a collaborative 
process and the key mechanism for policy transfer. Scholars from this perspective argue that 
learning through a collaborative process of international actors together with national agents 
have driven policy reforms. According to ideational perspectives, the adoption of social 
protection policies entails learning new solutions to problems of poverty and vulnerability. 
National agencies and actors thereby embrace the ideas and information through a learning 
process. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows: In the first section is a review of the literature on political 
settlement and social protection. This section is followed by a discussion on ideational 
approaches as explanatory variables in studies of social protection adoption. In both sections I 
discuss the limitations of the analytical frameworks. In the third section I present the theoretical 
framework from which this study draws, followed by the last section where I present the 
analytical framework for the study.  
 
3.2 Political Settlement and Political Institutions 
Some recent studies examining the spread of social protection policies in Africa focus on 
political settlements and national political institutions as explanations of social protection 
policy adoption across Africa. The political settlements approach was developed by Khan in 
relation to the need to understand “patterns and evolutions of distribution of power” and to 
explain different outcomes of policies and the conflicting aspects of institution. As a 
framework, the political settlements approach is defined as the “relative holding power of 
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different groups and organisations contesting the distribution of resources” (Khan, 2010, p. 1). 
As an analytical framework, the political settlement approach is centred on the analysis of how 
the distribution of organisational power explains the economic and political effects of 
institutions and policies (Khan, 2018). Scholars using the adapted political settlement 
framework for insight into understanding various economic and political processes, institutions 
or social order, have variously described the dynamism of political settlements as “a novel way 
of studying political economy… offers an opportunity to understand diversity… more open 
than mainstream institutional theory” (Behuria, Buur and Gray, 2017, p. 508,521,523). 
 
In their adapted political settlement approach for studying the expansion of social protection 
policies, Lavers and Hickey (2016) integrate the role of ideas and ideologies. Adapted from 
Khan’s political settlement approach and to address the shortcomings of Khan’s framework, 
they incorporate aspects of policy networks, resources, role of international actors, and the role 
of ideas. Furthermore, their framework suggests a comparative methodology for collecting data 
and suggests steps to be taken in conducting studies using the political settlements in explaining 
the politics of social protection policies. 
 
Scholars drawing from the adapted political settlement approach employ it to measure how 
choices related to social protection provision have been used as a source of patronage in 
competitive clientistic systems and also weak dominant parties where the ruling coalition can 
adopt social protection as a means to gain support, deflect weak opposition and serve the 
interests of the political elite (Khan, 2018). But where there is a strong dominant party with 
little pressure from weak opposition the value of using social protection for patronage purposes 
is limited. Recent studies that have employed the political settlement approach as a framework 
to explaining social protection adoption in Africa are mostly associated with the Effective 
States and Inclusive Development Research Centre.  
 
3.2.1 Political Settlements and the Spread of Social Protection Policies in Africa 
In relation to the rapid rise of social protection policies across Africa, scholars analysing social 
policy uptake and reforms argue that the rise in uptake of the policies can be understood by 
examining the political contestations and negotiations between political elites, voters, 
bureaucrats and transnational actors (Hickey et al., 2018). In the adapted version of the political 
settlements approach, the uptake of social protection programmes and policies is viewed within 
the framework of political shifts and dynamics occurring in countries where social protection 
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policies have recently been adopted. Central to the argument is that political agency and 
commitment by domestic political imperatives constitute the basis for a variation of adoption 
across Africa. Though the studies recognise the role of transnational actors and external 
influence in the policymaking process, their influence is downplayed. It is argued that their role 
is often overestimated at the expense of national politics (Hickey et al., 2018). In explaining 
the variation in adoption in the different countries – rapid adoption or resistance – scholars 
aligned to political settlement framework argue that this is a result of variations in constitution 
of the political elite and their relation to voters, bureaucrats and transnational actors. In 
countries where uptake was rapid – Kenya, Ghana and Zambia to some extent – the political 
settlement is characterised by high competition among the political elite (Lavers and Hickey, 
2016) while countries where there has been resistance, like Uganda, these cases are 
characterised by shifting dynamics “from a developmental dominant coalition to an 
increasingly weak dominant party settlement” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016, p. 4). 
 
Democracy can encourage the enactment of social policies. Democratisation processes, 
referring to the frequency of competitive elections and the adoption of multi-party-political 
systems, are considered to have played a key role in the shifts towards the adoption of social 
protection instruments by providing incentives to the political elite. According to studies 
drawing from the adapted approach, “the changing balance of power within and around ruling 
coalitions, shapes elite incentives and ideas in ways that shape commitment to particular policy 
agendas” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016, p. 3). This shift is attributed to electoral cycles as the 
political elite seek to solidify their electoral base or as a means of patronage. At the intersection 
of electoral cycles is the role of incentives and ideas in pursuing favourable political elite 
commitment to social protection policies, in particular the current commitment to social 
assistance programmes. In this sense the political settlements approach focusses on “the 
interaction between transnational processes and the changing balance of interests and ideas 
within particular political settlements that provide shifting incentives for the introduction and 
expansion of social protection” (Lavers and Hickey, 2016) . The argument that ensues therefore 
is that political agency has been the key driver of the adoption of social protection policies as 
the political elite seek to balance their interests through the provision of rents, in this case, 
through providing cash transfers.  
 
According to the scholars using the political settlement approach, several imperatives have led 
to the need for adoption of social protection programmes. First, there are the existential and the 
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legitimacy needs of the ruling class and the political elites. For instance, following the 
breakdown of previous governments in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front was worried that the food crisis of 2002 and 2003, which was brought about 
by severe famine and drought that heightened food security issues, portended an existential 
threat to the ruling coalition. Political elites in Ethiopia therefore adopted the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) (Lavers, 2016a). This statement however ignores that the push for 
cash transfer was driven by transnational actors and the design of the PSNP was an outcome 
of government insisting on cash handouts for provision of labour. The PSNP is a cash and food-
for-work programme established in Ethiopia in 2005. The PSNP 4 goal reads as “Resilience to 
shocks and livelihoods enhanced, and food security and nutrition improved, for rural 
households vulnerable to food security” (GFDRE, 2014, p. 3). According to the political 
settlement analysis, the PSNP was adopted in part to stabilise the coalition of parties as the 
political elite was wary of losing power after two successive regimes before it collapsed. Fear 
of collapse of government and the political settlement characterised by “an extremely weak 
excluded faction, cohesive intra-elite relations within the ruling coalition and top-down 
hierarchical system”, the ERDPF adopted the PSNP (Lavers, 2016a). In a bid to stem the unrest 
that may have ensued, the political elite in seeking legitimacy aligned with dominant 
paradigmatic ideas of the PSNP sold by international organisations and donor institutions. But 
if the concern of the ruling class was regime stability through the adoption of a cash transfer 
scheme, the PSNP would have been a universal scheme with no conditionalities. As it is the 
programme is targeted with a relatively low coverage of potential electorate. In addition, there 
is no evidence that social protection and cash transfer schemes in particular are the most 
significant source of political instability. 
 
A similar analysis is employed in Rwanda in view of the adoption of the Vision 2020 
Umurenge Programme (VUP). VUP was conceived in 2007 “as an integrated local 
development programme to accelerate poverty reduction but also enhance rural growth” 
(Gahamanyi and Kettlewell, 2015, p. 48). One of the components of the programme is 
unconditional cash transfer for labour-constrained households while households with the 
ability to work are engaged in public works programmes. Political settlements scholars argue 
that besides the high rates of poverty and inequality in Rwanda, the ruling elite adopted the 
social protection programme as part of the distributional regime in the country but also as a 
means of settling and not causing a threat to the political settlement (Lavers, 2016b). The idea 
of threats to legitimacy for the two countries as the reason for adoption of social protection 
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policies however seems unrealistic considering that both Rwanda and Ethiopia at the time were 
under the leadership of “strongmen” with highly centralised systems of governance under the 
President and the Prime Minister respectively. It is therefore highly unlikely that there was a 
threat to the ruling coalitions.  
 
The second imperative leading to the adoption of cash transfers according to the political 
settlement approach is neopatrimonialism. Central to this argument is that patrimonial politics 
was a key driver at national level leading to policy change. The argument derives from enduring 
debates on neopatrimonial politics, which assumes that in most countries in Africa, resources 
and services are distributed based on clientelist politics (Kelsall, 2013). The assumption from 
neopatrimonial arguments is that distribution of services is only possible based on how the 
political elite can obtain votes from their clients. In this case, social protection is allocated as 
rents, which are distributed by the political class in order to get votes from the recipients. Social 
protection was therefore framed as a way through which politicians can accrue political power 
and will through the extension of cash transfer benefits to their constituents. In countries where 
social protection policies have been implemented, cash transfer benefits are considered to be 
aligned to the interests of the political elite (Hickey and Seekings, 2018).  
 
Neopatrimonial politics is claimed to be persistent among African countries, with structures 
that endure through the years. In Zambia, access to services and public goods are still subject 
to patrimonial rules, with clientelisms and reciprocity still dominating (Harland, 2014) and the 
political settlement still hinged in rent allocation practices (Pruce and Hickey, 2017). Social 
cash transfer featured as one of the manifesto commitments for the Patriotic Front, which won 
election in in 2011. The unexpected  increase in the 2013 budgetary allocation for cash transfer 
distribution in particular targeted to the rural areas, was a way to fulfil election pledges (Pruce 
and Hickey, 2017). But if patronage politics is endemic to Zambia, questions arise as to why 
there was resistance to adoption before 2013. Politicians at the local levels also supported the 
programmes in anticipation for accruing election benefits from the programmes.  
 
Research however indicates that political leaders do not only seek patronage from extension of 
social services but are aware of poverty and inequality in their countries and seek to address 
them (Manor and Duckett, 2017). The study shows that that due to path dependency, “political 
leaders are locked into pre-existing patterns of behaviour and unwritten agreements between 
ruling elites and various social forces” (Manor and Duckett, 2017, pp. 305–306)  making them 
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easily succumb to patronage politics. However, in a in bid to address poverty and inequality, 
leaders have to overcome restrictive political or policy legacies, and tackle reluctance among 
politicians and bureaucrats. In addition, politicians had to challenge “pre-existing political 
understandings that favoured prosperous interests which were sometimes in league with 
complacent bureaucrats” (Manor and Duckett, 2017, p. 306), for example from finance 
ministries worried about fiscal implications. Besides political agency at addressing poverty and 
vulnerability, international agencies excluded national politicians from social protection 
policymaking processes through depoliticisation (Wanyama and McCord, 2017). Therefore, 
arguments proposing patronage politics as guiding the adoption of social protection policies 
are of limited heuristic value. In addition, donor funding comprised a huge percentage of cash 
transfers and the national budget are provision was not sufficient to influence political choices.  
 
Closely related to political settlements are explanations focusing on political institutions. 
Political institutionalists attribute social policy reforms to the role of national internal political 
processes. Similar to the political settlements approach, institutionalists argue that the changing 
political environment in Africa, as a result of democratisation, electoral circles and other 
institutions, including political parties, shaped social protection programmes (Chinyoka and 
Seekings, 2016; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2017; Jacob and Hundsback, 
2018). Central to the argument of national political institutions as the explanatory variable in 
the adoption of social protection are the dynamic changes that have occurred across the 
continent. The new era of competitive politics necessitated the political elite and ruling 
coalition to adopt and align with pro-poor reforms in social policy. The underlying assumption 
is that political institutions are important in understanding social policy reforms, especially 
those linked to social cash transfer schemes across Africa. Politics has a potent influence on 
events and the political class may seek redistributive services to enhance their popularity and 
legitimacy.  
 
By elevating the role of political institutions over the role played by transnational actors, 
international actors are considered purveyors of ideas with little power to bring policy change. 
The reality though is that international elites through social protection have created incentives 
to the political elite that align with the interests of the political elite.  
 
According to empirical explanations deriving from political institutions, social policy reforms 
in countries in Africa have occurred at specific times related to the electoral cycle. This is 
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because before periods of elections, governments made promises on expanding social cash 
transfers or seemed more “pro-poor” (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Siachiwena, 2017). 
Following the elections, the ruling parties and political elites getting into power have shown 
varied responses, ranging from increased budgetary allocation to resistance. In Zambia, 
budgetary allocation for social cash transfers increased following the election of Michael Sata 
(Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). Government allocation is estimated to have risen 
by 700 per cent in 2014. The increase attributed to the alignment of the ideological position 
and commitment to the improvement of the welfare of citizens, however aligns with pressure 
from international organisations.  
 
But in other countries, political institutions and party competitions failed to lead to similar 
responses to those of Zambia. In Uganda, resistance has been marked by the government 
reneging on promises of extending social assistance programmes (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016). 
The government of Uganda has only made nominal allocations, failing in the agreed promises 
to increase funding as other priorities become more prominent and as the government embarks 
on other competing projects. Only in light of international organisations’ threats to withdraw 
funds has Uganda increased budgetary allocation to the programmes. Since the start of the 
Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE) programme, despite great influence and 
pressure from donor organisations, government funding has remained limited. International 
actors often complain of a lack of political will, conceptualised through the amount of financial 
resources provided by government. Since the start of the programme the government of Uganda 
has only provided minimal resources in the form of office space and salaries for senior 
government officials (Angucia and Katusiimeh, 2015). Even in countries celebrated as early 
adopters like Kenya, governments have been slow to release funds, exhibiting resistance like 
Uganda in their slow financial commitment.  
 
3.2.2 Limits of the Political Settlement and Political Institutions Approaches 
The political settlements approach acknowledges the key role of global actors in the promotion 
of social protection policy reforms across Africa. However, their focus on national politics is 
rather thin on evidence and largely hinges on transnational action in the formation of ideas and 
creating incentives. By focusing on the adoption of social protection as a form of political 
settlement, the scholars allude to the different political dynamics at country level but fail to 
explain how the different national political elements led to the same outcome. In addition, they 
fail to explain similarities in adoption timing or design of programmes in different political 
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settlements. A look at the social assistance programmes across the countries shows similar 
designs and to some extent even similar programme names. For instance, in Kenya there is the 
Hunger Safety Net Programme, in Rwanda the Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) and in 
Ethiopia the PSNP. There is also little divergence in the design of the schemes, with slight 
variations in a couple of programmes. This aspect points to the role of another factor, which 
this thesis argues is the powerful role of transnational actors taking advantage of political 
processes to promote similar programmes. Though the political settlement approach 
demonstrates the different political configurations across countries, it does not explain 
similarities in programmes.  
 
The weakness of the role of political institutions is demonstrated by Siachiwena (2017), who 
argues that shifts in political parties by individuals characterise the political and electoral 
process in a number of countries in Africa. Politicians therefore shift alliances from party to 
party, creating new allies and sometimes creating new parties as vehicles for winning elections. 
In Kenya, like Zambia, to win elections, politicians seek the most popular party of the time 
without paying attention to party ideology. In addition, as stated by the political institutionalists 
themselves, social protection is not a salient issue in elections across countries in Africa yet. 
Salience of social protection policies in electoral processes can only emanate from bottom-up 
processes of social protection policymaking where the agenda is not driven by external 
agencies like donor organisations. In countries where social protection is an important 
campaign issue, it is closely linked to a strong state-citizen social contract built around citizen 
demands rather than from processes that have little participation of citizens. 
 
3.3 Ideational Approaches and Policy Change 
Besides the arguments by the political settlements approach and political institutions is the 
thesis that social policy reform in Africa is a result of diffusion of ideas – ideational approaches. 
Discussions emanating from this thesis centre around policy learning and the spread of ideas 
in bringing about policy change. In their view, ideationalists argue that ideas are the driving 
force behind policy change (Baumgartner, 2013). Ideas are described as “…. claims about 
descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” 
(Parsons, 2002, p. 48). Ideas are described as the building blocks of policy agendas (Parsons, 
2002). Ideational approaches often involve the use of reason, with idea carriers invoking 
concepts and applying values and weighing up evidence (John, 2012). Policy change therefore 
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occurs as a result of debates and arguments and contestations among policy actors. Parsons 
(2007) states that ideas work in three ways: first they define the problem and construct the 
problem; second, they shape the assumptions and the solutions to the problems and then they 
became discursive weapons that are used for amplification. For this reason, ideas are salient 
and the language employed in passing on the ideas gives them prominence. But ideas by 
themselves are not powerful enough to bring about policy change; who carries the idea is more 
powerful, thereby giving the idea power. As demonstrated in the study of social assistance in 
Finland, ideas are able to bring about change if they are carried, supported and imposed by 
powerful actors (Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen, 2014). 
 
Policy ideas are defined as “the causal beliefs, symbols, theories, perceptions, and lessons that 
underlie policy decisions and choices” (Foli and Béland, 2014, p. 5). International 
organisations are increasingly relying on ideational mechanisms in diffusing policy ideas rather 
than the use of conditionalities associated with aid. According to ideationalists, when people 
are exposed to “new ideas and a new way of doing things” they are able to alter behaviour and 
make different choices based on the new information they have. Social learning, socialisation 
and persuasion are the key mechanisms in ideational approaches. Ideas have an impact on 
policy change as they shape issues and problems in social, political and economic agendas and 
also shape how the problems may be solved (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011). Actors 
formulate and generate ideas while institutions interact with the ideas to facilitate or constrain 
policy change. Ideas are dynamic and how they are framed is important for policy change. The 
interaction of ideas with political actors and institutional forces are mediating factors for their 
adoption (Béland, 2009). Ideational approaches are likely to be successful when they take 
advantage of a policy moment that shakes and changes the stability of institutions. Policy 
purveyors adept at recognising mediational factors pay attention to timing as it provides an 
opportunity for the introduction of new ideas. Windows of opportunity may be necessary to 
bring about policy change but is not sufficient to bring about a major policy shift by itself 
(Baumgartner, 2013). Though learning may seem non-pressurising  and benign in influencing 
policy change, in reality it is a battle, a “discourse or hegemonic struggle through which 
different interests and actors jostle to be in the driver’s seat of ideas and world views” (Deacon, 
2012, p. 81) . 
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3.3.1 Ideas in Social Protection Policymaking and Policy Change 
Unlike the political settlements and political institutions explanations, ideationalists ascribe the 
uptake of social protection to the spread of ideas by transnational actors. Ideational mechanisms 
are increasingly used in Africa for policy transfer. Ideationalists contend that transnational 
actors are policy proposers, proposing social policy ideas to African countries which national 
governments accept. Ideas and expertise therefore are considered the central means of  policy 
influence by transnational actors (Béland and Orenstein, 2013). Transnational actors, like the 
IMF, World Bank and UNICEF, considered agenda setters, come together as advocacy policy 
coalitions, and rally behind a certain policy idea – social protection adoption –in framing their 
ideas and advocating for the uptake of social protection and cash transfers. Policy change, 
according to ideationalists, occurs through a system of ideas that influence how politicians and 
policymakers learn to address problems (Evans 2009). Besides changes in social assistance 
programmes of cash transfers, the spread of ideas is considered key to social pensions reforms 
that occurred across some African countries in the 1990s (Kpessa, 2010, 2013; Kpessa and 
Béland, 2012). Transnational actors are therefore considered policy proposal actors (Foli, 
2015) who set the agenda by defining the problem, and suggest feasible solutions which are 
mediated among actors at national level. 
 
Scholars working from this perspective argue that lesson drawing and learning were the key 
mechanisms through which the social relations between transnational actors and national actors 
were created. Policy learning “occurs when policymakers adjust their cognitive understanding 
of policy development and modify policy in light of knowledge gained from past policy 
experience” (Stone, 2004, p. 548). Lesson drawing and learning imply that national actors and 
governments are rational actors who decided to emulate the practice of social protection. 
Further, learning is portrayed as a positive and progressive connotation (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009). Foli (2015) in her study attributes the adoption of the LEAP in Ghana to the influence 
of transnational actors through ideational approaches, arguing that this was the main 
mechanism employed by transnational actors in diffusing the social protection programme. The 
argument contends that transnational actors, due to the limits of their influence as non-veto 
players and because they lack formal veto power, are obliged to work through persuasions, 
paying greater attention to convincing national actors to change policy (Béland and Orenstein, 
2013). But learning and the passing on of ideas is more than a benign exercise; rather, “ideas 
may serve the function of seizing control of the policy terrain, undermining policy learning, 
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generating policy atrophy in the host local context, distorting local realities and undermining 
long-term sustained development” (Adésínà, 2011, p. 456).  
 
Scholars working from this perspective consider social relations among actors in the policy 
space as symmetrical. This assumption is problematic at two levels: First it fails to consider 
the power bases of financial and knowledge resources which international actors bring into the 
policy space. The reality is that as a holder of material incentives and knowledge, transnational 
actors already possess power that they can use for the manipulation in the policy space. In 
policy transfer processes, policymaking is controlled by the actors with the resources who are 
capable of influencing the policy process and of changing actors’ interest; much of what looks 
like consent may be force (Howarth, 2010). The second problematic assumption is that 
knowledge is neutral and does not constitute a resource. The reality is that knowledge and who 
controls the knowledge in power transfer is a powerful player in the policy transfer process. In 
addition, knowledge by itself is a powerful resource which can be used to manipulate 
references and influence thinking of policy actors in specific directions by knowledge 
purveyors. 
 
3.3.2. Limits of Idea-based Approaches in Cash Transfer Adoption 
Although ideas are successful in explaining policy change, they can only explain results that 
come out of persuasion and advocacy. As suggested by John (2012), it is hard to say whether 
ideas could have brought changes by themselves. In addition, it is difficult to tell with clarity 
how and at what levels cognition occurred for policymakers to change their minds and adopt 
cash transfers. As mentioned above, ideas matter in policymaking and policy transfer and are 
powerful in bringing policy change when they are aligned to national contexts. What matters 
more however is who carries the idea and what position they hold in the policymaking arena. 
While understanding the role of ideas, which ideas are carried by each actor and who carries 
which ideas, in policy change it is important to understand how ideas are presented and how 
they are framed and shaped to align with the national social, political and economic context. 
Deriving from the point of view that ideas and knowledge are never neutral but based on the 
ontological and epistemological standing of the idea carrier, gives a better picture of how ideas 
are made and become powerful enough for policy change. 
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3.4. Theoretical Framework for the Study 
The study drew from the body of works on policy transfer as the theoretical framework. 
Dolowitz and Marsh in their seminal work define policy transfer as the 
“… process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development 
of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political 
system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p. 344).  
Policy transfer encompasses ideas of policy diffusion, lesson drawing and policy learning, with 
forms of transfer ranging from voluntary to direct coercion (Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 
2011). Policy transfer is multi-sited and multi-actor making the already dynamic social 
policymaking environment even more complex (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The transfer of 
social protection to Africa has opened the policymaking process to an array of actors, both 
domestic and international. Peck and Theodore describe the policymaking environment as 
“associated with the anointment of favoured ‘models’…entailing the enrolment of advocates 
and followers, the construction of pro-policy movements and the consolidation of norms and 
paradigms” (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p. 170). In the process of transfer of a policy, there are 
borrowers and lenders; this relationship, however, hardly changes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).  
 
The process of borrowing and learning  is not linear and neat, but mechanisms usually interact, 
creating difficulty in drawing lines between coercion and voluntary dynamics (Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009; Peck and Theodore, 2010). Policies too always transform from that which was 
envisaged; they mutate, and do not arrive as they were originally packaged. Mutation and 
change are attributed to the borrower’s context. For example, in Latin America, where the idea 
of cash transfers was borrowed from, benefits are often conditional on households participating 
in some human development activity. In Africa where, international organisations have 
transferred the scheme imposing conditions has been difficult due to lack of infrastructure 
among other factors. An analysis of policy transfer processes requires an understanding of how 
actors affect the policy process, and how agents relate to one another in order to further their 
interests. Actors within policy transfers processes include elected officials, civil servants, 
institutions, consultants, think tanks, and supranational institutions among others (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 1996). 
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3.4.1. Mechanisms in Policy Change  
In theory, policy transfer takes coercive or voluntary forms, but in practice policy transfer 
results from a combination of mechanisms (Nutley et al., 2013) envisaged in a continuum 
ranging from learning to coercion on the extreme ends (Sugiyama, 2011; Obinger, Schmitt and 
Starke, 2013). Agents of transfer use combinations of mechanisms, ideas and interests to 
convince players to adopt policies (Béland and Orenstein, 2013). Voluntary transfer occurs due 
to lesson drawing. While rare, direct coercive transfers still occur as in the case of SAPs and 
austerity measures towards Greece (Obinger, Schmitt and Starke, 2013). Soft coercive forms 
of policy transfer occur in cash transfer adoption when there is pressure from supranational or 
international organisations usually tied to aid and financial incentives  and when international 
organisations and national organisations advocate for certain social protection provisions 
(Lavers and Hickey, 2016). Indirect coercive mechanisms result from global/regional policy 
recommendations and mutual interconnectedness between states (Benson and Jordan, 2011; 
Lavers and Hickey, 2016).  
 
3.5. Policy Transfer and Power Nexus: Theoretical Framework 
The study adopts a policy transfer and power analysis as the theoretical approach. Following a 
review of existing literature on the subject under study, policy transfer alone was insufficient 
in explaining policy change, and therefore a power analysis approach was incorporated to bring 
about an empirically grounded analysis. Power in the study is conceptualised through Lukes’ 
view of power (Lukes, 1974). 
 
Different scholars conceptualise power differently. On one end of the spectrum, power is 
conceived as ‘domination over’; a situation in which power is exercised through structures of 
authority arising out of economic strength and control (Dahl, 1957; Weber, 1986). Power is 
conceived as an imposition through which one’s actions cause the action of another. Policy 
processes, however, even when involving powerful players, are often devoid of such direct 
control. Yet domination still exists in policy transfer mechanisms. For example, in the 1980s 
and 1990s governments in developing countries were compelled by the World Bank and the 
IMF to adopt SAPs to secure grants and loans (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 2002). Equally, 
the recent financial bailout of Greece points to such high handedness by international 
organisations in policymaking processes. In the context of Kenya’s uptake of social protection 
programmes, social relations between international and national actors were non-egalitarian 
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and asymmetrical. International agents were able to strategically exercise control and 
dominance over the transfer process through the knowledge and resources they brought to the 
policy arena. 
 
Rather than see power as an imposition, one can also view it as relational. Agents always exist 
and engage in practices within a constraining as well as facilitating nexus of power relations. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) suggest that power is not just the ability to exert one’s will directly 
over the other but also extends to the ability to prevent another person or group from access to 
decision-making arenas. It is from this view that Lukes expands to suggest a third dimension 
of power. In the seminal Power: A Radical View (Lukes, 1974), Lukes offers a 
conceptualisation of power which is based on three dimensions from which this study draws. 
Lukes conceptualises power in three dimensions. First there is overt power, the clear visible 
exercise of “power over”. The second is the dimension of “non-decisions” (Lukes, 2005). In 
policy transfer processes, this dimension relates to the ability to control the agenda and 
determine what is discussed. Further, the second dimension emphasises the ability to control 
the political agenda and to suppress or delay decisions on issues (Torfing, 2009). It is the 
dimension of “manipulated consent”, where actors try to minimise conflict by influencing, 
shaping and determining the wants of another (Lukes 1975, pp. 21-23). 
 
Third is the view of power as ideational, the ability of actors to shape perceptions, preferences 
and choices in ways that influence other actors’ understandings, thereby bringing change. 
Within the third dimension is the emphasis of suppression of latent conflicts through action or 
inaction (Torfing, 2009). Here the emphasis is on the role of ideas in convincing others to 
willingly accept a proposal “against their own ‘real interests’ by persuading them such activity 
is in their interest” (Lukes, 2005). Lukes explains it as follows: 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not 
want to do, but he also exercises power over him by determining his 
very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another 
or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is to secure 
their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? (Lukes, 
2005, p. 27). 
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Lukes introduces the idea of “non-agenda” or “non-decisions”, a situation where policy actors’ 
and groups’ interests are not represented, as policy monopolies constrain and control which 
actors are admitted into the policy space. Actors with monopoly in structural power relations, 
as in the case of the adoption of cash transfers, constrain the actors of others sometimes even 
more “powerful” actors through various strategies like depoliticisation, which is discussed in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis. Power acts to constrain some actors from recognising their domination. 
As Lukes (1974 p. 24) observes: “... is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power 
to prevent people to whatever degree, from having grievance shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things?” People therefore “accept their role in the existing order of things either because they 
can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they view it as natural and unchangeable, or 
because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 1974, p. 2). The superiority 
of social elites becomes part of the natural order of things.  
Lukes’ analysis brings to the fore matters of interests and legitimacy. Policymaking is a 
constellation of interests that actors use to legitimise their views and forms of legitimacy that 
in turn enable them to further their interests. It is through interests that one can distinguish 
legitimate from illegitimate power. Lukes suggests that it is possible for power to be exercised 
over people against their perceived preferences but in their real interests. To influence others’ 
interests, groups bring different resources into relations of power, which they manipulate to 
advance their interests. One aspect in the third dimension is the aspect where actors prevent 
the manifest emergence of grievances through shaping “perceptions, cognition and 
preferences” (Lukes, 2005, p. 25). Within this dimension, power is through “socially structured 
and culturally patterned behaviour” (Lukes, 1974, p. 22). In relation to governmentality as 
advanced by Foucault, meaning the techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour, 
strategies employed in the case of neo-liberal programmes try to shape the conditions under 
which these liberties are exposed as choices with governmental approaches and practices trying 
to shape the conditions under which choice is made (Dean, 2009).  
Lukes’ third dimension relates to Foucault’s on power/knowledge. In his proposition, he argues 
that the third dimension is a form of hegemony (Lukes, 2005). Here Foucault mirrors Lukes in 
that both propose that power and knowledge are inextricably interwoven. An analysis of power 
within policymaking processes therefore necessitates an analysis of strategies that actors 
employ within and through their social relations rather than one that emphasises top-down 
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singular modes of coercion. To Foucault, power is not singular; rather it operates in multiple 
forms. Moreover, it is ubiquitous; present everywhere and operating in all kinds of social 
relations. Social relations are the medium through which power is exercised. His notion of 
power as collective action is useful in analysing policy adoption processes where power is 
exercised through shaping others’ perceptions, preferences and determining their wants – a 
form of manipulated consent. Power relations are therefore not strictly coercive but rather are 
dynamic and reciprocal, with actors using strategies and tactics to impose their will on others. 
Power operates upon a complex web of relations and is more about “management of 
possibilities” and ability to “structure the possible action of others” rather than through 
violence or direct coercion (Mckee, 2009, p. 471). Power is multiple, it overlaps and at times 
contradicts (Foucault, 2002). 
Lukes’ conception of power offers a superior framework through which to study power 
relations in policy transfer as it widens space for complex interactions among social agents.  
Moreover, it provides room to examine different strategies through which policy transfer 
happens, from coercion to learning, while taking into consideration both formal and informal 
institutions. 
3.6. The Conceptual Framework for the Study 
This section sets out an analytical framework developed to understand the process and the 
dynamics of social protection policy adoption. The framework is generated by insights from 
the empirical data, the theoretical underpinnings of the study and the review of literature. The 
conceptual framework derives from the review and a critique of literature and the researchers’ 
own experience in the sector. The conceptual framework influenced data collection and 
analysis guided by the following questions: (1) How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and 
interests shape the development and adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP? (2) What 
institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the adoption of 
the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya? (3) What have been the changes in the social policy 
regime as a result of the adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya? (4) What lessons 
be learnt from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes in Kenya?  
 
The conceptual framework postulates the relationships and perspectives of the theoretical 
framework and underlying variables from the review of literature. The conceptual framework 
helps to focus the research process: the methodological design, the development of data 
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collection instruments that were used, data collection process and data analysis. The 
analysis/conceptual framework draws from policy transfer framework and power as 
conceptualised by Lukes, where we draw upon concepts of mechanisms of transfer, actors and 
resources. From Lukes’ conception of power, we draw the concepts of power, ideas, knowledge 
and interests. These concepts and information deriving from policy transfer reflects and inform 
on power as a theoretical framework upon which we draw on power which we incorporate the 
ideas of power based on Lukes’ faces of power. From Lukes’ three dimensions of power we 
draw upon notions of power, ideas and knowledge in explaining the mechanisms of transfer. 
 
The research questions developed provided a road map for the conceptual framework. 
Specifically, we sought to identify the process leading to the adoption of social protection 
policies in Kenya. Each category of the conceptual framework developed derives from the 
objective and the research questions as outlined in Chapter 1. The first objective aims at 
investigating the role of actors, ideas, incentives and interests in developing and promoting the 
CT-OVC and HSNP as social protection instruments. Therefore, the conceptual categories 
relating to it are “power/social relations” and “international mechanisms”. The second 
objective seeks to analyse the mediating factors leading to the adoption of the programmes. 
From this, the category that is emerging is “domestic mediating factors”. Lastly, the last 
objective sought to establish the social policy regime of Kenya as a result of the adoption of 
the programmes. Out of this objective, the appropriate categorisation is “social policy 
environment in Kenya”. Based on literature, responses from participants to the research 
questions, the researcher developed descriptors under each category.  
 
The analytical framework of the study is underpinned by a number of concepts. Resources in 
the case of social protection adoption represent both material and immaterial resources upon 
which actor relations within the policy network/policy space are constructed. Different actors 
bring with them differing resources upon which they draw and leverage to gain legitimacy in 
the policy space. In addition, resources are also used to influence other actors in the policy 
space. Resources here include financial, knowledge (ideas) and political power resources, 
which provide legitimacy to the participation of actors within global policymaking processes 
(Preece, 2013).   
 
Mechanisms of transfer are shaped through a manipulation of resources and positions and 
points of legitimacy by the various actors. As policy transfer agents, international organisations 
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carried a repertoire of resources, enabling them to control the mechanisms of transfer ranging 
from “power over” mechanisms to the influence of ideas. Power therefore includes the 
manipulation of resources, ideas, knowledge, finances and so forth to influence the interests of 
other actors. Considering Lukes’ three dimensions of power, interests represent a sort of 
“agreement”, while ideas are used to influence the preference of actors. Power is linked to 
conditionalities of financial resources which countries continue to depend on from international 
organisation (Abdulai, 2019). The outcomes of the policy transfer process and the 
policymaking process are shaped by the national context, which includes institutions.  
 
Resources: Resources include both material and non-material supplies upon which the process 
of social protection policy adoption is constructed. Power resources form the basis and the 
medium through which policy transfer agents pursue their aims to bring about policy change. 
Specifically, the resources involved in the generation of power include financial, organisational 
and knowledge resources from which policy purveyors derive their domination over other 
actors, particularly in asymmetrical social relation spaces (Bache and Taylor, 2003). We adopt 
the concept of resources in social protection policymaking and transfer in the interplay of 
actors’ relationship within the policy network. Transfer agents of social protection deploy and 
use resources available to them in a way and manner that then provides them with power to 
leverage on their policy ideas. The concept of resources was chosen to widen the analysis of 
dynamics of policy transfer, as these affect the outcome of the policy transfer – the adoption or 
rejection of the transferred policy. These material and non-material aspects in return reflect the 
power asymmetry that characterise the social protection policymaking space. In the framework 
we adapt knowledge, finance and organisation to suggest the key resources from which 
policymaking and social protection policy transfer are drawn.  
 
Mechanisms of transfer: In this framework, various actors draw on various resources to bring 
about policy change. Resources are deployed as a means of mechanisms of transfer. The 
concept of mechanisms of transfer here draws from Dolowitz and Marsh’s continuum, which 
depicts mechanisms of transfer as ranging from voluntary to coercive. The term mechanisms 
therefore cover a variety of aspects of transfer with a range of degrees. Transfer agents in the 
social protection policymaking space and as policy bearers do not just use one mechanism of 
transfer; rather they employ different mechanisms at different times, sometimes in 
combination, for policy adoption to occur. Differences in mechanisms depend on various 
aspects including country context – social, economic, and political – and the timing of transfer 
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and windows of opportunity. Negotiated transfer and direct coercive transfer are common in 
developing countries where recipient countries’ freedom of choice is constrained by transfer 
agents (Evans, 2009). 
Mechanisms of transfer in this framework are directly linked and connected with resources. 
Where there are material resources like financial resources with high dependency of the 
recipient country, the policy transfer process is characterised by conditionalities linked to the 
country increasing resources (Abdulai, 2019). Where mechanisms are deemed to be voluntary, 
policy transfer agents draw upon knowledge and ideas to influence other actors through social 
learning and to influence the preference of actors in the transfer of policies.  
Specific mechanisms of transfer drawing on the resources of transfer agents therefore include 
imposition of solutions and policies by the transfer agents – policy prescriptions. On the other 
side of the spectrum following on Lukes’ three dimensions of power is the influencing of other 
actors’ preference through what is considered social learning. Policy agents and transfer agents 
use different mechanisms depending on the country dynamics and context to bring about policy 
change. 
Agents: Another component of our framework comprises actors or agents who interact in the 
policymaking process. Actors operating within the space are shaped by and shape resources – 
financial and ideas/knowledge – to bring about policy change, in this case the adoption of social 
protection policies like the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Borrowing from Dolowitz and Marsh, in 
our conceptual framework we make a distinction between policy actors that carry the policy 
idea and the borrowers or recipients. Policy transfer agents in the social protection policy 
transfer process can be categorised into two broad categories. On one hand are transnational 
actors – those who carry the ideas and policies – and on the other national domestic actors. 
Both groups of actors are related and connected to each other based on the resources they 
possess and their sources of power. This structure shows that though we have transnational 
actors and domestic actors, to influence the policymaking process, actors collaborate with each 
other at different times. It does not necessarily suggest oppositional stands in the policy transfer 
and policymaking process, but refers to social networks based on actors’ relations with each 
other operating within a policy network or a policy advocacy network. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, agents of policy transfer in the literature include politicians, bureaucrats, 
policy entrepreneurs including epistemic communities, academicians, civil society 
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organisations or pressure groups, international organisations, global financial institutions and 
supranational institutions.  
Policy Context – Political, Social and Economic: Policy context in this study describes the 
windows of opportunity that transnational actors use to anchor the transfer and adoption of 
cash transfer schemes. In the policy transfer context, the policy context is sometime regarded 
as “windows of opportunity” upon which actors shape their policy agenda or anchor their 
policy agenda transfer (Kingdon, 2013). Policy context provides opportunity for transfer agents 
to promote the policy agenda. Policy context is related to the policy solution and therefore 
provides the basis of policymaking as it relates to social realities that may be present at the 
national level that then requires a solution. Political context on the other hand relates to the 
national political institutions that may provide a facilitative bedrock for policy adoption. 
Institutions shape the policymaking process but policymaking may also shape institutions and 
in the case of policy transfer in asymmetrical relations, policy transfer agents may shape the 
policy context to suit policy transfer. Based on this conceptualisation, the study therefore 
sought to examine the extent to which the policy transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the 
HSNP were facilitated by the social, political and economic context and the feasibility of the 
policies at the time of transfer and adoption.  
Ideas/knowledge: In this study, ‘ideas’ is used to mean “claims about description of the world, 
causal relationship of the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons, 2002). The notion 
of ideas here is borrowed from Parsons. Ideas are influential in bringing about policy change. 
Ideas are what policy transfer agents and actors use to frame problems and craft solutions. Ideas 
are closely linked to knowledge, with policy promoters seeking to change and influence other 
actors with ideas as they convey the agenda. Learning is considered an avenue through which 
policy agents pass on ideas and knowledge in policy arenas. Learning is viewed as a voluntary 
mechanism in policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) where knowledge and ideas are used 
to persuade others. Ideas matter, but who carries the ideas matter most. In policy transfer 
contexts involving asymmetrical social relations, the actor who possesses knowledge and ideas 
– the policy transfer agent – becomes a powerful authority, with the ability to manipulate ideas 
to bring about policy transfer. Carriers of ideas often depend on epistemic communities to make 
ideas and knowledge powerful.  
Interests: In policymaking processes, actors come with different interests which compete and 
the one with the most powerful resources wins. Actors pursue their interests by brokering 
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relations and seeking to influence others with divergent interests. Interests within the policy 
space may include pecuniary, material, political or self-interests (Adésínà, 2011; Stone, 2011).  
Convergence of interests is what brings about policy change. In policy spaces characterised by 
donor dependency, donor interests often prevail, as donors are able to marshal resources – 
power, skills, knowledge and finances – to influence other actors’ interests. Interests refer to 
the preference and power embedded in policy actors.  
We believe this conceptual framework may contribute to policy transfer literature in 
highlighting how power relations shape the content of policy instruments that are the object of 
transfer. The framework will further be helpful in highlighting actors’ interaction in the 
interpretation of the instruments adopted in other political systems. 
3.7. Conclusion 
The review of literature on the various propositions explaining the current policy change in 
Africa in the form of the adoption of cash transfers indicates that the proposition has been 
heavily skewed towards domestic and national processes and politics in explaining policy 
adoption. The main argument by the framework in this case is that domestic and national 
politics shape the adoption of the policies and are the key reason for the adoption of cash 
transfer schemes. While offering the role of international actors as caveats in explaining the 
adoption of the policies, the arguments fail to adequately address the powerful role of 
international and transnational actors in the policy space. Moreover, political settlement and 
arguments on politics fail to explain the asymmetry of relations that exist in the policymaking 
processes and the significant role of transnational actors as key transfer agents of social policy 
change. Ideational approaches, though paying attention to the role of international 
organisations, assume that learning and ideas are power-neutral. In addition, ideational 
approaches assume that learning is carried out by rational domestic actors seeking solutions to 
problems through a collaborative process. While ideational approaches present one mechanism 
through which international actors promote social protection, demonstrated in Chapter 6 it is 
through a discursive process rather than through straightforward social learning and lesson 
drawing.  
 
Consequently, this study adopts a policy transfer approach with a power analysis component 
to understand and explain the transfer and adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP cash transfer 
programmes in Kenya. In the study, we focus on the mechanisms that transnational actors used 
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to promote social protection policies. The study adopts a policy transfer approach combined 
with a power analysis as policy transfer by itself is insufficient to adequately explain the 
dynamics of social protection policy adoption.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction  
The purpose of this research is to explore the process and the dynamics that shaped the uptake 
of social protection policies in Kenya. By employing qualitative modes of inquiry, the research 
explored the mechanisms used in the policymaking process leading to the uptake of the 
policies, the domestic enabling factors in the adoption, and the resultant changes to the 
country’s social policy framework. To recap, the following were the research questions for the 
study: (1) How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and 
adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP? (2) What institutional, administrative and political factors 
facilitated or constrained the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP?  (3) To what extent has 
the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformation of the social policy regime?  
(4) What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes? 
To adequately respond to the above questions, the research adopted a qualitative 
methodological approach. 
This chapter describes the research methodology of the study. First is a presentation of my 
position in relation to the study. It then proceeds to discuss the qualitative approach used and 
provides a rationale of the choice based on the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of 
the study. The second section describes in greater detail the research design. This part explains 
the selection of the cases under study, the CT-OVC and the HSNP, and the sampling strategy 
for the recruitment of participants. The methods adopted for data generation are discussed, 
followed by an account of the process of analysis of the data. Lastly, the chapter highlights 
methodological and other challenges related to the study before offering a brief reflection on 
ethical issues that emerged during the study. Thereafter is a conclusion of the chapter.  
4.2. The Position of the Researcher in Relation to the Study  
Having worked in the social protection sector since 2007, it is prudent to state my position in 
relation to the study. The research setting was my previous area of work, with the study 
question emerging both from literature and out of my experience in the sector. Between 2007 
and 2015, I participated in the development of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy 
2012 and the National Social Protection Sector Review 2011. At the same time, I was involved 
in the initial design of the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT) and the implementation of the 
Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). Part of my other roles included training civil society 
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organisations and working with regional economic communities in the promotion of social 
protection policies. In considering my role as an insider, I needed to remain aware of ethical 
considerations and of the biases that I bring to the study (Greene, 2014). 
Several advantages accrue from being an insider. I had pre-existing knowledge of the research 
context and of the “historical and practical happenings in the field”. Previous interaction with 
the participants presented me with ease of identification and access (Greene 2014; Kerstetter 
2012; Unluer 2012). I narrowed down on knowledgeable respondents and those who had 
participated in the process of social protection policymaking. Some of the respondents had 
been colleagues at various stations. But as Greene (2012) notes, such kinds of relationships can 
compromise objectivity; to overcome this, I endeavoured for reflexivity to allow for “analytic 
distance”. As I was “already native”, I had the privilege of knowledge and knew the study field, 
thereby cutting down on the time needed for familiarisation.  
Whereas it is considered easy to access respondents, this is not always the case. Like other 
researchers, I had several appointments cancelled, postponed or others did not take place at all. 
As an insider, one is often considered knowledgeable about the field and about the topic of 
study (Unluer, 2012). For this reason, some respondents assumed I already knew the responses 
to the questions. To overcome this, I reiterated that it was their perspectives and views I was 
seeking. Another disadvantage common to insider researchers in qualitative studies is having 
one’s own biases cloud the view of the respondents. I needed to stay objective even in the way 
that I presented the questions.  I needed to guard against passing judgement on whether a 
response that had been provided was accurate or untrustworthy. The use of multiple means of 
data collection helped to guard against this as information could be verified from other sources 
of data. 
In the analysis of data, I was careful in checking the responses and had to stay reflexive and 
critical of self so as not to impose my meanings on that of the respondents. I needed to guard 
against dishonesty with the respondents’ answers and to report them as truthfully as I could to 
reflect participants’ responses and not my beliefs or biases. This vigilance was kept throughout 
the data generation process, analysis process, and presentation of findings and helped “enhance 
the confirmability” of findings (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Ethical issues especially privacy, 
trust and confidentiality had to be keenly observed.  
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Though it may seem that the insider researcher has an advantage over the outsider in terms of 
knowledge, Unluer (2012) contends that this knowledge difference is not usually immensely 
different from that of the outsider. In addition, all researchers face biases in their studies and 
each should guard against these biases; this is not peculiar to insider researchers only. An 
outsider may come to the field with predetermined biases that act the same as that of the insider 
researcher. For this reason, we all need to guard against our biases and not just the insider 
researcher.  
4.3 Research Strategy  
This project is an empirical study based on a qualitative research design. It is grounded in social 
constructivism. The selection of the approach was informed by the phenomenon the research 
sought to explain; the process of social protection policy transfer in Kenya. Drawing from two 
cash transfer programmes, the study examined the transfer and uptake of the policies. A 
qualitative research approach was useful as it allowed for the study of the phenomenon in its 
natural setting and context (Silverman 2014). The other strengths the approach offered, was 
the flexibility in interpretation of meanings and the ability to unearth processes beyond the 
surface (Yin, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Creswell, 2012a). The approach was useful in 
uncovering the not-so obvious by going beyond the “policy statements, structures and the post-
rationalisations of elites” (Peck & Theodore 2010, p. 172). An understanding of policy change 
involves studying processes that happened in the past and in a complex way (Creswell, 2012a; 
Starke, 2013) which quantitative methods would have been constrained in measuring. To 
understand these complexities, qualitative methods present the more appropriate and practical 
approach. 
The choice of an approach in a research study emanates from the assumptions and views one 
holds on reality. Epistemological positions not only guide our understanding of human 
knowledge but also how that knowledge is attained and the characteristics of that knowledge 
(Crotty, 1998; Silverman, 2015). Having clarity on our position shapes the formulation of “our 
research questions and how we seek information to answer the questions” (Creswell, 2012b, p. 
81). In addition, it guides our choice of methodology and methods, ensuring the soundness of 
our research and attainment of convincing outcomes (Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2012a). Our 
epistemological position informs our analysis, enabling us to go beyond mere description, by 
providing the basis of how we derive meanings from participants. 
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Based on the necessity to understand the linkages of causality and mechanisms that shaped the 
uptake of social protection, an acknowledgement of the complexities of the matter was 
necessary (George and Bennett, 2005; Creswell, 2012a). For this reason, the research relied on 
participants’ views and the multiple meanings and perspectives which they attached to reality 
(Crotty, 1998; Yin, 2010). The focus of the research was on the different constructions of social 
realities based on the same phenomenon. It was imperative to subsume my meanings and 
interpretations as the researcher to understand how social realities related to the phenomenon 
were “produced, assembled, and maintained” (Silverman, 2013, p. 26). Crotty (1998) notes 
that subjectivity of meanings is often negotiated socially and through interaction with others 
and with social norms. Rigorous development of the questions, data collection process, and 
analysis ensured a rich basis for capturing these realities (Tracy, 2010). To allow for flexibility 
of construction of meanings, the research questions were broad. The order of questions was 
also changed, questions reviewed, and different questions asked to different respondents. To 
study the phenomenon adequately, the research applied the case study approach.  
4.3.1 Rationale for the Case Study Approach 
The research uses the multiple case study approach to examine adoption of social protection 
policy in Kenya.  The use of case studies is well-established in determining policy transfer and 
policy change (Starke, 2013). George and Bennet (2008, p. 5) define the approach as “the 
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical 
explanations that may be generalised to other events”. Case study research methods are 
preferred when there is a need to study “a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (Yin, 2013a). When using multiple sources and methods for data generation, the 
approach can reveal social processes that influence outcomes and can uncover what has been 
underneath the surface. Triangulation of data methods was employed to achieve this through 
interviews with key informants, a review of documents and through participant observation. In 
seeking to explain the policy process in Kenya, the approach is appropriate for the study 
objectives.  
The strengths of a case study approach justify its selection. First, the case study approach has 
the advantage of inductive examination of complex interactions (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2013b) and the ability to uncover decision-making process in historical 
and social contexts. Secondly, it possesses the detailed exploration needed for uncovering 
causal factors (George and Bennett, 2005). In studying policy transfer, a case study approach 
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is appropriate as it stays close to policy subjects and actors, thereby developing a nuanced view 
of reality (Silverman, 2015). Lastly, it provides clues on causal factors while being attentive to 
policy studies. The study attempted to draw inferences from the dynamics that characterised 
the uptake of the policy by tracing the “spread of policies and ideas through historical 
reconstruction of decision-making at actor level” (Starke, 2013, p. 572). Therefore, case study 
deals with explanatory causal mechanisms and can trace “links between causes and observed 
outcomes” (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 6). Both case study and process tracing are suitable 
“for in-depth investigation of a complex phenomenon” (Shearer et al., 2016, p. 1202) which 
occurred in the past. 
As the researcher I was aware of the limitations of the case study approach. Generalisation, is 
often highlighted as one of its significant limitations. Thomas (2010) refers to Yin, who, due 
to this limitation, calls the case study the weak sibling among the social sciences. Despite this 
weakness, patterns and connections can be drawn with other cases. Kenya shares similarities 
with countries across Africa. The transfer of social protection policies happened at the same 
time frame and was promoted by the same transnational actors. This explains the congruence 
of programmes on the continent and the similarities in patterns of transfer and adoption. 
However, George & Bennet (2010) stress that generalisation is not the aspiration of a case 
study approach in the first place; rather its intent is to explain the particular, the specifics of 
the case (Thomas, 2011; Creswell, 2012a). To ensure transferability of the findings of the 
study, a “parallel criteria” to generability (Lincoln and Guba, 2000), I therefore provided 
sufficient information regarding the research design to enable others to decide how the findings 
may be transferred. The sub-sections below describe case selection, the study population and 
data generation.  
4.3.2 Case Selection and the Study Population  
The interest of the research was to explain the influence of external actors on a domestic policy 
process in Kenya. The research consists of two cases, the HSNP and the CT-OVC. For an 
exploration of external involvement in policy change, the two cases were representative in 
relation to the topic of study. The selection of the two cases was purposive due to their potential 
of  “yielding the most relevant and plentiful data” (Yin, 2010, p. 88). They exemplified 
different causal mechanisms in the adoption of cash transfers. Of importance was that the cases 
provide the broadest range of information and perspectives (Yin, 2010) and the “strongest 
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possible inferences” (George and Bennett, 2005). In the selection, the nature of the two 
programmes was reflected upon.  
The Kenya National Safety Net Programme comprises four cash transfer programmes, with 
both the HSNP and CT-OVC initiated through donor funding.  Though similar in external 
influence, the initiation of the two programmes differed in certain aspects. First is the timing 
of initiation. The CT-OVC was one of the earliest programmes initiated in the wave of 2003. 
A new government had come into power after 24 years of the presidency of Daniel arap Moi.1 
It was a recovery period following decades of economic mismanagement (Kelsall, 2013). On 
the other hand, the HSNP was initiated in 2007 during a period of relative economic and 
political stability. The two cases exhibit variation in dynamics based on Kenya’s socio-
economic and political context at the time of their initiation. Second was the relationship of the 
initiating donor and the state. UNICEF has traditionally worked with the Government of Kenya 
through joint programmes, while DFID funds have been channelled through direct budget 
support. Case selection was also driven by pragmatic reasons, taking into consideration time, 
money and access. Availability of relevant documents in both local and international databases 
was considered during selection. Thus, theoretical and logistical considerations drove the 
selection of the two cases.   
The combination of poverty and HIV/AIDS provided global and national impetus for the CT-
OVC. Following the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly (UNGASS) 
report in 2001, member states adopted a commitment to address the effects of HIV and AIDS. 
Highlights from the report indicated the devastating effects of the epidemic on children, 
prompting experimentation with cash transfers. In 2004, the programme enrolled 400 
households. The number has since grown to 300,000 households in 2016. DFID was at the 
forefront of the initiation of the HSNP in Northern Kenya. The programme aims at reducing 
poverty in the drought-prone areas (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Characterised by perennial 
drought and famine, the counties in the area are among the poorest in the country. 
Implementation of the first phase was between 2007 and 2012. Food aid distribution was 
considered an untenable solution, hence its substitution with cash. The first phase of the 
programme was reaching more that 100,000 households.  
 
1 Daiel arap Moi (1978 to 2002) became the second president of Kenya after the passing away of the first 
president, Jomo Kenyatta. Moi served as vice-president to Kenyatta from 1967 to 1978. 
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The multiple case study was not aimed at increasing representativeness, rather it was to provide 
an opportunity for some variation in factors (Charbonneau et al., 2016)  related to relevant 
policy decision-making. The key guiding focus was in the dynamics that are significant in the 
differences between the two. Multiple cases were selected to refrain from the risk of claiming 
one possible explanation, leading to incorrect conclusions (George and Bennett, 2005). 
4.3.3 Sampling 
In conducting a case study research, the first step involves identifying the case or cases and 
then setting the boundaries of the aspects to be studied (Creswell, 2012a; Silverman, 2015). 
The selection of the two cases, as discussed above, was purposive for the possibility of showing 
different perspectives on the processes of policy transfer. Purposive sampling is appropriate 
when studying processes rather than individuals (Silverman, 2015). The study comprised 
institutions and individuals involved in the design of the two social protection programmes.   
In consideration of the research question, the study took on a purposive sampling strategy. The 
primary inclusion criteria for the respondents was their participation in the process of transfer 
and uptake of the policy. Participants who were knowledgeable about the process, though they 
may not have been part of the process, were recruited too. The variation in sampling was to 
represent diverse views with the aim of drawing on different respondent perspectives about the 
cases. Recruited participants were “information rich cases” and selected purposefully to 
provide insight into and understanding of the phenomena of study (Suri, 2011; Bloomberg and 
Volpe, 2015). During the interviews, I employed the snowballing sampling procedure to 
identify other possible respondents. The organisations which were selected varied, enabling 
the maximisation of differences  (Yin, 2010; Creswell, 2012a). Having been part of the process, 
I easily identified those that had been at the forefront of the development of the policy. 
To identify respondents, I first developed a sampling frame of the organisations that had been 
part of the development of the policy. These were grouped into three clusters: government, 
bilateral/multilateral, international NGOs and domestic civil society organisations. Thereafter, 
identified individuals for interviews from these organisations. The first cluster included social 
protection advisers at the World Bank and DFID, social policy advisers at UNICEF and country 
managers and social protection managers from international NGOs and local extensions of the 
creation of bilateral agencies and international NGOs which included HelpAge International, 
HelpAge Kenya, Oxfam and Africa Platform for Social Protection. Respondents from domestic 
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NGOs included managers at the Kenya Alliance for Advancement of Children’s Rights and 
Social Protection Actors Forum. Government officials comprised Principal Secretaries from 
the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, the National Treasury and the Ministry 
of Devolution and Planning, Directors of the CT-OVC and HSNP Secretariats, and Members 
of the Parliamentary Committee of Labour and Social Development.   
4.3.4 Recruitment of Participants 
The second level of sampling involved the selection of individuals in these organisations. For 
in-depth interviews, I approached the individuals who had been sampled. Most of them were 
willing to respond to the questions even though some were constrained for time. Follow-up 
was necessary for such participants until the interview was granted. These were in most cases 
members of parliament who divide their time between their constituencies and the parliament. 
Coupled with the frequent travel involved in their work, it was difficult to obtain interviews 
with some of them. Where people had left the employment of their organisation or had moved 
to other stations, I sought to locate them through the organisation. In most instances, I 
interviewed the person who was presently working in that capacity at the time and the person 
who had left. During the interviews, I asked participants for other possible interviewees and 
followed up with them for interviews. This helped in the identification of respondents that 
could have been left out in the initial sampling design.  When I reached information saturation 
point and no new information was forthcoming, I exited the field. 
4.4 Data Generation  
The site for data collection was Kenya. Data for the research study was generated through 
multiple methods: individual in-depth interviews, document analysis, and participant 
observation. The combination enhanced the robustness and adequacy of the data collection. 
The ability to use multiple methods forms one of the advantages of a case study, enabling one 
to build an in-depth picture of the case (Yin, 2010; Shearer et al., 2016) . Moreover, conducting 
a multi-method study is important for triangulation purposes. Triangulation involves verifying 
evidence from different sources and the use of multiple methods to “shed light on a theme or 
perspective” (Yin, 2013b). In addition, it enhances the “dependability of findings” (Lincoln 
and Guba 2000).  
Before going to the field, in compliance with the university’s regulations, I presented the 
research proposal to the University’s Research Ethics Committee for approval and clearance. 
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Ethical clearance acts as a safeguard for participants and ensures that the research follows 
ethically sound protocols in the generation of data. A consent form, providing a brief 
description of the research objectives, was part of the proposal. Herein specified were 
participants’ right to withdraw from the interview and an assurance of confidentiality. It was 
clarified that no monetary benefits would be derived from taking part in the interviews. If in 
agreement, participants signed at the bottom of the form prior to the start of the interview. In 
case of violations, redress mechanisms were indicated in the form.   
To facilitate the generation of data, I travelled to Kenya and conducted the field work from 
January to September 2016. During this time, I carried out face-to-face interviews, accessed 
policy documents, and participated in activities within the social protection sector. Though I 
had names of individuals and contacts for the interviews, it does not mean that there were no 
difficulties in accessing them. Individuals for the in-depth interviews were contacted before 
the interview to schedule the time and date. I asked for their permission to take part in the 
research. In some cases, participants had to seek permission from their managers before they 
could grant the interview.  
4.4.1. In-depth Interviews  
Individual in-depth interviews were used as the primary method of data collection. Besides 
their potential to provide “thick and rich descriptions”, in-depth interviews do capture different 
perspectives and a different understanding from participants. Face-to-face interviews 
facilitated interactive, dynamic encounters that entailed dialogue and probing of accounts and 
explanations for clarity. This enhanced the generation of specific in-depth information into 
social and political contexts of decision-making. In addition, the prolonged engagement with 
participants through in-depth interviews enhanced the credibility of the study (Lincoln and 
Guba, 2000).  
Interviews were conducted with key policy staff from the three clusters discussed in 4.2.5 
above. Participants included those currently working in these organisations and those who had 
retired or relocated to other organisations or posts. Twenty-eight in-depth interviews were 
conducted in total. Follow-up interviews for a few participants were done by telephone. 
Different interview guides were developed for each of the three clusters of respondents.  
The interview questions were semi-structured. This allowed participants to present their views 
without the restrictions that come with structured questionnaires (Creswell, 2012a) while 
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enabling the researcher to be active in listening. The design of the interviews allowed for the 
flexibility and freedom of the participant to talk and ascribe meanings to their experience of 
the policymaking process (Silverman, 2015). One is more likely to get considered responses 
when questions are open. In most cases, the interviews were recorded. The researcher sought 
the permission of the participants before using the digital recorder. In some cases, participants 
asked not to have the interview recorded, while in others, due to security concerns, tape 
recorders were not allowed on the premises. In these instances, the researcher took detailed 
notes and aimed at reviewing the data right after the interview took place. But even when the 
interviews were recorded, the researcher took notes as reflections and as a back-up in case the 
equipment failed. Interviews were held in the participants’ offices, though in other cases, they 
took place in restaurants, especially for those who had retired or had left the employment of 
their organisations. Participants were taken through the consent form before the interview and 
asked to sign. Interviews were conducted in English, with each lasting about one-and-half 
hours. Except for one interview which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, all the 
interviews were conducted in Nairobi.  
Qualitative interviews allow for flexibility in several ways (Creswell, 2012a). Even though I 
had developed a guide of semi-structured questions, each interview differed in the order and 
the questions posed. Each interview also differed in demeanour depending on the relationship 
I had with the participant.  I was more familiar with some respondents and so these interviews 
took on a conversational tone. Others remained formal depending on the relationship with the 
participant.  
Each of the recorded interviews was transcribed into text for ease of analysis. The researcher 
endeavoured to transcribe within 48 hours of the interview. This aimed at capturing reflections 
and perspective while the interview was still fresh in the researcher’s mind. This was however 
not always possible as several interviews occurred close to each other, leading to a pile-up of 
records needing transcription. For ethical considerations, a number was assigned to those 
interviewed to protect their identities. 
Some respondents had changed their roles during the policymaking process. This meant that 
perspectives, views, and meanings could have changed or even become conflicting over time. 
For instance, one respondent had been a permanent secretary in government and was now a 
member of parliament. A civil servant was now working with a bilateral organisation while 
one from a bilateral organisation is now a civil servant. Others from international organisations 
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had moved to government and parliament. During the interview, I sought different perspectives 
regarding their previous roles. Organisational ethos and ideologies are powerful in structuring 
our meanings of reality. They affect our responses to those realities and our construction of the 
realities. As a researcher, I had to take this into consideration. For this reason, questions were 
adjusted, and others added to derive this kind of data. It also meant asking further probing 
questions.   
The research was cognisant of the limitations of an interview. First, they can appear 
staged.  Respondents can also provide exaggerated accounts in regards to foresight, rationality, 
and creativity (Creswell 2012).    
4.4.2. Document Review 
Certain documents were reviewed to establish initial context, background information and 
historical insight related to the study. Documents have the advantage of richness in data and 
are often readily available. They are also not dependent on ethical considerations (Silverman, 
2013). Documents were studied to reveal decision-making processes by actors in social 
protection. The extensive review and analysis of documents undertaken prior to the in-depth 
interviews was aimed at obtaining preliminary answers to the research questions. The texts 
reviewed were determined by the research questions. Some documents and reports were readily 
available on government and organisations’ websites but for those not accessible online, I 
relied on past contacts for access. From government ministries and the various secretariats, I 
obtained publications, policy documents, ministerial speeches, agreements and operational 
guidelines related to the programmes. From international organisations, the documents that 
were of interest included policy publications, reports, and loan and bilateral agreements. 
Documents reviewed from NGOs included reports, evaluation reports and other material on 
the subject under study. A preliminary list of documents was prepared with a final list presented 
as Annexure 2 in the thesis.  
In the case where the documents were not available online, I asked permission for access. Some 
of the documents needed institutional permission before access while others were inaccessible 
due to protocol and confidentiality matters. 
4.4.3. Participant Observation  
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In addition to in-depth interviews and document review, the study relied on observation as part 
of data generation. Observations were based on the research purpose and questions (Creswell, 
2012a) and involved observing social interactions among the actors. I attended four in-country 
meetings and forums convened by the National Social Protection Secretariat and the ministries 
of Planning and Finance. As some of the policymaking processes are still ongoing, this 
provided an opportunity to gain current views on social protection. Participation in the events 
was an opportunity for reflection on how historical events are linked to current processes. I 
kept notes of my observations during the events. The limitation which arises from participant 
observation is the possibility of biases and idiosyncrasies in objectivity in describing and 
reflecting on the reality (Agyepong and Adjei, 2007; Yin, 2013b). To guard against this, I 
refrained from making value judgement and placed more focus on learning and analysing from 
the participants’ perspective.    
4.5. Data Analysis  
 
Data analysis involved an iterative process starting from field work to the writing up of the 
study. To begin the analysis process, I took time to familiarise myself with the data and 
repeatedly reading through the interviews in search of patterns within the content. As the data 
obtained in the study was mainly qualitative in the form of text and narratives from the research 
participants, thematic analysis was appropriate for analysis. Thematic analysis is “a method for 
identifying, analysis and reporting patterns with data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 79).  
 
Interview data were transcribed and entered into ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided 
Qualitative Data Analysis (CASDAQ) tool. ATLAS.ti was useful in the analysis as it allowed 
for the systematic handling of the large data set. In addition, it enabled comparison of data 
between different groups of actors (international advisers, government officials, members of 
parliament and domestic civil society members), and easy scrutiny of patterns and linkages.  
 
Guided by the research questions and the theoretical framework, I undertook an initial coding 
exercise which entailed systematically going through the entire data set to assign codes to 
various sections of the transcribed texts. The initial coding process included “in vivo coding”, 
where the direct language of participants was used as codes (Saldana, 2015). This was done in 
such a way that the analysis reflected the perspectives of the participants and “to help us to 
preserve participants’ meanings of their view and actions in the coding itself” (Charmaz, 2006, 
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p. 55). The initial coding process involved considering the syntax and decoding, meaning to 
come up with key words and phrases emerging from the interviews as codes. In the second 
cycle, codes developed in the first cycle were grouped into a smaller number of sets where 
similar coded parts of text and passages from the data were grouped into subcategories which 
I later reduced into categories. Codes developed during the analysis process were developed 
from the theoretical and conceptual framework, and from the content of the data in alignment 
with the research objectives and questions. From the second cycle, I developed themes that 
entailed identifying common patterns and categories within the interviews conducted.  
 
Themes were drawn both from the theoretical framework of the study, a deductive process, and 
inductively from the data itself to be able to extend further the understanding on processes of 
policy transfer and to provide new information on the adoption processes of the CT-OVC and 
the HSNP in Kenya. A thematic analysis was useful in gaining an understanding of the 
knowledge and symbolic meaning that participants attached to the policy transfer process and 
useful in highlighting the process of social construction. It was useful in understanding what 
participants said about the process of social protection uptake based on their experiences, 
thereby enabling the interpretation of meanings from the findings and drawing of reliable 
conclusions.  
 
4.6. Methodological Challenges  
The study had its limitations and challenges. Limitations emanated from the research 
techniques employed and others arose due to the nature of the study site. Below, the limitations, 
their implications and how they were minimised are highlighted.   
First was the limitation of the sample size for the in-depth interviews. The social protection 
sector is composed of a small number of actors; the sector is close-knit. For this reason, the 
number of people who had participated in the policy process was naturally limited. Also, the 
actors from international organisations involved in both programmes were from the same 
organisations. This limited the number of those who could be interviewed for the study; 
however, the depth of the interviews ensured sufficient data. Some interviews lasted up to three 
hours as they involved a keenness in probing and getting as much information from the 
participants as possible. The multiple methods of data collection further provided a means to 
address this limitation. 
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Second were the biases arising from being an insider. These have been addressed in 4.3.2. 
above. 
Lastly, the researcher lost her field equipment during the field work. This happened at the 
beginning of data collection. At the time, one interview had been conducted and the respondent 
agreed to grant a repeat interview. The loss presented a setback as the lost items had to be 
replaced.  
4.7 Ethical Considerations  
Ethical considerations were incorporated throughout the phases and the process of designing 
and carrying out the research. When designing the questions, care was taken not to demean the 
respondents’ knowledge. The questions were formulated in such a way that they were not 
leading. Since I had had close contact with some of the respondents before, I needed to be 
appreciative of their views. It was prudent that I respect their perspective even when it differed 
from mine.  
Besides the letter of introduction from the university, I endeavoured to adhere to ethical 
requirements of informed consent, confidentiality, and data security. The researcher obtained 
informed consent from all the participants after letting them know the nature of the research. 
Participants were in no way coerced into taking part in the study and were allowed to opt out 
at the time of the interview if they so wished. Participants were assured of anonymity, and 
confidentiality of the information they provided the researcher. To observe confidentiality and 
anonymity, respondents were assigned pseudonyms. Respondents were assured that 
information would not be disclosed that may potentially harm them in the present or future. No 
inducements or compensation were made for participation. 
After transcribing the texts, codes were assigned to each text to protect the identities of the 
respondents. This enhanced confidentiality of the respondents and of their responses.  
4.8. Conclusion   
The chapter presents a detailed description of the study methodology. Qualitative approaches 
of inquiry were employed to explore the dynamics leading to the adoption of social protection 
policies in Kenya. The multiple case study captured variations and “went beyond the obvious, 
unveiling the behind-the scene dynamics” of the process. The case study approach was useful 
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in bringing out the causal mechanisms and providing a historical analysis of events of policy 
adoption. Case and sample selection were purposive, with sample population comprising those 
who had been part of the process. In-depth interviews constituted the main source of primary 
data, with the semi-structured questionnaires providing flexibility to both the researcher and 
respondents. Documents from organisations, online and otherwise, generated useful sources of 
historical details while participant observation further increased the richness of the data. 
Storage, management, and interpretation of data were facilitated through Atlas.ti. Data was 
thematically analysed for results through the software. Ethical considerations and 
methodological challenges are highlighted at the end of the chapter.  
The chapter that follows presents the political economy of Kenya. This is in recognition that 
policy transfer and policy uptake occur within a historical, political, social and economic 
country-specific context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SOCIAL POLICY 
AND POLICYMAKING IN KENYA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Since independence, the government of Kenya has aimed at improving the well-being of 
citizens through various social welfare programmes. The role of government as the primary 
duty bearer in promoting citizen well-being has however changed and oscillated over time due 
to external and internal pressures. For instance, external influence resulting from the spread of 
neo-liberalism has opened doors to external influence on policymaking processes. The outcome 
may often result in a disjointed set of programmes and in some cases multiple donor-initiated, 
donor-led programmes.  
 
This chapter provides a historical exploration of the formulation of social policy and 
policymaking through four political regimes in Kenya. The chapter examines attempts by the 
different political regimes at creating a welfare state from independence to the present. By 
examining the different political regimes, I argue that three fundamental influences have 
defined the architecture of social policy and social welfare in Kenya over time; the country’s 
colonial legacy, pressure from international organisations and the political choice towards a 
market-driven economy. In this chapter I argue that the three factors provide the political 
economy foundation on which cash transfer programmes are presently built as a definition of 
Kenya’s social policy choices. In the four political regimes which are classified as nationalism, 
the lost decades, institution rebuilding and recovery, and the era of constitutionalism in 
practice, I examine the influential factors that shaped the social policymaking process and the 
outcomes thereby. 
 
The chapter is as follows: first, I discuss persistence of colonial structures in shaping social 
welfare and highlight the co-existence and contradiction between the spirit of nationalism and 
the economic trajectory adopted by the first independent government. This is followed by the 
second section, where I demonstrate how external pressure in the form of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) resulted in shrinking fiscal space for investment in social 
policy, leading to an almost total collapse of social services. The third section is an analysis of 
the government’s efforts at recovery and an attempt at rebuilding institutions for both economic 
and social growth. I argue that the truncated efforts at broadening social policy are a result of 
the government’s pursuit of economic development at the expense of social development. This 
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section shows how donor and international organisations’ participation in the social policy 
increased during this period and shaped the social protection agenda in the country. The last 
section highlights how the present implementation of the new Constitution and increased 
political competitiveness creates room for a re-imagination and possibility of broadening the 
social protection agenda “beyond the narrow cash transfer narrative”.  
 
5.2 Colonial Era Social Policy and Social Development 
Colonial structures continue to define the economic, political and social spheres in Africa. 
Vestiges of the colonial state remain visible in policies and policymaking processes in former 
colonies, including Kenya; these continue to determine present trajectories of social welfare 
and social protection. Colonial legacy refers to structures present during imperial rule that have 
persisted over time and continue to influence policy structures to date (Amutabi, 2009; 
Nyong’o, 1986; Alemazung, 2010). As in most colonies, imperial rule in Kenya did not 
prioritize social welfare provisioning to Africans. Benefits provided by the colonial 
government are described as “palliative, tentative and marginal in nature” (Mhone, 2005, p. 
317), as the colonial administration developed social policy programmes only for those in 
formal employment, who were mainly Europeans. The colonial government invested little to 
improve the lives of Africans, resulting in poor welfare outcomes present to date in countries 
with a history of Western colonisation (Manji, 2000; Amadi, 2009; Ndege, 2009). Despite the 
need to extend social welfare to Africans, dissident colonial voices claimed that Africans 
wanted an easy life. The colonial government therefore refused to extend social welfare 
programmes to Africa. To justify this inaction, Seeley (1987) quotes a colonial administrator 
in Kenya, A.M. Champion, writing on “Native Welfare”: 
 
“The majority of Africans are not craving for a higher standard of living; they are often 
quite happy folk in their squalor, dirt and customs which for many of us can only be 
described as wretched, degrading and revolting” (Seeley, 1987, p. 543). 
 
The colonial government left the Africans to meet their own social welfare needs as churches 
and voluntary organisations attempted to fill the gap. Efforts by these organisations represented 
the only endeavours by the settlers in extending social welfare beyond the white population. 
But to qualify for assistance from the religious organisations, one needed to prove inability to 
work on grounds of illness or old age. To further restrict Africans’ access to social services, 
colonial rule forced Africans to stay in the reserves; access to the city was reserved for those 
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in employment. To justify their claims for lack of extension of services to the local population, 
the colonial government claimed that Africans were in “their natural setting and needed no 
relief or social services” (Seeley, 1987, p. 543).  
 
Taxes imposed on Africans, however, drove Africans to seek labour, bringing them from the 
reserves into the urban centres (Nyong’o, 1986; Mamdani, 1996). As social welfare in the 
urban areas worsened, in brotherhood, Africans formed self-help groups and associations, 
along ethnic lines based on their rural origin, to support each other and act as safety nets in 
times of bereavement, illness and other shocks. Through the Colonial and Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940, the London administration called for a more interventionist state, but 
reality and practice were far from rhetoric, with a continuation of colonial inadequacies in 
social services (Lewis, 2001). The colonial government expected and emphasized that Africans 
should meet their own needs, with attempts at creating a welfare system for Africans by the 
government only envisaged after the Second World War (Seeley, 1987). Two external factors, 
each reinforcing the other, drove the push for better welfare. First, the impact of WWII brought 
about change in the attitude of the new Labour government, which got into power to attempt 
to address welfare programmes in Kenya. Second, the colonial government feared the loss of 
labour from Africans, which they depended on. The population of Africans had declined 
following the wars, prompting the colonial government to institute health services (Lindner, 
2014). Services provided were however rudimentary, minimal and discriminatory. Male 
workers were privileged as the colonial government needed a healthy and stable work force. 
Church missions continued to provide maternal and child health (Lindner, 2014).   
 
With increased population growth and the rise of urbanisation, new problems began to emerge 
– unemployment, migration to urban areas, and growing inequalities (Seeley, 1987). 
Government realized that economic growth was not translating into social growth and 
investment in the economic sector was not necessarily promoting the welfare of the people. 
The first international aid started coming to Kenya after the Second World War. Aid 
organisations like UNICEF at the time provided remedial and ex post services with an emphasis 
on juvenile care and child neglect (Seeley, 1987; Lindner, 2014). UN bodies started advocating 
for attention to be directed towards social welfare and to be geared towards developmental 
rather than remedial service with consideration towards three functions: remedial, preventive 
and developmental. 
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5.2.1. Nationalism Versus the Market: Tension and Contradictions 
According to Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, “African Socialism”, shows the first 
government’s  inclination towards a capitalist model of development (Government of Kenya, 
1965). Like other first generation leaders on the continent including Sédar Senghor, Kwame 
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta adopted the ideology of African 
Socialism which at the core “aimed at Africanising political theory by making use of traditional 
forms of social organizations” (Speich, 2009, p. 457). As the state’s development blueprint, 
the key message centres on the economic development with a keen emphasis on accelerated 
growth. Social development formed part of the focus of government’s objectives in the 
sessional paper. Sessional Paper No. 10 emphasised government’s intention to follow an 
economic path with the expectation that resultant growth would lead to social development.  
“The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic 
growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanisation of the economy, education, 
unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that 
will not jeopardize growth… (economic) growth then, is the first concern for planning 
in Kenya…” (Government of Kenya, 1965, p. 18). 
 
The dualism of the social versus the economic, the division of the “same coin”, is evident in 
the above statement. The idea behind African socialism in Kenya  was “to design a route for 
planned economic and social change in which assumedly traditional African forms of solidarity 
were to coexist with open market structures and forced industrialisation” (Speich, 2009, p. 
450). Nyong’o (1986) however argues that the sessional paper had little to do with socialism 
but was a political tool to sort out differences between Kenyatta and his detractors.  
 
In the sessional paper, the government outlined the steps to be undertaken to achieve 
development. Unlike its neighbour, Tanzania, which adopted a genuine “African Socialism”,  
model, as its developmental path, Kenya from the outset embraced a market-based path, with 
an emphasis on citizens’ participation in their private and national development endeavours 
(O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Chinsinga, 2004). The philosophical premise for development in 
Tanzania was on forging an egalitarian non-exploitative society, limiting private control of the 
means of productions and “defined by efforts at developing a new generation of citizens 
committed to the nation state” (Adésínà, 2009, p. S39). In Kenya meanwhile social service 
provision for citizens remained at the core of government priority, but only in rhetoric - as the 
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president stated, like the colonial government, if Kenyans wanted to get development, they 
needed to work for their progress themselves. This statement represented a failure in 
government’s responsiveness towards its citizens by placing the responsibility of development 
on them (Murunga, 2004; Cheeseman, 2015). After a while the nationalist government lost its 
path towards development following a rise of “loss of democratic rights, detention laws and 
restrictions of political party organisations” (Holmquist, 1984, p. 72). The political atmosphere 
and the ideology underpinning Sessional Paper No. 10 contributed to the non-systematic and 
partial investment in social welfare and social security. The economic boom at the time 
accorded the government the opportunity to create a robust social policy regime which however 
did not represent a political priority. Political pressure and citizen demand at the time lacked 
the drive to push government action towards social investment.  
 
The trickle-down model espoused in the sessional paper failed to bring about development. 
Based on the adopted development model, government invested in high productive parts of the 
country with the hope that development accruing would trickle down to the other parts of the 
country. The sessional paper in outlining priorities concentrated on the productive areas of the 
Central Province and the Rift Valley for development investment, including the setting up of 
factories and infrastructure like roads. Other areas, like North-Eastern Kenya, considered 
unproductive, received little or no investment, leading to their marginalisation, a situation that 
persisted for years (Wario Arero, 2007). The allocation of development projects, including 
schools and hospitals, were skewed towards the president’s home turf (Holmquist, 1984; 
O’Brien and Ryan, 2001) and so did appointments into the civil service. President Kenyatta in 
this way built up the hegemony of the Kikuyu elite both in economic and political terms (Ajulu, 
2002). In addition, as Amadi (2009) notes, the national development plan expected to stimulate 
development for all people favoured the ruling elite and a small group of Kenyatta’s inner 
circle. Attempts by the state at redistribution made little impact as the Second Development 
Plan (1970-1974) still centred on economic development. With the failure of the government 
to enhance equity, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1972 called for a 
“balance[ed] distribution of wealth without sacrificing growth” (Holmquist, 1984, p. 76). The 
ILO report pointed to rising inequality in Kenya, terming it “growth without redistribution”. 
The government however made only minimal reforms at the time, marked by low state 
responsibility on provision of health, education, income and housing.  
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From the onset, at independence, the government favoured a market-driven economy. 
Chinsinga (2004) gives an example of this pro-capitalist orientation in the redistribution of land 
rights where the government adopted a willing buyer-willing seller arrangement. While on the 
one hand the government made investments in social development, on the other, it invested in 
activities expected to bring about economic benefits. At independence, the development 
rhetoric and strategy, as articulated by the founding presidents, centred on  the elimination of 
the “three vices” – illiteracy, poverty and disease (Seeley, 1987). To achieve these aspirations, 
the independent state, anchored in the spirit of African Socialism, - described above, extended 
social services to the citizens with the principle objectives of “social justice and humane living 
conditions for all citizens … though the means to achieve these goals were entirely economic” 
(Speich, 2009, p. 458). Two main imperatives informed the move: first, to plug the human 
resource gap left in the civil service after the departure of the colonial government and to enable 
the country to integrate into the global economy, and second, to bring to acceptable levels of 
well-being the living standards of people as articulated during the struggle for independence 
(Manji, 2000). The enthusiasm of independence spurred the nascent state to major investments 
in health and education. Primary school enrolment in Kenya for example increased by more 
than 100 percent between 1963 at independence and 1973 (Zeleza, 1991). Other African states 
coming out of the period of colonialism made similar investments. Nationalism drove the 
agenda for investment in the people and the prosperity of the nation with improved education 
standards and better health, ranked as paramount investments in the government’s agenda 
(Adésínà, 2009).  
 
At independence, the government extended social welfare and social security benefits 
previously targeted at white settlers to the rest of the working population. The extension  of 
education and health services to reach all citizens pointed to government’s capacity for 
implementing broad-based social service programmes (Manji, 2000). However, the 
independence government failed to adequately extend social services with changes in social 
security and health insurance provided to government workers as part of employment relations 
with little transformation to accommodate unemployed Africans (Seeley, 1987). Following the 
adoption of Sessional Paper No. 10, the government set up the National Social Security Fund 
in 1965 within the Ministry of Labour to administer pension benefits, and the National Health 
Insurance Fund later in 1967 within the Ministry of Health for inpatient medical cover to 
government workers.  
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Several factors made it possible for the government to invest in social welfare. First, 
government revenue had increased from both domestic and international sources (Murunga, 
2004). From domestic revenue, the government made budgetary allocations for social services. 
At the time, Kenya benefitted from the boom in prices of agricultural commodities out of the 
export of coffee and tea. Second, global oil prices remained low, making it affordable for the 
government to invest in infrastructure development and social services. It is estimated that the 
average GDP growth during the first 10 years, referred to as the “golden years”, was an 
impressive 6.6% (Figaro, 2013). During this period of economic prosperity, per capita income 
increased by about 36.8% between 1964 and 1978, attributable to growth in the agricultural 
sector following “conservative land reforms” (Nyong’o, 1986). Financial dividends accruing 
from the growth and the profit from the exports afforded the government sufficient fiscal space 
to make such investments without strain (Murunga, 2004). Investment in social development 
and social services, in particular in education and medical services expanded, leading to 
improvement in welfare.  
 
Nevertheless, social provision by the government was conservative, not expansive, and largely 
market-based. In an attempt to bridge the gap in provisioning, the government adopted 
harambee, a social welfare and community development model based on an ideology of self-
development (Nyong’o, 1986). With the literal meaning of “let’s pull together”, harambee 
became the slogan and the paradigm through which the government aimed at funding and 
providing for public and social goods (Cheeseman, 2015). Critics describe the model as an 
ideological tool that Kenyatta used to reduce social demands placed upon his government. 
Harambee put people and communities at the centre of their own development both by letting 
them define their need and letting them implement it. Government placed undue pressure on 
citizens to make financial and resource contributions towards projects which in most cases 
were primary social services like schools, hospitals and bridges among other services 
(Holmquist, 1984). Harambee became the pillar through which the government implemented 
community and rural development projects. Adésínà discusses similar initiatives in Western 
Nigeria, where communities supported the construction of schools with the government 
providing and paying teachers (Adésínà, 2009). It must be noted however that in this case, 
households were not under direct duress to contribute.   
 
The government and citizens undertook significant development projects through harambee, 
especially in rural areas where it is estimated that harambee contributed 40 percent of capital 
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development. (Ngau, 1987). In concrete terms, Harambee manifested in devolving 
responsibility for development and social provision to people themselves rather that the idea 
of state-led collection effort at enhancing wellbeing. Essentially, in so doing citizens took on 
roles expected of the state. Meanwhile, the state rolled back social provision and development 
of infrastructure. Harambee became the pillar through which the government implemented 
community and rural development projects. The state failed in its duty and passed the task to 
an already taxed population, perpetuating a course that started during the colonial era – 
expecting individuals to take care of themselves (Seeley, 1987). The spirit of harambee later 
spread to social and familial relations, forcing communities to raise funds to cover school and 
medical fees.  
 
5.2.2. International Influence Post-Independence 
After independence, the USA and Germany became influential donors of grants towards 
development projects. Nordic countries, the Dutch and Japanese started providing funding 
towards infrastructure development in the 1970s (Seeley, 1987). The biggest rise in aid funding 
through the years came from the World Bank with the government’s share of externally owed 
debt rising from under 5% in 1965 to 40% in 1997 as shown in figure 5.1 (O’Brien and Ryan, 
2001). Though most of the debt was not directed to social welfare programmes, it was tied to 
specific development projects aimed at promoting growth and poverty alleviation programmes.   
 
In the mid-1970s donor funding shifted to the provision of “basic needs”, significantly affecting 
the nation’s aspirations espoused in the Fourth National Development Plan of 1979 to 1983. In 
the plan, the government articulated its intention to move from the emphasis on industrial 
growth to “poverty alleviation through the expansion of income earning opportunities” 
(Government of Kenya, 1979). Seeley (1987) contends that the increase in donor funding for 
projects led to a diversification and proliferation of aid organisations seeking to cover 
government’s reduction of social welfare expenditure. Kenya, considered a darling of the 
developed world at the time, continued to attract foreign aid. Scholars estimate that between 
1970 and 1996, the amount of aid rose to about 45% of the government budget, making Kenya 
one of largest aid recipients in Africa. From Figure 4.1 it is, however, instructive to note that 
during the same period, the highest level of aid to GDP was 7 per cent indicating that donor 
organisations spending was independent of government’s own spending. At the time though, 
international organisations’ interference in policymaking remained minimal, especially in 
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relation to financial management, as the country was able to balance its financial obligations 
owing to relatively low petroleum prices, and a steady revenue from exports.  
 
Fig 5.1 Evolution and pattern on total aid to Kenya 
 
 Data from OECD/DAC 2015 
 
Further, in terms of macro-economic management, the donor community considered Kenya a 
better performer than other African countries with the relative economic growth aided by the 
setting up of factories and industries (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). Though the country fell short 
of meeting its budgetary obligations, there was relative stability in its ability to invest in 
education and health and meet its financial obligations while servicing its external debts. The 
government however missed opportunities for expanding social services, which then became 
impossible during President Moi’s tumultuous political tenure characterized by heightened 
corruption and both domestic and international pressures, as described in the next section.  
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5.3. The Lost Decades – Moism 
President Moi took office in 1978 following the death of the first president. His term in office, 
from 1978 to 2002, was characterised by both political and social agitation for change. Socially, 
a number of exigencies, both domestic and international, during his tenure negatively impacted 
the provision of social services, leading to an almost complete breakdown in services, hence 
the term “the lost decades”. The following section therefore considers both the endogenous and 
exogenous factors influencing social policy options during Moi’s term in office.  
 
5.3.1. Deepening Inequalities  
Following in the Nyayo (footsteps) of President Kenyatta after his death, Moi further 
entrenched ethnic divisions among Kenyans. The deepening of ethnic divisions was brought 
about by political precariousness and feelings of insecurity in his first years of his presidency 
(Holmquist, 1984; Murunga, 2004). Moi’s presidency faced a leadership and legitimacy crisis 
as he inherited a government and a civil service full of Kenyatta loyalists. He later consolidated 
power after the attempted coup in 1982 and to solidify his position, he sought political 
alignment with  and galvanized support from his ethnic group, the Kalenjin, and other smaller 
ethnic groups (Chinsinga, 2004). Politically, the Kalenjin were not heavyweights in terms of 
political participation in comparison to the Kikuyu, Luo or the Luhya. In addition they lacked 
a strong economic base compared to the Kikuyu (Murunga, 2004). To cement this support, Moi 
embarked on a skewed distribution of public and social goods to his home area and to the 
regions perceived to be his support base. In so doing, his actions marginalized other areas of 
the country, continuing the pattern of uneven development started by President Kenyatta.  
 
To further purge the government of dissident groups, President Moi replaced the Kikuyu in 
civil service with cronies from his support base and, just like his predecessor, disregarded all 
forms of meritocracy (Murunga, 2004). Political ethnicity became the dominant manner by 
which the government distributed resources, with development favouring a few parts of the 
country (Ajulu, 2002). For the 24 years of Moi’s presidency, reforms to social security in terms 
of benefits remained as part of formal labour employment with not extension to those outside 
employment. Single party politics ensured no protests on the matter in Parliament. He also kept 
criticism of his regime under control through fear and detention of those opposed to him.  
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5.3.2. Harambee – Pulling Together  
In continuation to the spirit of harambee started by former President Kenyatta, President Moi 
pursued the idea of self-help development with vigour. Besides abandoning social development 
to the people, harambee became an instrument through which he gained access to the rural 
areas, providing him with a more hands-on and direct relationship than his predecessor.  
(Holmquist, 1984). Harambee became a tool of surveillance and governance. Moi relied 
heavily on the provincial administration established by the colonial government and together 
with his connections through harambee gained superior knowledge and an advanced grasp of 
politics and the dynamics at the local level. Harambee became popular as people considered it 
some sort of redistribution mechanism where they got back from politicians and business 
people who were under great political and societal pressure to contribute during events 
(Holmquist, 1984). Each household was expected to contribute, particularly when the president 
headed a fundraising event. At times, local administration forced households to contribute, 
which Holmquist (1984) describes as a form of tax, with the poorest hit the hardest. With time, 
harambee became an opportunity for endemic corruption. With little accountability 
mechanisms in place, politicians used it as a tool to bribe voters and embezzle funds (Waiguru, 
2006; Cheeseman, 2015).  
 
Whereas government used harambee to build and maintain infrastructure in rural areas, 
scholars attribute the growth of patronage and clientelism in the Kenyan political system to the 
practice (Amadi, 2009; Cheeseman, 2015). It became a path to political fiefdom with many 
ascending to power based on their contribution and loyalty to the president. In addition, 
politicians used harambee for their own personal benefit through coerced contribution 
(Cheeseman, 2015). The harambee philosophy became a means of addressing government 
failure in social policy (Brass, 2012) and an avenue for  political and economic exploitation of 
the poor. 
 
5.3.3. Pressures of Aid and SAPs 
Covariate shocks in developing countries in the 1980s, and others specific to Kenya, changed 
the development course for the country and other countries in Africa. With the global fall in 
prices of primary export commodities, compounded with the spike in oil prices and internal 
failures in economic management (Mosley, 1986; Rono, 2002; Branch and Cheeseman, 2006), 
Kenya found itself in difficult circumstances (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001). Revenue deficit grew 
following the fall in the prices of coffee and tea, on the one hand, and increased costs of oil 
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and petroleum products imports, on the other hand. With these challenges the national budget 
deficit grew exponentially. Corruption eroded and further depleted national revenue. To 
balance its books, Kenya turned to external actors, the IMF and the World Bank. Following 
pressures of the highlighted budgetary difficulties, Kenya’s first loan from the World Bank 
came in1980 (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Murunga, 2004; Figaro, 2012). As demonstrated in 
figure 4.1 above, multilateral aid increased during the period between the 1980s and 1990s 
following the lending from the World Bank under the SAPs and later to moderate the effects 
of the same programmes.  
 
The IMF and World Bank leveraged on the lending to pressurise government on economic and 
political reforms. The conditionalities imposed by the lending bodies required the government 
to restructure public management to continue receiving financial aid and loans. In the 
restructuring process, the international financial institutions made it conditional for the 
government to cut down on its spending and reduce wastage of funds (Mosley, 1986). 
Government cut its expenditure on public services first, with a radically trimmed budget in the 
1983/1984 financial year (Holmquist, Weaver and Ford, 1994). Government reduced 
budgetary allocation to education and the health sector which constituted its biggest 
expenditure with spending in subsequent years falling from 74413.83million in 1995/6 to 
62417 by 2000/1 (Colclough and Webb, 2010, p. 14). User fees were introduced on a cost-
sharing basis. The introduction of fees on public services meant that citizens paid user fees at 
the point of service. Patients unable to pay were denied medical assistance, resulting in 
unnecessary deaths due to minor ailments. School heads demanded fees with charges going 
beyond the financial capacity of most households. The introduction of fees at tertiary level led 
to frequent student protests. Inevitably, education standards in Kenya, as in other parts of 
Africa, fell,  with irreparable consequences (Aina, 2004). The poor suffered most as they could 
not afford the charges levied on public goods. Poverty levels rose drastically, compounding an 
already difficult situation in the traditionally neglected areas like the North-Eastern Province.  
 
IMF and World Bank demands for reforms in the public sector were aimed at creating a “lean 
efficient public service.” To achieve leanness, the lenders made the following demands to 
government; first, the World Bank and IMF required government to freeze civil service 
employment. With the growing number of university and college graduates, this measure 
escalated unemployment rates. The freeze affected young graduates hoping to secure 
employment within government, leading to the growth of the informal sector. The second 
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condition imposed was a freeze on public service wages. Practically, this further lowered the 
purchasing power of Kenyan public servants. Public services became unaffordable and a 
segment of the population opted out of public services due to the cost. Third, the government 
was required to retrench part of its workforce to cut down on its wage bill. The measures 
recommended failed to improve efficiency; instead the provision of services by the state 
declined. Other adjustment measures recommended were related to the privatisation of 
parastatals to increase efficiency (Murunga, 2004), which led to high levies imposed even on 
the most basic services such as water. To further get the country back to a path of a balanced 
budget, government instituted reforms in the money market with a significant devaluation of 
the Kenyan shilling. According to the reformists, the measure made sense as a weaker shilling 
meant the country could earn more income from export of goods. For Kenya as a net importer, 
the result was an imbalance of payments as commodity exports could not match commodity 
imports, leading to inflation, rising indebtedness and slow growth (Zeleza, 1991). 
 
5.3.4 Government Resistance and the Rise of Non-governmental Organisations  
The government did not undertake all the reforms in the manner recommended by the lenders. 
Slow or total non-adoption indicated resistance to some of the recommended prescriptions, 
leading to delays in the reforms despite pressure from the World Bank and IMF. For instance, 
government staggered public sector reforms, which required a reduction in the number of state 
employees. Instead of a decrease, the civil service expanded from 500,000 in 1982 to 715,000 
in 1991, occasioned by the employment of more teachers (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Figaro, 
2013). Some reforms were also not adopted fully and the privatisation of some state organs 
were never fully achieved, with only piecemeal reforms adopted. Figaro (2013) points to a case 
of the Kenya National Cereals Board whose reforms were delayed and, in the end, did not take 
place. Kenya and donor relations became strained as donors issued threats to enforce 
compliance on the resistant government.  
 
Government resistance did not lead to an immediate cessation of aid. Aid continued to flow 
with donors and the government engaged in threats and sanctions. But from 1991, the IMF and 
the World Bank suspended lending to government (Murunga, 2004). Suspension of the loan 
agreement lasted three years, with the agriculture, education and health sectors affected the 
most by the withdrawal of loans. Besides economic reforms, the World Bank and the IMF 
required government to undertake political reforms (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008; Figaro, 
2012). Moi’s regime was considered repressive, necessitating calls for political reforms both 
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from within and outside the country, calls he rejected, terming them an attempt by Western 
powers to destabilize the country. Eventually, due to sustained pressure, Moi succumbed and 
in 1990 acceded to calls for a return to multiparty democracy. External pressure centred on 
economic reforms while internally the pressure aimed at political reforms. Figaro (2013, p. 
322) argues that internal factors, in particular “ethnic rivalry and economic decline” pressed 
the country towards economic liberalisation more than external factors did. He fails however 
to acknowledge that pressure brought about by SAPs partly resulted in the economic decline 
in the country.   
 
The World and IMF forced Kenya and other countries in Africa to adopt SAPs to ensure 
continued funding support from the international community. Governments may adopt 
contextually unviable policies to qualify for the funding and at times for “continued support 
and legitimacy from the international community” (Lant Pritchett, Andrews and Woolcock, 
2012, p. 5). The imposition of SAPs by external actors on sovereign states brought about some 
policy options that proved detrimental to citizens; some  of the negative effects are still felt 
today (Gough, 2013). The effects of SAPs led to a further deepening of an already deficient 
social policy and welfare regime. Inadvertently, the policy reform measures resulted in 
increased poverty and a decline in the well-being of many people. The government of Kenya 
estimated that poverty levels at the time rose from 48% of the population in 1990 to 56% in 
2001, per capita income declined from USD 271 in 1990 to USD 239, while unemployment 
rose to 14.6% in the same years (Government of Kenya, 2003). To protect the poor from the 
effects of SAPs, the World Bank advocated safety nets reminiscent of the colonial era, 
characterized by their minimalist provisions, residual tendencies and targeted approach 
(Konkel, 2014). 
As people sought means to make ends meet, the informal sector provided an avenue through 
which most could earn a living and access affordable services. The situation opened the doors 
donors and aid organisations operating in the country from a previously small and homogenous 
group (Briggs, 2014). Due to perceptions of runaway corruption and looting, and non-
accountability, donors, the World Bank and IMF, in an attempt to protect funds, switched to 
project aid from direct budget support with funds remitted to international organisations or 
directly to resident advisers for better control of funds (Murunga, 2004; Branch and 
Cheeseman, 2008). With most funding directed to non-state actors rather than the government, 
the measure opened doors for wider participation of NGOs in national policymaking processes 
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(Brass, 2012). The number of NGOs grew in response to the available financial resources rather 
than to meet social needs. 
 
The effects of SAPs and funding cuts led to a neglect of social policy and social protection as 
neo-liberal demands considered market forces as better players than the government in social 
provisioning (Murunga, 2004). Kenya moved further from the state-led development path to a 
market-oriented one (Government of Kenya, 2003). Government abandoned the provision of 
social protection and social services altogether while dependency on aid organisations 
increased. Ideologically, the IMF and the World Bank further entrenched the dualism between 
social and economic development. Social security for the unemployed continued to rely on 
overstretched kinship and familial ties greatly overburdened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
 
Agitation by donor organisations and multilateral organisations led by UNICEF brought to 
attention the reality of the devastation of neo-liberal reforms and the effects on children. In a 
two-part report published entitled “Adjustment with a Human Face”, UNICEF highlighted the 
effects of the adjustment policies on the human condition of the poor in particular women and 
children (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart, 1987). UNICEF argued in the report that basic services 
needed to be protected from “adjustment” and social assistance ought to go beyond relief and 
subsidies in a way that promoted the production of the poor (Jolly, 1991). UNICEF however 
was careful to avoid rebuttals by outright claiming “that deterioration in the human situation 
was the direct result of the adjustment policies,” rather alluding to the overall economic 
situation – both nationally and globally (Jolly, 1991, p. 1818). With resistance and mounting 
criticisms, mixed results in effectiveness, poor outcomes, failure in institutional development 
and sustainability, the World Bank owned up to the inadequacies of the policies (Figaro, 2013). 
The Bank, United Nations Development Programme and the African Development Bank 
thereafter started an initiative to provide policy advice and support for protection of the poor. 
It was within the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme that the World Bank sought to 
address the “social cost of adjustment” through, among other measures, instituting “social 
safety net” programmes (Jayarajah, Branson and Sen, 1996, p. 60).    
 
While the entire population suffered the consequences of the reforms, children suffered the 
consequences of cuts on social expenditure and bore the greatest brunt of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. UNICEF’s presence in terms of social welfare provision grew in the country in 
response to the situation of children. Meanwhile, the increased number of NGOs and other 
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donor organisations provided more than a stop-gap for welfare provision as they became 
service providers, monitors of public policy, information providers, and key shapers in 
domestic policy (Manji, 2000). These organisations included faith-based groups, NGOs and 
civil society organisations, most seeking to provide essential services like education and health 
and in some cases even infrastructure (Manji, 2000). The encroachment of NGOs on what was 
seen as government policy space further put the state at loggerheads with the NGOs, who they 
considered puppets dancing to the tune of Western ideologies in undermining the rights and 
legitimacy of the state (Manji, 2000; Brass, 2012). Government regulations sought to decrease 
NGOs’ space in political matters but with increased funding and political backing from donor 
countries, their influence in the social and political space increased. 
 
During the period described as the lost decades, the role of NGOs in service provisioning 
became prominent. Some of the gains of the post-independence era, including increased 
education enrolment, a reduction in maternal and child mortality reversed or stagnated during 
the period both due to external and internal factors (see Zeleza, 1991; Francis, 2005). As 
Murunga (2004) points out, Moi’s misrule resulted in an ineffective and illegitimate state 
unable to function in its role of redistribution and allocation of resources. Attempts at recovery 
by the next government brought about a sense of hope in the prioritisation of broader social 
policy for all citizens. In the next section I describe how the duality of economic versus social 
development during Kibaki’s term failed to meet the expectations of Kenyans. I also trace the 
institutionalisation of cash transfer programmes and the role of donors in the process.  
 
5.4. Recovery Phase: Institution Building - A Narrow Return to the Vision  
The election of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ended the 40-year rule of the KANU 
party in a convincing win in December 2002, ending 24 years of Moi rule. NARC, an 
amalgamation of different parties, according to political pundits transcended ethnic politics in 
unity for the cause and the good of all Kenyans. The euphoria that characterised the 
inauguration of the new government brought with it hope for a better future with high 
expectations for political, social and economic improvement (Barkan, 2004). The drafting of 
the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment (ERS), six months into the 
NARC administration, signalled change. And though donors provided funds for the 
development of the ERS, the strategy was anchored on the NARC manifesto (McCormick, 
Mitullah and Manga, 2007).  
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The ERS came after the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which donors had initiated 
following the failures of SAPs. The PRSPs aimed at placing poverty at the centre of 
development through the participation of citizens in matters of development. Government and 
donors developed the PRSPs around a three-year strategic financial plan, the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework, to enable measurement and evaluation of programmes. IMF and 
World Bank further lending to Kenya was contingent on the development and were perceived 
as a continuation to SAPs and the same liberalisation measures that has led to rising poverty 
(Kiringai and Manda, 2002). PRSPs did not however achieve much in regard to poverty 
reduction as the principles of SAPs were still reflected in the poverty reduction papers and 
certain categories of the population that could not participate in “sustainable programmes” 
were left behind.  
 
Drafters of the ERS took into consideration the failures of the SAPs and their contribution to 
economic and governance decline. The ERS, with the introduction of the Medium Terms 
Expenditure Framework, aimed at bringing about fiscal discipline through accountability (Tax 
Justice Network, 2009). However, the strategy paper was still heavily skewed towards 
economic growth as a precursor to development as indicated in the statement “rapid economic 
growth or the baking of a bigger national cake, is the only assured way of reducing poverty” 
(Government of Kenya, 2003, p. 31). The strategy paper expressed the intention of the 
government to increase social services for citizens left behind in the medium term. However, 
on social protection, the paper in passing mentioned “government’s plans to incorporate social 
protection programmes as an economic and social imperative as part of the social plans” 
(Government of Kenya, 2003, p. 33). 
 
Apart from the ERS, the government developed a new blueprint document, Vision 2030, which 
set out among others government plans towards development. In it, the government laid out a 
plan for the country’s development and achievement to middle income status by  2030 (Fourie, 
2014). Vision 2030 was developed around three pillars, social, economic and political, where 
it is envisaged that the country will earn and sustain a double digit economic growth and 
become industrialised by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2007b). Vision 2030 set out three 
pursuits: achievement of higher growth, achievement of equity and poverty reduction, and the 
promotion of governance (Government of Kenya, 2007b). The policy document, however, like 
other development strategies before it, perpetuates the notion of economic development before 
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social development. Social development remains residual with a focus on economic 
development. Social protection is discussed widely within Vision 2030 with cash transfer 
programmes for older persons pegged as a flagship programme. Through Vision 2030, the 
government set out to create a fund for the financing of social protection programmes from its 
coffers. Emphasis is placed on providing cash grants to categories of people, including older 
persons.  
 
5.4.1. Economic Progress with little social Growth 
The country experienced sustained economic growth from 2003, with the steady acceleration 
in economic growth rate reaching a high of 7.1% in 2007 as compared to 2.9% in 2003 when 
Kibaki became president. A number of factors stimulated this growth, including better financial 
management and fiscal policies, booming commodity exports, increased foreign direct 
investment, increased investment in education and greater democratisation (Kimenyi, Mwega 
and Ndung’u, 2015). The dynamic growth and the economic outcomes failed to transform the 
welfare of those living in poverty. During this period, government and donor relations 
improved with a resumption of lending by the IMF in 2003 (Otieno, 2005). During the period 
from 2002, foreign aid increased, which could be attributed to increased donor interest 
following regime change. Fiscal space increased enough to extend social provisions with donor 
funding and goodwill also improving following the expansion of the political space. The new 
level of freedom enabled international organisations and bilateral organisations space to work 
with the government and provided leverage for them in the national policymaking process. 
Donors committed to provide funding to the government, but the divisive politics that 
characterized Kibaki’s presidency failed to expand social policy provisions. When NARC 
came to power there was hope that public service delivery would improve and jobs would be 
created (Chege, 2008). Perceptions however indicate little in terms of change in living 
conditions despite the economic growth, “only the well-off were benefitting from the 
expansion and benefits were concentrated to only a few” (Kimenyi and Romero, 2008, p. 8).  
Grand corruption increased within government as Kibaki brought back the old guard (Barkan, 
2004). Amid these realities and with failure to realize social growth the excitement that brought 
in the NARC government faded.   
 
5.4.2. Truncated Reforms in Social Policy  
Government made some efforts at transforming social development through several policy 
instruments during NARC’s term. Free primary education, as promised during the campaigns, 
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was introduced with full implementation in January 2003. NARC showed determination by 
implementing the Free Primary Education (FPE) scheme with no existing budgetary allocation 
despite donor reservations. Experts lauded the government efforts at FPE as an inclusive policy 
with capacity to reduce inequalities and break intergenerational cycles of poverty among poor 
households (Oketch and Ngware, 2010). Through the FPE policy government abolished school 
fees and other levies in a bid to extend primary school enrolment and retention particularly to 
disadvantaged school age children. The enrolment rate rose from 92% in 2002 to 104% in 2003 
of the school going children (Vos et al., 2004). Despite mixed reactions from different 
stakeholders, DFID provided financial and technical support to implement the programme.  
 
The policy decision was driven by short-term political considerations rather than long-term 
national development considerations. Various challenges are associated with the hurried 
implementation of the policy. For example, classrooms were congested, and the pupil to teacher 
ratio was high with limited physical facilities to accommodate new entrants (Vos et al., 2004). 
Delays of disbursement of funds to schools affected learning for almost a year, within which 
time some parents opted to take their children out of public schools to private schools (Oketch 
and Ngware, 2010). In addition, inadequate numbers of teaching staff and a lack of learning 
materials compromised learning. Corrupt practices at schools and at the Ministry of Education 
headquarters through procurement and tendering processes led to withdrawal of DFID support, 
making access to learning materials more difficult. Other challenges related to teacher 
absenteeism and a lack of administration skills among school management.  
 
Within the social protection sector, several reforms were implemented. Changes undertaken in 
the National Health Insurance Fund and the National Social Security Fund broadened the 
inclusion into the schemes for workers previously excluded. NSSF transformed from a 
provident to a pension fund opening with enrolment of  previously excluded individuals from 
the informal sector and those in self-employment (Government of Kenya, 2003). The widening 
of membership represents a major reform since the enactment of the NSSF in 1965. The 
Government remodelled the NSSF Act to include for the growing majority of Kenyans in the 
informal sector whose number had risen from 10% to 80%  as a share of the working population 
(Government of Kenya, 2013). As a result, the NSSF is now the largest social security benefit 
scheme in East and Central Africa (Barya, 2011). However, benefits paid out by NSSF upon 
retirement are minimal and inadequate, thus failing to provide sufficient income protection in 
old age. Coverage in terms of numbers is low and narrow (Kimenyi, Mwega and Ndung’u, 
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2015), pointing to government neglect at promotion of ex ante social security programmes at 
the pursuit of reactionary programmes.  
 
Reforms at the NHIF failed to yield success as planned in the Economic and Recovery Strategy 
(ERS). In the ERS, NARC committed to restructuring the hospital insurance fund into a social 
health insurance fund that would provide medical cover to all Kenyans (Government of Kenya, 
2003). Even though a proposal for the National Health Insurance Scheme passed through 
Parliament amid great controversy, the president declined to sign the bill “due to a mix of 
technical and political reasons” (Abuya, Maina and Chuma, 2015, p. 2). A number of factors 
impeded the attempts; first, the ruling coalition and cabinet was fragmented. Internal politics 
and wrangling had splintered the government and the cabinet. Policymaking became partisan, 
with each side determined to bring failure to their opponents. Second, unlike cash transfers, the 
proposed national social health insurance lacked financial and technical backing from donors. 
Thirdly, following the capitalistic structures of the economy intertwined with the political, 
some business people frustrated plans with the profit motive prevailing.  
 
Government undertook piecemeal reforms in the health sector while the NSSF and NHIF 
opened up and admitted membership from the informal sector and unemployed persons. In 
addition, payment coverage extended to outpatient services and to patients with chronic 
illnesses. With the failure to enact an appropriate social health insurance law, healthcare 
financing is still largely “out of pocket” spending. At the moment, ongoing discussions are to 
expand health coverage to all Kenyans.  
 
5.4.3. Cash Transfer as the Alternative to Wider Social Policy 
Through the campaign period leading to the 2002 elections, UNICEF launched a multi-pronged 
campaign to coincide with the electioneering period aimed at positioning the welfare of 
children within the political space. Following the UNAIDS report highlights on the devastation 
of children due to HIV/AIDs pandemic (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV, AIDS, 
2001), part of the campaign appealed to political aspirants to sign a memorandum indicating 
their support for a 10-point agenda and commitment to improve the well-being of children if 
elected (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). UNICEF took advantage of the window of 
opportunity presented and launched the campaign in which aspirants made promises towards 
the improvement of the well-being of children. As a matter of priority, Parliament set up a 
committee after the elections to ensure implementation of the 10-point agenda amongst them 
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support for the CT-OVC. The political coalition, the euphoria of newness and determination 
by the government to follow through on its election promises provided fertile ground for the 
push for the idea of experimentation with the CT-OVC. The availability of funds by UNICEF 
facilitated the start of the pilot programme.  
 
Politically, the timing for experimentation with cash transfers was ideal as it coincided with 
the first term of the NARC government. Ideologically, adoption of cash transfers is a 
continuation of market-linked solutions to social problems. It was argued among promoters of 
cash transfers that with cash, even the poor could access social services like health and 
education from the markets. Though the idea of cash transfers lacked initial political support, 
the opening of the policy space permitted donor experimentation first with the CT-OVC, and 
then other cash transfer programmes followed. The state supported the idea of the CT-OVC 
based on its intended outcomes and also because it was not required to fund the programme. 
UNICEF, together with the Department of Children in the Ministry of Home Affairs, set up the 
pilot programme in 2003 (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Under the leadership of the vice 
president on whose docket the department lay, the programme later gained support both in the 
Cabinet and Parliament.  
 
Donor organisations funded the programme from 2003 to 2006 before the first government 
allocation and later DFID and later the World Bank started providing funds towards the 
programme. DFID started funding districts worst hit by HIV and AIDS. The World Bank 
however remained non-committal as it was interested in having conditionalities attached onto 
the programme, a move that was resisted by UNICEF, DFID and the Department of Children. 
Following a loan facility from the World Bank in 2009, the programme expanded. The 
agreement signed in July 2009 provided credit from the International Development Association  
amounting to USD 126 million towards the expansion of the CT-OVC for a period of four 
years (World Bank, 2009). Through the first credit amount of USD 50 million, the CT-OVC 
increased enrolment into the programme from 14,000 to 47,000 households in the next 
financial year (Government of Kenya, 2012). The World Bank however attached 
conditionalities to the programme linked to education and health as part of the agreement.  
 
Study findings indicate that the government, though not keen on social protection, started 
drafting the national policy on social protection after the Livingstone Conference in 2006. 
Donors supported the inter-ministerial process led by the Ministry of Social Development, 
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Gender and Social Services (Government of Kenya, 2012). Amid wrangles and tension over 
ownership between the lead ministry and the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development, 
MPs passed the Kenya Social Protection Policy Bill in 2012. International organisations and 
the government however were already experimenting with pilots for different categories of 
households. DFID set up the Hunger Safety Net Programme in 2007 while Concern 
International and Oxfam set up a cash transfer after the 2007/2008 political violence targeting 
households in urban slums. The Ministry of Gender initiated the Older Persons Cash Transfer 
in 2006 as a Rapid Results Initiative experiment with an expansion in 2008. The Cash Transfer 
for Persons with Severe Disability followed thereafter in 2010. Among other social protection 
programmes tested at the time was Kazi Kwa Vijana, a public works programme for youth 
which was discontinued due to corruption concerns and lack of government support. 
 
Economic management improved during Kibaki’s tenure; nevertheless corruption associated 
with his inner circle led to grievances within government, making it difficult for the 
government to implement its promises (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006; Kelsall, 2013). Kibaki’s 
term failed to translate economic growth into social development. Resentment within NARC 
and political manipulation finally led to the break-up of the NARC government, with the 
disagreements further culminating in the post-election violence in 2008. Kibaki’s term is a case 
of missed opportunities (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006). With the new Constitution 
promulgated in August 2010, development agents and citizens expect that structures of 
devolution will lead to a change in social development planning. The next section is a 
discussion of the implications of the Constitution of Kenya for social policy and social 
protection.  
 
5.5. Social Protection in the Age of Constitutionalism 
The adoption of the Constitution of Kenya in August 2010 signalled a new political and 
economic era in Kenya. One of the aims of the Constitution is the strengthening of institutions 
of governance, and it also aims at promoting the attainment of equitable distribution of 
resources through devolved structures of implementation. In terms of social provisioning and 
in particular social protection, the focus is perceived as fundamental in ensuring a more 
equitable and inclusive society. The Bill of Rights in the in Article 43(1) (e) and highlights 
that: 
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Every person has a right to social security… (and) the State shall provide appropriate 
social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependents 
(Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31) .  
 
Within the social protection sector in Kenya, “the right to social security includes both social 
assistance and social insurance and thus is synonymous with social protection” (Government 
of Kenya, 2016b, p. 1). The Constitution highlights provision for groups of people in the 
various articles from Article 52(1) to 57. The categories include children, minorities, senior 
citizens and people with disabilities, and social protection therefore is considered a remedial 
avenue for social economic injustices regarding the provision of social welfare to Kenyans. 
The Constitution statement however represents a residual take on social policy where provision 
is on condition on the inability to take care of oneself.  
 
As discussed in section 3.2.1 of the thesis is that international elites through social protection 
have created incentives to the political elite that align with the interests of the political elite. 
For this reason, politicians considered social protection as a means to gain political mileage. In 
the last four years of the Jubilee government, the government has increased budgetary 
allocation to social protection programmes, thereby expanding the number of households 
participating in the programmes (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Interviews from participants 
point to two main factors. First, the heightened competitive nature of the political system and 
the electoral process since 2002 makes it crucial for governments to deliver on its promises. 
Successive governments are increasingly coming under pressure to increase social provisions. 
Government is increasingly facing demands from the electorate, hence the need to commit to 
the expansion of programmes related to social policy. Citizen’s awareness and engagement and 
the extensive use of social media has increased demand and accountability from below, 
prompting government’s responsiveness. Though most programmes started during Kibaki’s 
term, the Jubilee government has relaunched the programmes to create an impression of 
newness to the programmes to gain political mileage. The OPCT for example has been 
launched three times in four years by the Jubilee government.  
 
The second reason leading to the increase in budgetary allocation is based on a conditional 
funding model - the Programme for Results (P4R) Agreement which the World Bank signed 
on behalf of other international organisations. Through the agreement, the government is 
required to increase its allocation towards social protection programmes to receive sector-wide 
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budgetary allocation from the Bank (Government of Kenya, 2016b). The mechanisms and the 
operational technicalities related to the P4R are discussed in Chapter 8 of the study.  
 
Besides the Constitution, the Jubilee Manifesto highlights the coalition’s plans to increase 
budgetary allocation towards social protection programmes. The proposal is highlighted in the 
2017/2018 budget, with increased allocation to the OPCT (Jubilee Coalition, 2013). The plans, 
if actualized in 2018, represent a big leap in Kenya’s uptake of cash transfer programmes and 
the government’s commitment towards expansion and strengthening social protection policy. 
The combination, with health coverage for older persons, nevertheless still falls short of social 
policy provisions capable of improving the welfare of older persons.  
 
Other institutions that support the strengthening of social protection are Vision 2030 and the 
National Economic Social Council (NESC). According to respondents in the study, the Jubilee 
government adopted the National Vision 2030, as the country’s development blueprint which 
is scanty. In addition, the NESC mandated to oversee the implementation of Vision 2030 is not 
operational, as it is not fully constituted. Though the secretariat exists, the president is yet to 
appoint members to the council. The Vision 2030 secretariat is operational but with a reduced 
mandate. The Jubilee government has instead pursued government development through the 
party’s manifesto with little alignment to previous development plans like Vision 2030. 
 
With the remodelling of the social protection, where all cash transfer programmes are now 
under the National Safety Net Programme, efficiency and delivery of the programmes has 
improved. With the Government now making substantial allocations to the programmes, 
perceptions of ownership have increased within government. However, research participants 
are of the view that government leadership is insufficient with decision-making is still under 
the control of international actors. Government’s lack of leadership is weakened as the World 
Bank is providing additional financing based on deliverables by the government. Even though 
at different times UNICEF and DFID resisted the conditionalities, the resource factor shifted 
power, giving the World Bank greater influence over the design and policy direction of the 
NSNP. Government accepted the testing of conditionalities in the CT-OVC programme. 
Between the 2013/2014 and 2016 financial years financing from the World Bank for social 
protection programmes amounted to USD 16,452,715 (Government of Kenya, 2016b).  
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With government and international actors’ preoccupation with cash transfers, other social 
policy instruments like universal healthcare provision and improvement of learning 
opportunities continue to receive minimal investment. For example, the number of citizens 
participating in ex ante schemes like the NSSF remains limited. The Constitution is currently 
in its ninth year of implementation, it is therefore premature to make judgements regarding its 
effectiveness in transforming the social policy landscape in Kenya.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it was suggested that the social policy trajectory in Kenya is based on the 
country’s colonial past, influenced international pressure and the narrow pursuit of economic 
development provided a political economy foundation for the narrow definition of social policy 
to cash transfers. As demonstrated in the chapter, the Government of Kenya has continuously 
made efforts towards institutionalisation of social development, though there have been 
moments of shift in policy, with the state pursuing economic development at the expense of 
social development. In light of the uptake of cash transfer policies, the discourse and definition 
of social protection has narrowed to this single instrument. In adopting cash transfer 
programmes, Kenya chose to select the social policy instrument in line with its dominant 
economic principle (Mkandawire, 2005) based on a market economy and capitalism rather than 
nationalism. Cash transfers represent a return to neo-liberalistic tendencies imposed during the 
period of SAPs, resulting in the re-commodification of social services like health and 
education.  
 
While governments hold the prerogative in policymaking and choice of policy instruments to 
pursue, international factors often influence government decisions. For this reason, an undue 
emphasis on explaining internal politics as the key drivers for the adoption of cash transfers is 
narrow and limiting. The argument in the thesis therefore draws attention to both internal and 
external drivers of social policymaking in Kenya. Internally, political choices and tensions 
continue to redirect government on social policy with oscillations from one political regime to 
another. The solid anchorage of economic and social rights in the constitution offers an 
opportunity for Kenya to widen its social policy beyond a single instrument. Intense donor 
presence and control has compromised the political basis for a broader social protection policy 
imagination. With the lack of coalition support of social protection programmes, the 
programmes continue to be donor-driven and donor-led. There is therefore no political impetus 
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to build or identify coalitions to sustain the current social protection discussions. Moreover, 
the policy process excluded existing social movements like the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions (COTU), who may have been instrumental in demanding a more inclusive social 
protection model. The programmes have remained donor-driven, lacking anchorage in the 
politics of the country. 
 
While we have explored the dominant factors that constituted the key influences in the 
formation of pro-policy approaches in the different political regimes in Kenya, these are not 
the only factors. Politics and policy change are complex matters and there are always subtle 
influences on decision-making and policymaking. As highlighted, the current policy regime 
has been largely influenced by global factors, with international organisations leading in 
shaping the adoption of cash transfers. Their success is derived from a process of interaction 
with domestic players and actors in the policy space through social relations in a process laden 
with power. Therefore, in the next chapter we explore power relations in the uptake of cash 
transfer policies. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERESTS AND POWER RELATIONS IN SOCIAL 
PROTECTION POLICYMAKING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Part of this chapter has been published as Ouma, M. and Adésínà, J. (2018) ‘Solutions, 
exclusion and influence: Exploring power relations in the adoption of social protection policies 
in Kenya’, Critical Social Policy, pp. 1–20. 
 
Inasmuch as power is understood to influence and shape policymaking, discussions on its role 
in the transfer and adoption of social protection policy remain scant. Debates concerned with 
the process of adoption instead lean towards explanations of social learning and ideational 
approaches. Recent studies emphasise domestic politics and national institutions as the key 
explanatory variables in the rapid adoption of the policies in parts of the developing world. 
However, power based on the asymmetries between the different actors in the policy space 
shape the social protection agenda and the implementation of the policies in Kenya. 
Policymaking is the constellation of power and interests, with interests guiding actors’ actions 
(Weyland, 2007). It is therefore imperative to examine the adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP 
in this light. Even when ideational approaches constitute the main medium of transfer, elements 
of power are visible in the transfer process and the social relations therein. An understanding 
of how adoption occurred, whether through ideational mechanisms or a structural process, 
needs an analysis of how motivations, interests, and power drove the “political battle of 
poverty” (Mkandawire, 2010a, p. 43).  
 
Through evidence, this chapter illuminates the exercise of and how power played out at two 
levels: international and national. Competing ideological positions at supra-structural level 
cascaded to the national level, thereby having a bearing on relationships among agents and 
influencing decisions and choices in the policy transfer process. However, the differentiation 
between the two levels is to aid in analysis rather than to show a distinction between the levels. 
In reality, social boundaries between the different levels, international and national, are blurred 
and social agents flow seamlessly across the different levels. In addition, as mentioned in 
previous chapters, policymaking and especially that involving transnational social agents is a 
process where one cannot clearly and cleanly separate the international from the national. In 
the chapter, I also demonstrate that competition and exercise of power has not just been 
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between domestic and transnational actors but likewise among domestic actors and 
transnational actors themselves.  
 
Power here is presented from the perspective where actors exercised and displayed its various 
forms at various times. The analysis indicates that the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP 
was reinforced through asymmetrical relations between actors with transnational and 
international agents exercising greater power derived from their resource base. The finding 
underscores what other scholars discuss, namely that the exercise of power in policymaking 
processes arises out of asymmetrical relations among actors (Gaventa, 2006).  
 
To properly present the empirical analysis of the topic under discussion, the chapter is 
organised into three sections. At the beginning is an analysis of actors’ interests in the policy 
space. In this section I map out actors in relation to their interests, legitimacy, and resources in 
the adoption and transfer of social protection policies at national level. In the section I highlight 
how different interests shaped the policymaking process and how their convergence shaped the 
uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. In the second section I demonstrate how international 
actors legitimised their participation in the policy terrain based on the resources they brought 
into the policy space and how they manipulated the resources to condition the policy space for 
the adoption of the cash transfer schemes. In the last section I draw from Lukes’ three 
dimensions of power (Lukes, 2005) and analyse three mechanisms through which actors 
exercised power for the adoption of the programmes in shaping the agenda, through the 
exclusion of other actors and in shaping the preferences of others. Thereafter is the conclusion 
to the chapter.   
 
6.2 Interests in Social Protection Policymaking 
In this section, I analyse the policy network of relationships based on interests among the actors 
in the social protection policymaking process. As already mentioned, the plurality of actors, 
both domestic and international, entailed multiple and conflicting interests. Interests are 
preferences and power embodied in policy actors (Shearer et al., 2016) through which policy 
change comes about. Consequently, a good understanding of the interests of different players 
was important in studying how power and influence were exercised in the policy process. In 
addition, the analysis demonstrates how different actors furthered their interests and how it 
affected those of others. As Shearer et al. (2016) note, the one who is able to attain their interest 
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is the one with resources, power, capacity, and skills. As will be demonstrated in the section, 
through the skilful exercise of these variables, the interest of international organisations 
prevailed in the adoption of cash transfer programmes. From the analysis data, we identified 
three broad sets of interests: public and social interests, political interests, and 
individualistic/ideological interests. The convergence of these interests in bringing about 
policy change is discussed below.  
 
6.2.1 Public and Social Interests  
Governments are always looking for policy solutions to solve domestic problems. Issues shape 
interests and therefore the long-standing problems of poverty and vulnerability were at the 
forefront in the quest for policy solutions. Though all the actors within the policy space 
coalesced around this interest, findings indicated that it was more pronounced among members 
of parliament and bureaucrats. Government officials sought to enact the policies to address 
both new and old problems presenting in the country associated with poverty. With a rise in 
the burden resulting from the HIV and AIDS pandemic, urgent intervention was necessary to 
mitigate the effects on orphans (Bosworth et al., 2016). Old problems of perennial hunger and 
food insecurity in Northern Kenya prompted the provision of cash instead of food aid. Public 
interests therefore influenced actors, especially the bureaucratic class, and the political class 
who considered the CT-OVC and HSNP models in the light of their likelihood of addressing 
the problems (Weyland, 2007). Characteristics related to public and social interests were 
described as “for the people”, embedded in national development plans and for collective 
interests.  
 
National bureaucrats pursued the adoption of the policies on the promise of their efficacy to 
improve wellbeing for the poor and vulnerable. By virtue of government structure, bureaucrats 
in the policy process represented the implementation arm of government. Their interests 
centred around their mandate as civil servants in translating government policies into 
programmes that could work for the poor and vulnerable, and therefore they considered the 
adoption of the programmes a step in this direction. Legally, being charged with translating 
policies as set out by the legislature into programmes, bureaucrats had a close working relation 
and contact with lawmakers. They therefore comprised the key agents in the policy network, 
acting as a point of centrality for relations with other actors. As epicentres of policy 
development and implementation of programmes, their interest lay in advancing government 
policies for the benefit of citizens. One government official explained this as follows: 
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Policy implementation is one of the greatest tasks for the bureaucrats… and we learn 
and borrow from other countries to advance the well-being of citizens from other 
countries (MFP-03, 29/7/2016).   
 
For politicians, their support for and interest in the programme emanated from their role as 
legally legislated individuals with veto power in formulating policies for their constituents’ 
interests. In articulating their duty as lawmakers, they referred to the programmes as “for the 
benefit of all Kenyans and those they represent” as they stated: 
 
The government and member of parliament have a mandate to safeguard its citizens 
and the programmes were started with that in mind. The CT-OVC is anchored in 
governments’ ambitions and work for the benefit and support of children (MP-01, 
31/8/2016). We have an obligation as government to make things work for the poor 
(MP-02, 27/09/2016). 
 
Their interest in the social protection policymaking process linked to that of their constituents 
and their participation sought to expand the redistribution of programmes to them. Likewise, 
members of civil society described their interest in the participation of the policymaking 
process as a representation of the poor and vulnerable. Like the members of parliament, they 
felt duty-bound to represent the needs of the public in the policy network. 
 
Politicians and bureaucrats situated the cash transfer programmes within long-term national 
development perspectives, as stated by one government official; politician: 
 
Social protection and cash transfers fit within the economic recovery strategy of Kenya, 
which was developed in early 2002, they are part of the national Medium-Term Plans 
and Vision 2030 (MFP-03, 29/10/2016). 
 
Broad interests are here “considered the intersectional linkages and cross-thematic framings” 
(Adésínà, 2011, p. 461), in addressing poverty, rather than the narrow view limited to social 
protection. National bureaucrats and politicians discussed the programmes from the 
perspective of linkages with broader government development plans like Vision 2030. For this 
reason, their support for the programmes aligned to other existing public policies like health 
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and education. In addition, domestic actors were interested in long-term programmes rather 
than short-term ones as promoted by other actors. Furthermore, actors clustering around public 
and social interests preferred programmes that reach a wider group of people rather than those 
that target only a segment of the population. For this reason, they advocated geographical 
targeting for a wider spread of benefits rather than targeting based on proxy identities of 
poverty. The political class preferred this diffusion of programmes within a wider geographical 
area as it boosted their political bases. Bureaucrats too supported geographically disseminated 
schemes for the programmes to gain the support of the political class. Moreover, 
geographically disseminated programmes, according to interviewed members of parliament, 
promoted a sense of collectiveness in the ethnically diverse country. As “representatives of all 
people, whether children or older persons”, politicians resisted pressure from other actors’ 
support for allocation of funds to particular categories of the population over others, arguing 
that their duty was to all citizens (MP-01, 31/8/2016). This finding shows that politicians often 
refrain from single-focus advocacy and therefore in contestation between different 
international organisations pushing for their preferred categories of recipients, politicians 
involved in the policy process resisted taking sides.  
 
6.2.2 Political Interests  
Elected political officials’ participation in policymaking processes emanated from their role as 
representatives of the people. As members of parliament, their power resource lies in their 
constitutional right as legislators and in the national approval of budgets (Dente, 2013). They 
therefore wield significant power and influence in determining the direction of government 
policies. Driven by a normative commitment for advancing the wellbeing of citizens, 
politicians promoted programmes reaching a large number of people. However, politicians do 
not only pursue cash transfer programme goals to bring about transformation for their 
constituents but also for political expediency (Weyland, 2007; Niedzwiecki, 2016). Political 
interests therefore tended to be short-term in relation to election cycles. The expansion of the 
cash transfer programmes to more people was considered an avenue through which politicians 
could garner votes. This view was not only expressed by other informants but by the political 
elites interviewed. A member of parliament explained it as part of the political game where 
perceptions matter and as MPs, they have to be seen by their constituents as promoting policies 
on their behalf:  
In politics, it is about perceptions and so we have to be seen, whether you do things is 
what determines if you may or may not get re-elected (MP-01, 31/8/2016).  
  
 
106 
 
This was discussed further by a domestic actor who pointed to increased interest in social 
protection by politicians near election periods (MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016). The finding is 
expected, as pro-poor programmes can be used to gain political mileage and used for patronage 
(Tillin and Duckett, 2017).  
 
Due to their powerful sway in policy matters, politicians were however excluded at various 
stages of the policymaking process, thus minimising their contribution to the process. Their 
participation was therefore reactive in response to other actors’ actions. The coalition of 
bureaucrats and international organisations feared their political involvement would scuttle the 
adoption process before the uptake of the programmes solidified. As explained by a participant 
from the international organisation, the deliberate exclusion of politicians from the 
policymaking process was because they did not want them (politicians) to bring “politics into 
the programmes” (IOS-02, 23/3/2016). The exclusion of the political elite and depoliticisation 
of the policy space is discussed further in this chapter.  
 
Politicians are often excluded from policy processes under assertions that if allowed into the 
process, the programmes would fall prey to patrimonial interests leading to patronage politics 
(Mkandawire, 2015). This exclusion, however, apart from compromising national ownership 
of programmes, also signals the disregard other actors have of them as elected officials 
accountable to their constituents. The policy network has disregarded the importance of the 
political class. As one respondent explained: 
 
“… Politicians destroyed the targeting and interfered with the programmes as they 
insisted that targeting of the programmes has to be done their way” (TT/C-01, 
1/4/2016).  
 
Politicians’ power in budget approval for the expansion of programmes is critical, especially 
in the current constitutional dispensation that makes it difficult to bypass them or constrain 
their agency.  
 
6.2.3 Individualistic/Ideological Interest 
The third interest driving the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP evolved around 
organisations seeking to pursue either their self-interest or around the ideological persuasions 
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aligned to their institutions. Individual and ideological interests were narrow, individualistic, 
and based on material and pecuniary interests. Members who clustered around the interest 
group were international organisations described as “heavyweight agencies and big names in 
development studies” (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2007, p. 1) in relation to their powerful 
influence in policymaking. International organisations have the ability to “construct the social 
world in which cooperation and choice take place” and to do this “they help to define the 
interests that states and other actors come to hold” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005, p. 162). 
Besides international organisations, other agencies promoting individual interests were 
domestic civil society organisations. Individualistic and ideological interests were 
characterised by narrowness in approach, material appeal, and self-interest.  
 
Narrow in approach: The narrowness of the interests was exhibited in a number of ways. 
First, it involved advocacy towards strict targeting mechanisms on poverty and the promotion 
of a single instrument not anchored in broader social policy and national development plans. 
Advocacy and promotion focussed on ex-post remedies instead of a broader focus on structural 
factors promoting inequality and poverty, with an excessive focus on one group of the 
population (Adésínà, 2011). The promotion of cash transfers narrowed down from broader 
social policy to a single instrument (see Adésínà, 2015). The “narrowing” of the instrument 
and of social policy indicated the ideological persuasions of the different organisations in the 
policy space. For example, the World Bank promoted safety nets which provide temporary 
relief to households in times of distress and shocks related to their social risk management 
framework.  
 
Besides proposing temporary programmes, the World Bank preferred schemes with strict 
targeting criteria focussed on poverty. The narrow focus on poverty, however, is inadequate in 
reducing poverty as it focuses on micro-level programmes instead of the structural causes of 
poverty. As Mkandawire (2010, p. 44) says, it “avoids the grand narratives of development and 
concentrates instead on small-scale micro-level projects in which personal engagement and 
testimony was important” and is characterised by neglect of labour markets.. Interests based 
on organisational ideology were characterised by short-term perspectives not embedded in the 
broader social development national narrative. International organisations’ financing rarely 
went beyond 10-year cycles, indicating the short-term agendas of international organisations.  
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While the primary focus of civil society organisations lay in promoting social welfare, other 
interests evolved around the material benefits accrued from promoting cash transfers. Findings 
indicate that NGOs were created specifically to promote social protection on the continent. 
International organisations provided funding that domestic actors had access to. But with 
decreased funding over time, domestic civil society organisations are no longer functional, with 
others moving on to other agendas. Critics of the process of transfer of the policies note that 
civil society organisations promoting social protection policies were a creation of international 
organisations. Their participation therefore did not emanate from national imperatives; rather 
it was in response to supporting an agenda from which they could access funds. The finding 
was confirmed by a member of civil society who confessed that:  
 
It was the first time we were hearing about social protection. We had no idea what it 
was but there was money to start a platform and we figured we would learn along the 
way (CSO-01, 6/4/2016).  
 
From the statement, two observations emerge. First is that the promotion of the cash transfer 
agenda was not part of the civil society agenda in Kenya and their engagement in the policy 
network aimed at buffeting the efforts of international organisations. Their interest in the social 
protection network was driven by the availability of funds offered by international 
organisations. The new agenda therefore presented a potential area of financing for domestic 
organisations. As they had little knowledge of the agenda, they depended on the international 
organisations for advocacy direction. It was however noted that international organisations 
preferred to work with international NGOs who were largely composed of foreigners and 
considered to have no ties to domestic actors or clientelistic forces and partnership. 
 
Second, though acting out of social interest, domestic civil society networks (CSOs)’ impetus 
for getting onto the social protection “bandwagon” was to legitimise participation of 
international agencies. Through financing, international organisations created and formed 
strategic networking with the CSOs to give legitimacy to their work and to promote the policy 
instruments agreed upon by the bilateral agencies (Adésínà, 2014). CSO alignment with 
international organisations was based on the resource factor in exchange for their support for 
international organisations’ promotion. Domestic civil society organisations acted as 
middlemen between bureaucrats and international organisations on the one hand and politicians 
on the other and were therefore instrumental in mediating a number of policy processes.  
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Other actors within the policy space with individualistic interests comprised members of the 
epistemic communities. Comprising consultancy firms, academics and individuals, this group 
was described as experts in social protection. Their participation and intervention in the policy 
process derived from their perceived knowledge on the matter and therefore their ability to 
structure the collective problem and find the most appropriate solutions. Similar to CSOs, 
members of the epistemic community were linked to international organisations on the basis 
of financial resources (Adésínà, 2011). Policy transfer agents contracted them to conduct 
impact assessments, programme and policy design and in some cases implementation of 
programmes. A participant from civil society observed that: 
 
You find there are international consultants that are writing SP policy for Kenya, then 
they go to Liberia and Zambia, then to another country. If you read the policies of these 
different countries, then they are similar. Where do the international consultants come 
from? They are linked to the international organisations. 
 
It was presumed that due to their knowledge and expertise on the matter, they had the ability 
to define interests and set agendas. As experts, they were recruited by international 
organisations to support the cash transfer agenda. The power of epistemic communities lies in 
their ability to strengthen certain positions based on research and knowledge while pushing 
their clients’ interests (Dente, 2013). 
 
To be considered “national”, consultancy firms set up offices at national level, forming 
alliances with academics and think tanks in-country. Some former employees of international 
organisations set up consulting firms which guaranteed them contracts from their former 
employers. Other interests pursued within the policy space were for academic advancement by 
conducting research and publishing of evidence on impact and other aspects related to the 
programmes. To this end a participant stated:   
 
People simply want to learn, it is not like is not necessarily that people want to give 
transfers – out of the 45 countries providing CT, if you analyse them most of them are 
pilots and they are pilots and fairly small – some with a short lifespan and the reason is 
that there is still inquisitiveness among people especially the sellers – on what can cash 
do? If you give out cash what will really happen? How will communities behave?  They 
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are testing elements of human behaviour when they give cash, it has absolutely nothing 
[to do with] helping people or ending poverty – to put it crudely. People want to test 
human behaviour. People are learning and people put a lot of money into learning 
processes and half the time the lessons are not taken anywhere (CSO-05, 28/09/2016). 
 
6.2.4 Self-interest purposes 
Politicians, for example, explained that though they were advocating for the programmes to 
bring about change to citizens, it was noted that their interests also revolved around self-
interests. For example, they explained their enthusiasm in the adopting the programmes as a 
freedom for them from having to be “social protection for their constituents”. Their support for 
the adoption of the programmes therefore emanated from their need for alternative mechanisms 
of provision to their constituents. Members of parliament explained that the provision of the 
cash transfer programmes freed them from contributory obligations for their constituents 
related to medical fees and burial expenses to school fees and expressed support for the cash 
transfers based on this expectation. Expounding on this viewpoint, a participant explained:  
 
So essentially the support mechanisms came from individuals and from politicians. 
They took on the burden of being the “cash transfer”. If there was a problem the 
politician provided the hearse, medical support, school bursaries – the politician was 
basically everything. And it is these issues that cash transfers are resolving (CSO-01, 
12/2/2016).  
 
This perspective points to the self-interest of MPs in the extension of cash transfer programmes. 
Political promotion of cash transfers was therefore both in their self-interest, for political 
expediency and in the public interest.  
 
6.3 Power, Resources and Legitimacy  
The success of efforts of adopters depended on several factors. These included their continued 
involvement in policy formulation in Kenya, their skilful persuasion and pressuring of the 
government, and their skilful manipulation and recognition of windows of opportunity. To 
pursue these factors effectively, resource bases composed of knowledge and financial resources 
and how actors manipulated them within the policy network enhanced the adoption of the cash 
transfer programmes.  
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International actors as dictators of policy were aware of their shortcomings as non-veto players 
within the policy network. To overcome these shortcomings, members of international 
organisations identified domestic actors to build alliances within the policy network. These 
alliances were built based on the resource base they possessed – financial and knowledge 
resources. To begin with, contrary to the assertion that international organisations find 
domestic allies to work with (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Béland and Orenstein, 2013), where 
such allies did not exist, international organisations undertook to create them. A case in point 
is the creation of the Africa Platform for Social Protection (APSP) supported by international 
organisations to drive continental advocacy efforts for social protection, and charged in turn 
with creating national coalitions of social protection. International organisations provided 
funding to domestic civil society organisations and opened up avenues for training and 
cooperation at national, regional and global level. Such organisations were supplied with 
resources – ideas, technical expertise, international recognition, and financial and material 
support – to promote the adoption of cash transfer policies.   
 
On the other hand, domestic civil society organisations who act as “mediators”, mostly between 
the political class and international organisations, brought with them their mandate to speak on 
behalf of the public. Funded civil society organisations had a dual role: first was to advocate 
with the political class and second, they were expected to drum up support at the grassroots 
level. The second role aimed to build the demand side of social protection. Civil society’s role 
was to make the claims that the reform agenda corresponds to the will of the citizens and the 
elites (Delpeuch and Vassileva, 2017).  
 
The knowledge provided by international organisations included the basics of social protection 
and cash transfers. For this reason, actors, including government agents and civil society 
organisations, depended on international organisations for capacity building and knowledge 
transfer upon which to frame their advocacy. For example, they depended on reports and 
information produced by the international bodies which corresponded with that of think tanks 
and epistemic communities. However, despite their national presence and being 
“representatives” of the people, their ideas and positions had no weight and did not bear 
significantly on the policy reform process within the policy network. Even within their 
advocacy to government and MPs, it was imperative to demonstrate alignment with 
international organisations to make inroads. Policy advice from local producers of knowledge 
is rarely taken seriously and to get their policy proposals and preferences considered, domestic 
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civil society organisations needed to align with international organisations to make their views 
become international recommendations. In addition to funding and knowledge, international 
organisations created ties for the domestic civil society organisations with the international 
global coalition and networks of social protection. 
 
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, formed a point of centrality within the policy network. Based 
on their legal power as implementers of policy decisions and conveners of the Social Protection 
Committee, they brought together all the relations within the network. Their strong relations 
with international organisations was based on knowledge and material support in the form of 
equipment and financial support needed in running the programmes. As conveners and the 
central point for the promotion of the policies, they formed the core team determining inclusion 
and invitation into the policy network. Through an exercise of power, they decided on who 
could enter the policy network and at what time. For this reason, they were able to exclude 
other actors, particularly those they considered not to be bringing in significant resources, like 
civil society organisations or those whose participation would derail the policy adoption 
process like politicians.  
 
The significant power of politicians as legally mandated policymakers and their participation 
in the policy process meant they could only be excluded for a short term.  In recognition of 
their power as lawmakers and to allocate resources for the programmes, through a number of 
meetings with civil society groups and government bureaucrats, MPs were influenced towards 
support for the programmes.  
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Table 6.1 Types of actors and power base in social protection policymaking in Kenya  
 
 
 
 
POWER 
BASE  
 
TYPES OF ACTORS 
Political 
Interests 
Legal/Bureaucratic 
interests 
Special interests General 
Interests 
Financial     World Bank 
DFID 
UNICEF 
Veto power  Members of 
Parliament 
   
 
Knowledge  
 Civil servants UNICEF 
Oxfam 
HelpAge  
Social Protection Actors 
Forum (SPAF) 
Africa Platform for Social 
Protection (APSP) 
World Bank 
DFID  
UNICEF 
 
 
 
In the next section I analyse the dynamics of power from three perspectives: first, through the 
shaping of agenda; second, by constraining the agency of others and lastly by influencing the 
preferences of other social agents.  
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Figure 6.2 Actors’ relation in social protection in Kenya 
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6.4 Power in defining the problem and its solution  
This section presents how various actors exercised power in shaping the agenda for social 
protection policymaking in the uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Contrary to assertions 
that transnational organisations are “proposal actors” in the policy arena (Béland and 
Orenstein, 2013; Foli, 2015), findings from this research indicate their role was not only limited 
to  prescribing the policy solution but, through an exercise of power ensured that their 
prescribed solution was adopted with as few deviations as possible. An analysis of how 
transnational actors shaped the agenda draws from Lukes’ three dimensions of power  (Lukes, 
2005) fitting into three categories: in shaping the agenda, through exclusion of other actors and 
in shaping the preferences of others.  
 
6.4.1 Power to Shape the Agenda: Agenda Setting  
Problem definition is key in policy change. Rational actor models conceive of policy change 
as a logical process whereby problems are assessed, solutions proposed and choices made 
followed by implementation of the solution (John, 2012). UNICEF presented the reality of 
child vulnerability and poverty arising out of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. “Adjustment with a 
Human Face”, a report by UNICEF, suggested that SAPs had negatively affected children. 
Another study by UNAIDS indicated the number of orphans in Kenya were approaching 1.6 
million with about 892,000 resulting from HIV and AIDS (Bosworth et al., 2016). Both reports 
were important in framing the problem and solution. To address the problem of homelessness 
among orphaned children, non-governmental organisations and individuals had set up 
orphanages. The idea of cash transfers offered an alternative response to institutionalisation of 
children. In an internal meeting of UNICEF country advisers held in 2002, the idea of providing 
cash to orphaned children was suggested among other solutions. As explained in the interview, 
The idea of cash provision was settled upon as it was an innovation that had not 
been tried as a response to the epidemic anywhere in Africa (IOS-03, 
13/3/2016).  
Government officials did not resist the idea. First, the reality of suffering children and 
households was visible. UNAIDS and UNICEF as global authorities presented credible 
assessments of the situation with figures to support their argument for the need of a cash 
transfer programme. Second, UNICEF through funding from the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) committed to financing the pre-pilot phase (2004-
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2006) with no financial obligations from government. UNICEF thus defined the problem – 
orphanhood, vulnerability, and child poverty – backed by credible data and presented the 
solution to the problem as cash transfers. To make this conceptual leap effectively, promoters 
of cash transfers discredited orphanages as solutions to the problem and instead advocated the 
retention of orphans within their households and communities. 
To keep the idea on government agenda and to avoid failure of the pre-pilot programme, 
UNICEF seconded three personnel as technical advisers to government. First was a 
communication specialist seconded to the Social Protection Secretariat with the role of 
packaging information on social protection in general. The second officer was attached to the 
Department of Children’s Services with the responsibilities of day-to-day administration of the 
programme. A participant in the study considered the officer’s tasks mundane and remarked,   
The duties of the officer sent to the Department of Children included taking care 
of all details related to the programme as required – whether programmatic or 
administrative, ranging from taking down minutes to document filing and data 
entry (IOS-06, 28/9/2016).  
The role of the third officer, a public finance expert attached to the Ministry of Finance, was 
“keeping CT-OVC on the ministry’s agenda through advocacy for increased funding to the 
programme” (IOS-05, 20/7/2016). As a previous Ministry employee, he/she was familiar with 
budgeting processes and were therefore able to bring an added advantage to the transfer process 
by debunking notions of unaffordability. The secondment of staff to run day-to-day duties 
resonates with the idea of power, not necessarily as force, but as working through practice in 
everyday mundane and routine tasks (Foucault, 1980a). UNICEF justified the secondment of 
technical assistance as a response to capacity gaps within government. Yet, in reality, the 
secondment was less about absent expertise but more about insertion of agents of advocacy 
within daily interactions and policy discussions. The duties of these technical assistance 
advisers often conflicted with, and at times subsumed, those of government officers, leading to 
disagreements (TT/C_04, 13/4/2016). Through their power, international elite groups reify 
their decisions over time through their exercise of such power (Lukes, 2005). Insertion of 
technical advisers can undermine the capacity of government bureaucrats to deliver 
programmes as it curtails the development of accountable structures within government 
(Adésínà, 2011; Mkandawire, 2015).  
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Similar control over the “solution” was replicated in HSNP. Previous DFID support to 
Northern Kenya, based on provision for food relief in response to the cyclical famine and 
drought in the region provided a foundation for implementation of HSNP. With the realisation 
of the failure of previous attempts at ensuring food security, coupled with the global food crisis, 
DFID shifted its strategy from the provision of food aid to direct cash transfers. The HSNP 
neither began with a systematic scoping of a possible solution nor with the testing of effective 
solutions; rather transnational actors prescribed a predetermined policy solution, as described 
by other critiques (see Peck, 2011). In confirmation, a government official stated as follows:  
DFID woke up and decided they want a cash transfer programme, they had the 
money for the programme for five years. The government was not consulted but 
since DFID had the money and were not asking government to fund the 
programme, the government agreed (MGSCD-02, 25/04/2016).  
From the statement, two observations can be inferred. First, we should note the abruptness with 
which the decision was made and the lack of consultation with domestic actors by transnational 
actors in “providing new solutions to old problems”. Second, contrary to assertions that 
transnational actors are “proposal actors” (Foli, 2015), the statement suggests that transnational 
actors can be “policy enforcers” as they imposed the idea of cash transfers. Taking advantage 
of these asymmetrical relations, agents from the international organisations not only prescribed 
the policy solution but encompassed a more direct exercise of power through which they 
ensured their recommended solution was adopted. Whereas some scholars have argued that 
transnational actors are flexible and adaptable in their promotion of policy solutions (Béland 
and Orenstein, 2013), findings from our study indicate that international organisations 
remained rigid both in their policy solutions and paradigms and also in how they wanted the 
programmes implemented. Only in light of opposition from powerful veto actors like members 
of parliament did they become flexible and adaptable to alternative views. 
To further ensure the programme was implemented as prescribed, decision-making and the 
day-to-day running of the programme remained the prerogative of DFID, leading to the 
description of the HSNP as “donor-initiated, donor-driven, donor-implemented, but 
government-branded” (TTC-04, 13/4/2016, CSO-05, 28/09/2016). DFID recruited and 
managed the programme through the Programme Implementation and Learning Unit (PILU), 
comprising a team of consultants. Though PILU was situated within the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA), a government agency, the team reported directly to DFID. 
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In describing the decision-making process, a respondent involved in Phase 1 of the programme 
stated:  
Decisions were [made] by DFID and in situations where the government is not 
putting in any money, government cannot be in control. The government was 
there to append its signature and was required to create a conducive 
environment for the programme to run (TTC-04, 13/04/2016).  
In addition to revealing the control that DFID had over the decision-making process, this quote 
points to the diminution of the state’s role in the policy process from that of policy leader to 
that of an enabler and facilitator (Peck, 2011).   
6.4.2. Competition among Ministries 
As mentioned earlier, contestations over control of the social protection agenda manifested 
among domestic actors through bureaucratic infighting. The Ministry of Labour opposed the 
leadership of the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development (MoGCSD), arguing 
that the ministry lacked the legitimacy to lead the process of policymaking. The MoGCSD had 
led the process since 2006, and the decision to set up a national secretariat with the role of co-
ordination of social protection policies and programmes was heavily contested by officials 
from the labour movement. In the ensuing contestation, Labour officials cited lack of “co-
ordination power” and lack of legitimacy to coordinate the social health insurance and social 
security components of social protection. As each of the pillars is governed by different Acts 
of Parliament, there was conflict over the powers conferred on the MoGCSD. A participant in 
the study attributed the delay in the finalisation of the national policy on social protection to 
the tension and power struggles between staff of the two ministries that stalled the process at 
one point (MoL-01, 04/05/2017).  
 
Contestation of the leadership of national social protection process emanated from the 
conceptualisation of social protection. Since the Constitution uses the words “right to social 
security” in Article 43 of the Constitution, the Ministry of Labour argued that social security 
was within their purview. To stake their claim further, the Ministry on behalf had ratified the 
Social Protection Floor and therefore by virtue of this, the responsibility of ensuring its 
implementation lay with the Ministry of Labour. On probing the matter further, our findings 
indicate that with the backing of international organisations, in particular, the World Bank and 
DFID, the National Social Protection Secretariat was set up at MoGCSD and to end the 
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contestation, a Social Protection Co-ordination Bill is under development to address issues of 
co-ordination.  
 
6.4.3. Naming as a form of power 
The ideological contest playing out at the supranational level cascaded to the national level. A 
perusal of documents revealed that following an agreement between the World Bank and the 
government for financing the social protection sector, the World Bank changed the name of 
the programme to National Safety Net Programme (World Bank, 2009). Resistance was notable 
within UNICEF in particular, who argued that the change of name indicated a return to the 
minimalist poverty-targeted programming. As is argued, safety nets are temporary preventative 
measures (Stiglitz, 2017). By being the most significant funder of the programme, the World 
Bank in effect was furthering its ideological interests. One of the respondents stated, 
 
This is internal World Bank politics, they like to use the word safety nets. It shows a 
weakness among Kenyan senior policymakers. Why should they let internal World 
Bank terminology take over the programme? The World Bank was absolutely insistent 
that word safety nets be used. It is not just a word, it has connotations (IOS-03, 
13/3/2016).  
 
The statement reflects the weakness within the government of Kenya to control and shape the 
social protection agenda. It is also an indication of the locus of power in the social protection 
arena in relation to manipulation of power by the World Bank deriving from financial 
resources. Despite the rhetoric of change since the Washington Consensus, the World Bank 
seems stuck in this model both philosophically and ideologically. In the next sub-section, I 
discuss how power was exercised in constraining the actions and agency of other actors in the 
furthering of interests.  
 
6.5 Power in Constraining Options, Actions, and Agency 
As discussed in the previous sub-section, actors within the social protection policy arena acted 
in their own interest by seeking to shape the agenda. In the next section, I discuss mechanisms 
that were exercised in constraining the agency of other social agents within the policy space to 
achieve uptake by excluding other actors and setting up structures of implementation outside 
government.  
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One interviewee described the policymaking process as “a very closed system, an elitist 
sector”, thereby capturing the exclusivity of social protection policymaking (CSO-01, 
6/04/2016). For instance, the Social Protection Committee, a network tasked with design and 
development of policies and programmes at national level comprised largely of government 
and international organisations with occasional participation of domestic civil society 
organisations. As noted by Shearer et al., (2016) networks can influence the balance of power 
by choosing to include or exclude participants. Fearing political capture, transnational actors 
and government bureaucrats deliberately excluded politicians from the policy process to 
minimise “political interference and to depoliticise the policy space” (IOS-03, 13/03/2016). As 
Weyland (2007) observes, domestic and external actors can share interests which they use to 
control the policy agenda,  and for this reason international actors and domestic experts in this 
process excluded politicians. According to a representative from the international 
organisations, the move to exclude politicians ensured little interference from politicians with 
interests to gain mileage and expediency out of the programmes. By defining the process as 
technical, donors further aimed to exclude the political class. Such an observation follows on 
from other studies where the depoliticisation process entails advocates framing poverty 
reduction as a technical problem to be tackled by experts and professions even when the 
problem has emerged out of political circumstances (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007; Sanyal, 2013). 
In reality, the policy problem necessitated political action as it had been brought about by 
political marginalisation of Northern Kenya. By suppressing the participation and agency of 
politicians, their input remained reactive, as confirmed by a participant:  
Politicians were not involved and were just reacting to what we were doing. If 
any of them came, it was to complain mainly on how we had conducted 
targeting in their constituency (TTC-04, 13/04/2016).  
 
By excluding politicians and depoliticising poverty and vulnerability, international actors and 
government bureaucrats exhibited acts of power. The action of depoliticisation of the policy 
space and exclusion of political elites from the policy space while giving way to technocratic 
governance is at the heart of neo-liberal thinking in the development discourse in Africa, which 
Gumede observes as “an uncritical acceptance of this definition of development has resulted 
in the subservience of the political elites in Africa to subordination of politics to economics” 
(Gumede, 2017, p. 10).  
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Ironically the same actors who promoted the exclusion regularly decried the lack of political 
will as the main hindrance to adoption of the programmes. With the shift of power in the 
budget-making process from Treasury to parliament as spelled out in the Constitution, 
expansion of the cash transfers rested on MPs. Their inclusion in the closed policy space was 
therefore imperative if more funding was to be allocated to the programmes. In what a 
participant described as a “reclamation of their policy space”, MPs in the HSNP counties 
rejected the targeting model proposed by donors (TT/C-01, 1/04/2016). The rejection of the 
targeting model by MPs had been emboldened by government allocation of funding towards 
HSNP Phase 2. Such resistance was inconceivable in HSNP Phase 1 as the government of 
Kenya was not funding the programme at all. In adopting a poverty-targeted model, in one of 
the counties, Turkana, 70% of all households would benefit while the other three counties 
would each have 10% of the beneficiaries. While the role of members of Parliament is required 
in the initiation of crucial bills and programmes, bureaucrats and international organisations 
and the epistemic community within the social protection sector carried on most of the 
activities with the role, so MPs remained reactive. The role of MPs in the policy process 
remained modest as policy formulation was largely undertaken outside the political policy 
space.  
In reaction to this model, research findings revealed that MPs threatened to withdraw funding 
for the programme through the budgetary process unless an agreeable targeting model was 
adopted. Resistance and threats from MPs forced a revision of the targeting model to ensure 
equity in numbers. Members of Parliament were only able to exercise this kind of resistance as 
the Constitution (2010) gave them the prerogative of resource allocation without which MPs 
would be impotent in their participation in the policy space. Even though resistance and 
defiance by MPs shows that even in situations of coercion by transnational agencies, domestic 
actors have room to exercise their agency and national level politics prevails in policymaking 
processes (Béland, 2009; McCann and Ward, 2012), it needs to be noted that decisions on the 
adoption of cash transfer policies had already been made and the policies adopted. Members 
of Parliament were therefore reacting to an already defined and confined territory within the 
boundaries of cash transfers already determined by international organisations. Moreover, their 
focus was not on fundamental and important issues like how social protection and cash 
transfers are situated within the national social policy but on technical issues of whether or not 
to target beneficiaries into the programmes. 
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Exclusion of others within policymaking and policy implementation is not new in Kenya. The 
colonial administration at district level, fearing a loss of power, objected to newcomers entering 
what they considered their domain (Lewis, 2001). Equally, domestic Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) like the APSP and SPAF were occasionally excluded from the policy 
process. Paradoxically, the same CSOs were established with funding from international 
organisations like DFID, with the specific task of generating grassroots demand for social 
protection instruments, specifically cash transfers. Domestic civil society members considered 
international organisations and staff from the Ministry of Social Development dominant 
members of the Social Protection Committee with influence to decide who participates in the 
policy process. According to participants from domestic civil society, international agencies 
used highly technical terms and esoteric language in committees and networks of 
policymaking. Civil society members perceived the esoteric language as exclusionary 
strategies that constrained their meaningful participation. This is also a question of how people 
and organisations come into the policy terrain where they have neither the expertise nor the 
knowledge to participate. In addition, it reflects how international organisations constructed 
and invented CSOs to participate in advocacy of social protection policies – hurriedly and 
without consideration on whether they had knowledge or prior experience on the matter. As 
highlighted during an interview with a member of civil society concerning their participation 
within the policymaking process:  
But when the policy and the Bill were being developed, we got incorporated as 
they know that their legitimacy and capacity to lobby on some issues is limited. 
It can only reach a certain point. When ultimately the policies were adopted we 
got out of the loop and started watching things happen at the periphery. CSOs 
are invited when it is convenient. CSO participation and that of NGOs in the 
programmes is very limited (CSO-01, 06/04/2016).   
The exclusion of domestic CSOs undermined public participation, resulting in an erosion of a 
citizen-state contract based on social provisioning. Civil society actors viewed their occasional 
inclusion in the Social Protection Committee as a move by international actors to legitimise 
the policy process. Even when included, domestic CSOs were assigned peripheral roles like 
advocacy and implementation in hard-to-reach areas. Donor agencies instead contracted 
international NGOs more closely linked to them like Oxfam and HelpAge International as key 
partners in implementation. The inclusion of domestic actors in the Social Protection 
  
 
123 
Committee, especially in the policy development process, aimed at providing legitimacy to a 
process dominated by non-veto actors. NGOs involved in the process were largely international 
ones like HelpAge International and Oxfam who implemented different aspects the HSNP. The 
participation of national CSOs was brief and peripheral.  
As members of Parliament gained more leverage, they demonstrated their power in several 
ways. In exercising their agency in the policy space, Kenya Women Parliamentarians 
(KEWOPA) developed the Social Assistance Bill. Presented as a Private Members Bill, the 
Bill was passed as the Social Assistance Act No. 24 of 2013, on the last day of the eighth 
parliament, posing a dilemma to the ongoing social protection policy process by the Social 
Protection Committee. The Bill, though credited to KEWOPA, was driven by CSOs. In what 
was termed “a process to break the deadlock between the Ministry of Social Development and 
the Ministry of Labour”, CSOs aligned to social assistance sector and cash transfers crafted 
and developed the Bill which they rallied a member of KEWOPA to table in parliament. Civil 
society did not act alone; international organisations and the Department of Social 
Development, acting in the background supported the process – both technically and 
financially.  
 
Some participants in the study intimated that they were ignorant of the passage of the Bill at 
the time. Some bureaucrats who participated in the study suggested that they only became 
aware of the passage of the Bill later as they had not been consulted on the matter. It is therefore 
unclear and could not be ascertained from the study what the process of passing the Bill was. 
Bureaucrats within government at the Ministry of Social Development reported that they had 
not been consulted in the process to provide due diligence to the Act before it became law. 
With the passing of the Bill, social transfer programmes, including the cash transfers schemes, 
came under Acts of Parliament similar to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) and the 
National Hospital Fund (NHIF) with Social Protection Policy becoming the umbrella policy 
for the three.  
 
The contents of the Bill conflicted with aspects of the Social Protection Policy and according 
to a government official in the study, the Social Assistance Bill is “unimplementable” due to 
structural and governance conflict with some aspects of the Social Protection Policy (ML-01, 
23/08/2016). It is misleading for the Ministry to claim that the Bill is unimplementable as they 
covertly supported civil society lobbying of MPs for introduction of the Bill. The nature of the 
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Social Assistance Bill – its contents, its development and the rushed manner in which it passed 
through Parliament without consultation is proof of the muddied and competitive policy terrain 
that persists within the social protection sector. For a Bill to be passed in Parliament it has to 
go through three readings (Government of Kenya, 2015a) but during consultations in the 
stakeholders’ forum I participated in during the fieldwork period, participants indicated that 
they were not involved in the discussions and processes leading to the passage of the Bill. The 
passage of the Social Assistance Bill was therefore a rushed process. In addition, it points to 
the disjointed policy terrain and minimal government ownership and leadership in the 
policymaking process.  
 
6.4.5. Working parallel to the grain   
Findings from the study indicated that there were two significant ways in which international 
organisations worked outside of government structures, thereby constraining the agency of 
others. First, DFID chose to work with British organisations during the first phase of the 
programme, and second, they set up an implementation unit for outside government to manage 
the HSNP. 
 
Working through British organisations: Contrary to normative expectations, international 
organisations took on the role of implementers. DFID for example subcontracted the different 
components of the implementation of the HSNP to British-affiliated organisations. 
International actors thereby became delivery service providers (Adésínà, 2011). By doing so, 
DFID constrained national capacity by choosing to contract implementation of the HSNP to 
international organisations. A review of programme documents indicate that the first line of 
contracts was awarded as follows: payments were awarded to the Financial Sector Deepening 
(FSD), Administration to Oxfam GB, Rights to HelpAge International, Evaluation to Oxford 
Policy Management and targeting to Save the Children (HSNP Secretariat, 2010). Though 
based in Kenya, the INGOs were national branches of international organisations. National 
organisations were subcontracted in the second tier by the contract holders to implement the 
programmes at the “hard-to-reach” North Eastern Province. In a further constraint of national 
capacity, staff members of the components were seconded from international hubs to manage 
the programmes. As one respondent noted: 
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It was also implemented by Europeans and you wonder how it is a government 
programme. Just two of us could be said to be nationals… The others had been recruited 
and came from abroad just for the purpose of the programme (TT/C-04, 13/4/2016). 
The above sentiments illustrate how international organisations may infringe on policy 
implementation processes, creating a situation where state functions are outsourced (Peck, 
2011). National staff were constrained by the international organisations who not only 
dominated the agenda but the implementation too. In echoing this view, a participant in the 
study suggested that their presence in meetings regarding the programme served diplomatic 
purposes, reiterating the argument that government’s role was that of an enabler for the 
implementation of a donor programme. 
Working through PILU: The creation of a parallel management unit, PILU, further crowded 
out government capacity. The creation of parallel units by policy promoters is not new as during 
the new public management reforms in the 1980s “incentive-driven delivery agencies and 
autonomous offices” were set up (Mkandawire, 2015, p. 589). Apart from contracting British 
NGOs and firms as programme implementers, DFID created PILU as a parallel structure within 
the NDMA as a technical assistance team. Staff at PILU were recruited as consultants with 
contracts from a consulting firm contracted by DFID. The parallel structures within the 
programme compromised reporting lines and the decision-making process. Staff within PILU 
were not government employees but employed as consultants outside government structures, 
yet situated within a government department. Commenting on the structure of PILU in relation 
to staffing, a civil society member who participated in the study explained as follows:  
But it was a UK-based firm [that was] given the contract to roll out the programme, 
staffed by British nationals and a sprinkling of [other]nationals… They did not only 
peddle the idea, brought in the human resources but they also appointed a monitor from 
their country to come and ensure that their interests are protected, and their ideas are 
properly propagated and that their ideas are used as per their requirement. HSNP is 
classic, a perfect example (CSO-05, 28/9/2016). 
 
This statement corroborates Peck’s argument that the problematic promotion of cash transfers 
has involved the “privatisation of policy expertise and delivery systems” (Peck, 2011, p. 177). 
However, unlike the HSNP, the CT-OVC implementation began within government of Kenya 
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structures at the Department of Children’s Services with civil servants as implementers. A 
perusal of records and information from key informants reveal that PILU manages all aspects 
of HSNP implementation and the daily running of HSNP (DFID, 2013, 2014). This in effect 
diminishes state capacity and erodes the state’s role as implementers of programmes and a 
sovereign authority within its territory.  
Government capacity is often cited as the reason international organisations chose to work 
outside state structures, but on further probing, it became clear that DFID lacked trust in 
government. The issue about lack of capacity within government was contested by a senior 
government official who during the interviews stated the unwillingness of DFID to work within 
the existing structure (MGCSD-01, 23/03/2016). The explanation was that DFID needed to 
ensure the success of the pilot and therefore it was imperative for them to control every aspect 
of the programme. By claiming a lack of capacity within government, participants commented 
that the view contradicted DFID’s own “capacity building efforts” over the last 15 years through 
the training and resources invested for learning, viewing it as a scapegoat by which 
transnational actors legitimise and perpetuate their continued engagement, domination, and 
control of the policy process (TT/C-04, 13/04/2016). The general view among government 
participants in the study was that UNICEF was flexible while DFID remained rigid, especially 
in financing procedures due to lack of trust in the government system through their constant 
desire to curb fiduciary risks. UNICEF’s flexibility has to do with the fact that as a UN agency, 
it is required by UN norms and standards to work with member states on the programmes they 
have without circumventing the authority and leadership of the country in policy 
implementation. To curb against the perceived risk, DFID ensured day-to-day activities at PILU 
were under its supervision.  
6.6 Ability to Influence Preference and Desires  
Apart from structural mechanisms including financing, ideational approaches constituted one 
of the core mechanisms through which transnational actors promoted the uptake of cash 
transfer policies in Kenya. Mechanisms employed in the learning process included spreading 
of norms, persuasions, socialisation and demonstrations (Peck, 2011; Foli, 2015). Mechanisms 
of learning in policy transfer are deemed more acceptable than those from coercive 
mechanisms (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The origins of different ideas and learning matter for policy 
uptake as they can indicate different power structures and asymmetry between the learner and 
the idea promoter. In addition to their financial resources, transnational actors possessed a 
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hegemonic position on the ideas promoted within the Kenyan learning process. Learning and 
influencing processes involved diverse approaches to ensure policy adoption.  
Participants identified DFID as the lead organisation in the learning process, sponsoring 
various courses, study tours, and South-to-South partnerships. While ideational mechanisms of 
social protection are often presented as benign processes of knowledge transfer from one actor 
to another, policy learning in Kenya involved the expenditure of financial resources and 
persuasive power. A report on DFID’s role in influencing the adoption of the programmes for 
example indicates that in Zambia and Uganda the organisation set aside between GPB 10m to 
up to GBP 150,000 in each country for two to three years for policy influencing purposes 
primarily for commissioning of studies and to facilitate study tours (Hickey et al., 2009). 
Though it is difficult to quantify the amount of funding spent on learning purposes, the report 
highlights that in Ethiopia, 90% of an adviser’s working time was spent influencing the 
adoption of the policies in the first years of the programmes (Hickey et al., 2009). In Kenya, 
DFID proposed to spend 12 percent of the total budget of HSNP Phase 2 GBP 10.270 million 
on PILU for  “(i) Management, monitoring; (ii) Long- and short-term technical assistance for 
capacity building and delivery; and (iii) The international procurement of independent 
evaluation service” (DFID, 2013). It was however difficult to quantify how much had been 
spent on direct influencing for policy uptake.  
A large part of the learning process involved multiple training courses from early adopters, 
notably South Africa and Brazil, where empirical evidence demonstrated the impact of cash 
transfer programmes. Other learning avenues included conferences, seminars and study tours 
mostly targeted at mid-level civil servants comprising directors and their deputies. Participants 
mentioned that promoters of cash transfers organised study tours to countries that were 
considered to be successful in adoption and implementation, including Brazil, Mexico, and 
South Africa. High and medium-level government officials’ participation was desirable as 
transnational actors considered their ability, power, and proximity to influence others essential 
for policy uptake. The most influential training course according to participants was the 
Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes course organised by the Economic 
Policy Research Institute (EPRI) with funding from UNICEF, DFID and other organisations 
like HelpAge. The conversion of hard-line ministries of finance from sceptics to champions of 
cash transfer programmes occurred in these training sessions. A government official at 
Treasury who attended the training confessed:  
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I went to the training sceptical about the idea of giving cash to the poor but left 
converted. I came back and, in my briefing, asked my seniors to consider 
increasing the budgetary allocation we were making towards cash transfers 
(MFP-03, 29/07/2016). 
Specific emphasis on participation in the training sessions focussed on staff at ministries of 
finance and planning who promoters considered hurdles to the adoption and expansion of the 
cash transfer programmes. Regional meetings and conferences set up as learning and sharing 
platforms provided avenues for exerting soft pressure and advocacy for the uptake of cash 
transfer schemes with the aim to inspire governments to emulate what others had achieved. 
The normative or symbolic appeal (Weyland, 2007) provided inspiration for the development 
of the Kenya National Social Protection Policy after a regional meeting organised by the 
African Union (AU) in 2006 under the banner “Livingstone Call for Action”.  
Regional meetings and conferences are spaces in which regimes find themselves “assessed and 
respected” thereby adopting certain prescriptions from the promoter (Rodgers, 2014; Lavers 
and Hickey, 2016). As one participant mentioned, the choice of Zambia to host the conference 
was deliberate. The Government of Zambia had been reluctant in adopting the pilots started by 
various international organisations. Hosting the regional conference in the country therefore 
aimed at “embarrassing the government into adopting the four cash pilot programmes which 
were under implementation” (CSO-05, 28/9/2016). Shaming tactics are sometimes used to get 
“others to comply with values and norms they advance” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 15). 
With global and regional pressure, countries seek to emulate others especially what is 
considered innovations like cash transfer policy to demonstrate their modernity. At times, the 
adoption of policies is led by the drive to look good before global public opinion, termed 
normative or symbolic appeal (Weyland, 2007) even though they may not be appropriated for 
national context. Kenya too as a member of the regional and international community felt 
constrained to adopt cash transfers. To influence the uptake of social protection policies, 
international organisations couched social protection policies as the new standard in modern 
development, hence making countries including Kenya willing to adopt the programme 
through peer pressure, similar to what Lukes refers to as persuading them what they want for 
themselves (Lukes, 2005; Weyland, 2007). 
Furthermore, the South-to-South cooperation mediated by DFID and the International Policy 
Centre (IPC), was an avenue through which international organisations created learning 
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relations between Global South countries. South-to-South cooperation involved the sharing of 
knowledge and ideas through the provision of technical assistance, publications, video 
conferencing and study tours between Latin American and African countries. Creating a wealth 
of information through these avenues aimed to sell the idea of cash transfers and to showcase 
best practices, with the efforts aimed at creating normative appeal. Different countries adopted 
different learnings from Latin American countries. For example, in Kenya, officials indicated 
the development of the single registry as emanating from the South-to-South cooperation, with 
the programmers from Bolsa Família providing technical support. Though acknowledging the 
role of learning from the process, a participant from civil society criticised the exclusion of 
domestic CSOs.  
Whereas one of the key aspects of the social protection experience in Brazil, South Africa and 
India  has been the inclusive participation of CSOs,  sometimes redistributive policies have 
been promoted as part of democratisation by wider groups of CSOs beyond the narrow 
definition of NGOs (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Tillin and Pereira, 2017). The South-to-South 
cooperation failed to create avenues for participation of domestic CSOs within African 
countries. Domestic critics point to the South-to-South process as exclusionary with the 
involvement of only government officials and international organisations. Elsewhere, others 
have argued that among the reasons the South-to-South cooperation has grown is because of 
“efforts by traditional donors to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development and 
the realisations and the agreement that the transfer of knowledge and practice among southern 
countries is more effective in promotion of international development” (Costa Leite et al., 
2013; 1). 
Learning and influencing therefore involved a process of intense contact with national actors. 
While ideational mechanisms of social protection are often presented as a benign exercise, with 
knowledge transfer from one actor to another, our research findings indicate the process 
involved great amounts of financial resources and persuasive power. Apart from knowledge 
and learning as mechanisms for policy transfer, structural mechanisms in the form of financial 
resources emerged as a key tool for persuasion for the Government of Kenya to adopt the CT-
OVC and the HSNP. Financing is discussed more broadly in Chapter 7 of the thesis. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
An examination of policy transfer in Kenya shows how power was exercised by different actors 
within the social protection arena. As noted in the previous chapters, international 
organisations, mainly the World Bank, DFID and UNICEF, were the significant international 
actors promoting the CT-OVC and the HSNP. To achieve their interests, they formed issue-
based coalitions with members of epistemic communities and other organisations to advocate 
the uptake of particular forms of social protection policies in Kenya. Domestic actors 
comprised civil servants within specific ministries, Members of Parliament and domestic 
CSOs. The exercise of power at national level reflected contestation and competition at 
international level centring around ideological persuasions of the various supranational 
organisations. At national level, the exercise of power played out in subtle ways through the 
day-to-day interactions, communications, and relations between actors. International actors’ 
financial and knowledge resources and transfer prestige base made them powerful and they 
became producers of power (Rodgers, 2014), enabling them to shape the social protection 
agenda, constrain the action of other actors and to influence the preference of domestic actors 
in the policy transfer process. By crowding out civil servants through denial of state capacity, 
the DFID-driven HSNP further undermined governments leadership in the policy process. 
 
A couple of fundamental scenarios emerge as a result of the asymmetrical relations in the 
policymaking process. First is the element of policy capture in the interest of international 
organisations. Due to resources globalised actors bring to the policymaking space, state 
interests through incentives and pressure became subservient to interests of international 
organisations. Their dominance in setting the policy agenda left little room for the state to assert 
its sovereignty in finding solutions to address poverty and vulnerability. Second is a façade of 
ownership of the programmes as national programmes. The phrase “donor programme, 
government-branded” aptly captures the ownership hype. While it is often argued that 
ownership of programmes can be measured by how much budgetary allocation governments 
put into programmes and whether a country has a social protection policy in place, these 
yardsticks may be flawed and need deeper examination. Processes of policy development are 
often controlled by international organisations. Budgetary allocations, on the other hand, can 
be influenced by incentives and pressures as I will show in the next chapter of the thesis. As 
observed by Shearer et al. (2016) in their study, among the international organisations within 
the contestations, it is the most powerful that “wins”, it is the most powerful whose interests 
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prevails. Chapter 7 offers an extensive analysis of the funding for the cash transfer programmes 
as a mechanism for transfer.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL LEARNING, DISCOURSE AND POLICY 
NARRATIVES IN POLICY TRANSFER 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Policy transfer theories posit various mechanisms that facilitate the adoption of policies. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), mechanisms for policy promotion are best viewed 
as a continuum ranging from coercive to learning, often with a combination of mechanisms 
employed to bring about policy adoption. In this regard, various scholars in explaining the 
adoption of social protection programmes across Africa demonstrate the different mechanisms 
employed by transnational actors in the policy process (Adésínà, 2010; Foli, 2015; Wanyama 
and McCord, 2017). While coercive and semi-coercive mechanisms centre on the use of 
resources, particularly financial resources, discussions on learning take an ideational approach 
in explaining the adoption of cash transfers. In studies of ideational mechanisms, social 
learning is often portrayed as benign. In acknowledging the role of ideational approaches in 
the uptake of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya, this chapter however demonstrates that 
the learning process, beginning from the generation of ideas and knowledge, involved 
premeditated strategies as a play and extension of power symmetries among social agents in 
the policy arena. In this regard, ideational approaches involved the creation of a “structure of 
knowledge” and a discursive hegemony brought about by a social construction of words and 
meanings. Construction is a core mechanism in “social learning”, used in framing, selection, 
valorisation and making assumptions about causality (Engelstad, 2009). Policy promoters 
further strengthened the discursive hegemony, carrying it through powerful policy narratives 
that resonated with the political and social context at the time.  
 
Ideational approaches, learning through sharing of ideas, constituted one of the mechanisms of 
the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP; however, inasmuch as knowledge transfer and 
social learning were instrumental in the adoption, they still reflected sustained power structures 
and imbalances between the different social agents. As Foucault suggests: “It is not possible 
for power to be exercised without knowledge; it is impossible for knowledge not to engender 
power” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 52). Research findings suggest that power permeated throughout 
the ideational process from the generation of knowledge to the adoption of the programmes. 
The policy site inhered politics, “processes of contest, negotiation, and marginalisation, 
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knowledge” (Jones, 2009) served to add legitimacy to the political action to an already agreed 
upon solution.  
 
The process of social protection adoption is often described as social learning where 
international actors promoted ideas from Latin America. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 
6, an examination of the policymaking process shows that the problem that needed solving, 
that is, poverty and vulnerability, did not occasion looking around for a solution; transnational 
actors identified the solution and linked it to a problem. To bring about policy change, policy 
promoters needed to recast the problem to make it amenable to the idea of cash transfers.  
 
This chapter discusses the power of knowledge in shaping the adoption of the two programmes 
and how transnational agents generated knowledge and meanings within the social protection 
arena to promote learning. The structure of the chapter is as follows: the first section is a 
discussion on social learning and the formation of discourse around the policymaking process. 
I look beyond a description of learning and show how ideas were made powerful based on who 
held and passed on the idea, and how they were made powerful in the context of Kenya. I 
consider how policy agents framed and articulated ideas in relation to poverty and vulnerability 
in the policymaking process. In the second section I consider how knowledge and ideas were 
generated and by whom, and how proponents of social protection programmes used the 
knowledge generated. Then I analyse the framing of ideas and construction of new meanings 
to old problems where I and consider how the social protection policymaking process gave 
words new meanings by discursively reconstructing poverty and vulnerability. In the last 
section of the chapter I consider how three policy narratives, economic, moral and social 
justice, were crafted in the promotion of the two cash transfer programmes and used to shape 
policy acceptance.   
 
7.2 Social learning, ideas and discourse in the promotion of cash transfers  
Learning is expected to lead to certain outcomes; in this case, the learning related to cash 
transfers and social protection aimed at the adoption of the two cash transfer programmes. It is 
more conducive to learn from a place of flat structure with open dynamics rather than a top-
down structure with social dynamics characterised by power and superiority. Domestic 
organisations participating in the study acknowledged that learning emanated from 
international organisations. There was a convergence of opinion from participants associated 
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with the CT-OVC that the adoption of the programme relied on learning. One of the 
participants defined the World Bank as “curators of knowledge” (IOS-01, (13/3/2016). These 
views reflect the asymmetrical relation that characterised the learning process in the policy 
process and the top-down manner of the learning process. In addition, it reflects the centre of 
power in the policymaking process as power is knowledge, and vice versa, and that those who 
dominate also hold significant ideological/knowledge power (Foucault, 2002). 
 
Whereas learning and passing on of ideas may be perceived as passive and benign, various 
scholars describe it as one involving a struggle of ideas and meanings among social actors in 
the policy process. Mkandawire (2014) states that the propagation of ideas involves a battle of 
minds, citing Adebayo Adedeji who claimed—in relation to the way structural adjustments 
were promoted in Africa—was akin to the struggle of the “Battles for the African Mind”. 
Though the use of ideas may seem non-pressurising and benign in influencing policy change, 
Deacon, McBride and Merolli (2013) describe the process as a battle of “discourse or 
hegemonic struggle through which different interests and agents jostle to be in the driver’s seat 
of ideas and world views” (McBride and Merolli, 2013, p. 301). Adésínà (2011) describes 
learning in policymaking in this way: 
 
Learning is more than a benign exchange among intellectual and policymakers or 
medium for policy learning. Ideas may serve the function of seizing control of the 
policy terrain, undermining policy learning; generating policy atrophy in the host local 
context, distorting local realities, and undermining long-term sustainable development 
(Adésínà, 2011, p. 456). 
 
According to participants managing the CT-OVC, the process of adoption involved social 
learning based on bounded rationality where actors went about the implementation of the 
programmes while learning. Social learning, though publicised as the mechanism through 
which the adoption of the programmes happened, is inconsistent with the research findings, 
which suggest that international organisations employed different tactics of power to bring 
about the adoption of the CT-OVC. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the idea of cash 
transfers was generated first and only then did learning take place. Two study participants put 
it as follows:  
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The start of it goes back to 2002. There was an internal UNICEF and regional directors 
of UNAIDS meeting and they challenged the UNICEF country manager to do more on 
the issue of the OVC, and that is how we came up with the idea of cash for orphans 
(IOS-03, 13/3/2016).  
You know DFID just woke up one day and said we are starting a cash transfer in 
Northern Kenya (MGSCD–03, 25/4/2017). 
 
The two statements from the interviews indicate that ideational approaches, though present, 
did not influence to a large extent the adoption of the programmes rather international 
organisations like DFID had themselves been influenced by the circulation of dominant ideas.  
Moreover, in the case of the HSNP, as stated by the government official, there is an indication 
of how DFID made the decision to start the programme prior to consultations with others in 
the sector. It is symptomatic of the continuity of “welfare imperialism”, where decisions 
concerning development and policies are crafted in the metropole for Africans, with little or no 
initiative by the recipient citizens (Lewis, 2001). 
Where learning and ideas come from matters in policy change. Importation of ideas and 
learning related to social protection policies happened through international organisations who 
successfully monopolised the propagation of ideas. Two participants from civil society 
expressed this view as follows:  
UNICEF, DFID and the World Bank are international organisations, and this gives 
them the power and opportunity to push an agenda or idea to whichever level… they 
have a lot of influence advocating ideas (CSO-02, 25/01/2016). Donors have strength 
to push forth policies… Donors determine what to do and run with it… inequalities 
manifest in relationships between donors and government (CSO-04, 13/05/2016). 
These sentiments indicate two views by other actors on the role of international organisations. 
First, there is the idea that where ideas come from is a reflection of a balance of power 
(Baumgartner, 2013) but also that the centre of gravity in the generation and transfer of policies 
is still the North Atlantic (Rodgers, 2014). The North is therefore the centre of knowledge and 
power.  
The second view reflected by the participant is the power of the promoter of the idea, as ideas 
on their own cannot determine policy change. As noted by other scholars in the literature, ideas 
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are able to bring about change if they are carried, supported and imposed by powerful agents 
(Béland, 2009; John, 2012; Baumgartner, 2013; Kangas, Niemelä and Varjonen, 2014). Key 
informants from government and domestic civil society organisations attributed the power of 
international organiations as the carriers of ideas to the resources at their disposal. The 
resources enabled them to set the learning agenda and determine what kind of ideas are 
discussed. These sentiments resonate with Lukes’ second dimension of power, which views 
power as the ability to have control of the agenda, and decide what is to be discussed, the power 
over negotiations and influence over agendas (Lukes, 2005). National organiations therefore 
considered them an authority whose ideas could not be challenged. A representative from a 
national organiation elaborated at length as follows: 
International players played an important role because they have money and a lot of 
influence with the government. In my view, donors have a lot of influence at the 
Secretariat to the extent that government does not dispute their views often – they have 
influence in terms of finance, in terms of decision-making, even the technical support 
they want to give to government. They also contract international consultants that are 
writing policies for Kenya, then they go to Liberia and Zambia, then to another country. 
If you read the policies of these different countries, they are similar. Where do the 
international consultants come from? They are linked to the international organisations. 
So that influence in my view is crowding out the role of the government and the 
participation of national CSOs in SP. (CSO_02, 25/01/2016) 
The statement further indicates that endorsement of an idea by powerful agents is not enough; 
they often have to be promoted and theorised by epistemic communities – usually those sources 
with the ability to conduct research, with “critical intellectual mass and connections between 
the place of transfer and the research node” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007, p. 456). 
International organiations stimulated the idea of cash transfers, which were then transported by 
think tanks and “travelling” epistemic communities comprising academics and consultants. 
International organisations relied on the epistemic communities’ ability to transport the ideas 
across borders and in their expertise and knowledge to present ideas so that they fit into the 
domestic context. In addition, how international organisations framed the idea of cash transfers 
made it powerful. Commenting on the framing of the idea of the CT-OVC, a participant from 
an international organisation explained it as follows:  
 
The idea was conceived by UNICEF and we framed the idea in a good way and that is 
how it got accepted (IOS-03, 13/3/2017).  
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This statement not only indicates the power of an idea and who promotes an idea but even more 
the power in framing an idea.  
Ideas have to be carried by agents through discourse. As described by a participant in the study, 
“the idea of cash transfers was propagated, it became a song; it was either cash transfers or 
nothing else” (CSO-04, 13/5/2016). This comment reflects the consistency and the vigour with 
which international organisations promoted cash transfer programmes through discourse. To 
create a powerful discourse requires that elites consistently and continuously articulate and 
communicate their ideas through discussions, deliberation, negotiation, and contestation 
through all available channels (Schmidt, 2011). For this reason, effective communication and 
argumentative skills were important resources, as these have power and the ability to change 
perceptions and make the impossible seem possible.  A member of civil society intimated that 
this task therefore could only be entrusted to one of their own. He expressed these sentiments 
as follows:  
They could not trust anyone to come and propagate the idea, it had to be someone from 
abroad to come and ensure that the message was delivered as required (CSO-05, 
28/9/2016).  
 
The policy transfer process required elites with the ability to construct and maintain a discourse 
that with clarity of the agenda and keep on with the advocacy until government took to the 
idea. This is in line with Ferguson's  (1994, p. xiv) sentiments on how development institutions 
act to formulate a discourse which in turn “constructs a particular kind of knowledge, thereby 
creating a structure of knowledge around that object with interventions then organised on the 
basis of the structure of knowledge.” Discourse is more than language; it is a site of “social 
relations of power as it situates ordinary practices of life and defines the social action that is 
possible” (Foucault, 1980a). 
 
Discourse as learning gained efficacy out of the discursive coalition that formed around it. The 
coalition not only sought to validate the discourse but also imposed it on others. A member of 
civil society commenting on the promotion by both international actors and the epistemic 
community explained it as follows:  
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Donors sold it thoroughly in two ways: One, they promoted it as programmes of choice, 
and second, countries were essentially told to implement it (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).  
 
The following statement points to two aspects through which adoption took place. First was 
through the formation of a powerful discourse around cash transfers and second the imposition 
of the idea by international organisations on the government of Kenya. The collective action 
and the communicative force of transnational agents – what they said about the problems –was 
legitimate within the Kenyan context of past failed solutions in addressing high levels of 
poverty and vulnerability. The legitimacy of the statements by the discursive coalition, 
following on Foucault, “acquire their legitimacy from the institutional sites from which they 
are uttered and also from the status of the speaker” (Sanyal, 2013, p. 79). 
 
While ideational mechanisms remained key in the transfer of social protection policies, it is 
imperative that in explaining their role we go beyond a description of the mechanism to 
understand how they became powerful enough to bring about policy change. An analysis of 
the hegemony of discourse that brought this about is therefore key to understanding the policy 
transfer process. Hegemony is a process through which a dominant group applies educative 
pressure to gain the consent and collaboration of individuals or other groups (Gramsci, 1971). 
Hegemony, drawing from Gramscian perspective, is described and conceived variously as a 
“consensus protection by an armour of coercion, a form of politics where organic intellections 
aim to create broad consensus while success in eliminating oppositional forces and moral 
intellectual leadership that aims to create a collective will” (Torfing, 2009, p. 117). Ideas and 
the discourse around them on their own are not powerful enough to bring about change; they 
only become powerful based on human agency that advocates and invests time and energy to 
push them forth. As demonstrated in the chapter, ideational approaches around social 
protection in Kenya involved the use of reason, invoking of reconstructed concepts, applying 
values to categories of people and the weight of evidence to support the solution (Schmidt, 
2011).  
 
By creating a “structure of knowledge” on the efficacy and effectiveness of cash transfer 
policies, transnational actors, drawing from their resources, participants in the process sought 
to attach meaning to their actions by forming them so that they formed part of a discourse. 
“Structures of knowledge is about how certain problems come to be constructed in the way 
they do, the knowledge that is authorised or legitimated in the construction of those problems 
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and how that knowledge can be productive and powerful” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p. 22). 
International organisations expressed power through the hegemony of, first, who generated the 
knowledge around which ideas were derived, and second, how the ideas were advanced. Ideas 
were easily passed through a marshalling of evidence which transnational actors used to frame 
issues, knowledge, and information for manipulation and persuasion. Transnational actors 
through their expertise presented social learning to fit with the social and political context 
through construction of meanings, framing and through policy narratives. Policy narratives 
were employed by proponents to persuade and manipulate other policy actors.  
 
In the next section, I present findings from the study in regard to how transnational actors 
generated knowledge and the purpose the knowledge served in policymaking to ensure policy 
adoption. 
 
7.3 Knowledge generation for ideas 
In seeking to promote the CT-OVC and the HSNP, transnational actors generated and produced 
knowledge to bolster the agenda. The generation of knowledge derived from evaluations, 
piloting of programmes and from research conducted by transnational agents and from expert 
knowledge. Through the generation of and dissemination of ideas, transnational agents set up 
what Ferguson (1994) refers to as a “structure of knowledge.” Participants in the study were of 
the view that, knowledge emanating from research on social protection burgeoned with huge 
quantities of studies on various aspects of cash transfers ranging from impact to effectiveness, 
targeting of the fiscal space and many others. Knowledge is central in policy processes and that 
which is considered to be coming from experts plays “an important role in the construction and 
reproduction of policy narratives” (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011, p. 7). The generation 
of knowledge and ideas represented perpetuation of power in the policy adoption process, as 
those who conducted the studies were epistemic community members linked to and contracted 
by international organisations. Further, research findings indicate that the generation of 
knowledge for the construction of discourse relevant for the promotion of social protection 
policies can be examined from two aspects; how knowledge related to the ideas was generated 
and for what purpose.  
Apart from knowledge generated from lead adopters of social protection programmes like Latin 
America and South Africa, transnational actors generated knowledge from within the two 
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programmes during the pilot phases. Transnational agents derived knowledge from the various 
evaluations on ongoing pilot programmes. While impact evaluations are designed to improve 
programmes, findings suggest that different international agencies carried them out in 
competition with other donors to convince policymakers to adopt a particular programme. 
Impact evaluations therefore acted as tools for advocacy and influence for each organisation’s 
preferred instrument. Two participants from the study explained it as follows:  
 
The rapid expansion of the programme was actually as a result of the evidence that had 
been found from the 2007/2008 evaluation and later 2009/2011 that showed positive 
results. For the first time, there was a programme that showed that poverty had reduced 
by 12%. This was the first government that ever showed that and therefore treasury was 
convinced and bought in into expanding the cash to the CT-OVC. The World Bank was 
also convinced and thereby started supporting the programme (IOS-05, 20/7/2016). 
These sentiments reflect the high premium that international organisations placed on 
evaluations as tools for advocacy to convince both the government to increase its funding to 
the programme but also to catalyse the participation and support of other donor organisations. 
Through this advocacy, the government increased funding to the CT-OVC with an increase of 
registered beneficiaries into the programme. UNICEF, which commissioned the evaluation, 
presented the results in lobbying for increased allocation of funds to the programme as proof 
of the effectiveness of cash transfers. In this way, the thoughts and action of development 
bureaucrats were powerfully shaped from the positive results emanating out of the structure of 
knowledge set up by the promoters of cash transfers. Research findings indicate that on the 
strength of the evaluation results, the World Bank used the findings in the evaluation report to 
“sell” a loan to the government, which facilitated the expansion of the programme. This was 
confirmed by a participant in the study:  
The World Bank was able to push this through from the impact evaluation that was 
conducted at that time (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).  
With the loan agreement came the exponential expansion of the CT-OVC from 3,000 in 2007 
to 150,000 households in 2013 (Bosworth et al., 2016). Other cash transfer programmes in the 
country expanded too within this period. While the results from the evaluation were important 
in the advocacy for expansion of the programmes, other political economy conditions at the 
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time provided a window of opportunity for this form of advocacy, as is demonstrated in Chapter 
9.  
Transnational agents used and drew out of expert knowledge to legitimise particular agents’ 
actions and their preferences and biases. In presenting cash as the solution to poverty and 
vulnerability, some participants in the study were of the opinion that evaluations conducted by 
international organisations aimed at legitimising cash as the solution:  
We placed an evaluation of the programme, as part of the things being a pilot, you want 
to show that cash transfers work and what does not work, this was 18 months after the 
programme had started (IOS-03, 13/03/2016).  
International organisations set up the research to demonstrate that their preferred proposition 
works, thereby corrupting the science of research which starts out with a hypothesis that then 
is confirmed or nullified by the findings. However, advocacy-led research, where researchers 
are contracted, is structured to find evidence that donors’ choice of policy action is the correct 
one. All evaluations therefore demonstrated positive results, about which some participants 
expressed doubt. The generation of knowledge through evaluations therefore served legitimacy 
purposes, and not just learning per se but to prove that giving cash to the poor works.  
Thirdly, different organisations produced knowledge to provide ammunition to the different 
competing groups of international organisations to “fight” others’ ideas and show that their 
programmes were more effective in addressing poverty. Within the contested space, each actor 
in promoting their preference generated knowledge for use to ensure acceptance in the “battle 
of the minds”. For example, in their reports which were widely shared by government, 
HelpAge Report indicated that:  
HelpAge International also simulated the impacts on national poverty of an expanded 
social pension. Findings were that a universal pension of KES 2000 to everybody over 
60 would lead to a reduction of four percentage points in the national poverty rate, from 
45.9 per cent to 41.9 per cent. This would equate to over a million people being lifted 
out of basic needs poverty, which would be a huge success (HelpAge International, 
2011, p. 3).  
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Through the generation of knowledge from other countries and deriving from simulations, 
HelpAge demonstrated that Kenya could afford an old age pension. In addition, through the 
models, HelpAge demonstrated that a social pensions scheme was efficient enough to end 
intergenerational cycle of poverty” to be able to fight for their case of the adoption of the 
programme. The argument however is subject to questions. First, the amount provided per 
household (KES 2000) is insufficient in meeting any households needs. The amount neither 
qualifies as sufficient to lift any household out of poverty even at low levels of poverty at USD 
1.25. Second, the argument presented by HelpAge depended on studies carried out in South 
Africa, showing that older persons receiving the Old Age Grant were using part of it to facilitate 
transport costs to their children and grandchildren searching for jobs. The argument assumes 
that sharing is an inherent default for households receiving the cash transfers and that the same 
argument in South African can be used in Kenya. As Boswell and others note, sometimes facts 
and knowledge constitute ammunition for contested areas and for political situations (Boswell, 
Geddes and Scholten, 2011). Rather than serve the purpose of improvement of programmes, 
international organisations in this case employed knowledge as tools for persuasion for the 
adoption of the programmes and for fighting off attacks against preferred policy solutions from 
politicians or from other agents in the policy space. In such cases, ideational processes become 
discursive weapons that are then used in construction for policy reform (Béland, 2009).  
Lastly, transnational actors produced knowledge as a resource to bolster choices and provide 
support for ideological biases. To do this, international organisations commissioned some 
evaluations with the aim of furthering their ideological preferences. Participants in the study 
singled out the World Bank’s agenda on imposition conditionalities specifically in this case.  
As explained in one of the interviews: 
DFID and the World Bank were at loggerheads over conditionalities. We brokered a 
deal whereby this expansion to Nyanza province would be like a larger pilot test for 
testing conditionalities and non-conditionalities and we would bring in kind of a 
reputable international evaluation firm to evaluate the conditionalities. World Bank was 
getting ideas from Latin America, where they have promoted conditionalities. And in 
the evaluations, it turned out that they could not measure conditionalities versus non-
conditionalities because the programme operators had not been able to implement the 
conditionality model (IOS_03, 13/03/2016). 
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But following the evaluations indicating the non-effect of conditionalities, the World Bank 
rejected the results as it did not confirm their bias towards conditionalities. The World Bank, 
apart from being conditioned by their ideological orientation had their knowledge shaped by 
their ideas of how cash transfers had worked in Latin America where they had experience. But 
imposing conditionalities on the CT-OVC is problematic. First is the assumption that the 
services related to education like schools, teachers, and health are available. Second, it assumes 
that those receiving the cash will not incur further costs in accessing the “conditions”. Third is 
the notion that the services are of an appreciable quality to meet the medical or educational 
needs and lastly is the assumption that the poor do not want to take their children to school or 
health clinics and must be forced to do so with conditions. With the evaluation demonstrating 
that conditionalities made no difference, a government official described it as a relief as the 
government and other donors had been opposed to the idea of conditionalities from the 
beginning (MGSCD-02, 12/5/2017). The knowledge generated thus served the other agents as 
it stalled and deflected pressure for the institutionalisation of conditionalities to the programme.   
 
Following on the point above, the overall knowledge production process reflected the 
prevailing interests of each group based on the epistemological position of the group. 
Transnational agents sought to generate data and knowledge that confirmed their position and 
drew from their epistemological orientations as long as it did not contradict their agendas. To 
achieve this, three important observations emerged. First, donor organisations hired out 
evaluators or members of the epistemic community who are of the same ideological orientation. 
A perusal of documents reveals that the World Bank, for example, preferred Latin American 
organisations like Ayala Consulting while DFID mostly hired British organisations.  
 
Second, as ideas were generated after the solution, it is possible that organisations could have 
kept certain issues from discussions. In the case of the World Bank and the issue of 
conditionalities, as one of the respondents said, “the report was never brought out to light and 
even until now we have no idea what was in there” (IOS-03,13/3/2016). Evaluations that were 
unfavourable to certain groups or those that contradicted the interests of the international 
organisations were kept off the agenda so as not to contaminate the process of adoption of the 
policies.  
 
Third, communication to the government in relation the programme served to advance the 
interest of the international organisations and they kept off information that which appeared 
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harmful to their agenda. This was clearly a case of what Foucault terms the “rules of 
formation”: the power to regulate what is talked about, how to talk about it, who is authorised 
to talk, and how various pieces of information are combined in creating hegemony (Torfing, 
2009). An example is how policy promoters choose to silence the role of labour and labour 
markets in improving the lives of people in Brazil. The efficacy of broader social protection 
instruments in countries that have reduced poverty was not discussed in the promotion, with 
the single narrative of cash transfers dominating the policy process. Instead, the cash transfer 
programmes were valorised over other policy instruments that played a key role in advancing 
and improving livelihoods from early adopter countries where transnational actors transferred 
the cash transfer agenda.  
 
Competition among international organisations based on knowledge was important in 
convincing the government on adoption. Findings indicate that even though it was in the 
interest of international agents, especially DFID and UNICEF, to promote the HSNP and the 
CT-OVC, other organisations veiled as national interests prevailed in the adoption of the Older 
Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT). DFID resisted attempts by the government at setting up the 
OPCT as it would have contaminated the randomised control test it was carrying out in the 
HSNP. However, the government initiated the programme with its own funding despite protests 
from donors forcing DFID to change the design and strategy of the experiment. The 
government ignored the protests and set up the OPCT, as explained by an official from the 
ministry implementing the OPCT:  
The government wanted a programme of its own and for that reason they set up the 
OPCT with their own financing so that they could have control over the decisions” 
(MGSCD-01, 23/3/2016).  
 
This action went against plans of international organisations who had envisaged that the 
government would scale up the CT-OVC and the HSNP instead of starting new programmes. 
An advisor with one of the donor agencies expressed it in this way:  
 
We had advised the government to stick to one programme, but we come back after 
five years and there are five programmes (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).  
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This statement and government’s decision to implement the OPCT indicates government 
agency and how international competition shaped political decisions to eclipse the advice of 
powerful players. But instead of adopting a universal social pension in a few districts as 
advocated by HelpAge, according to an official in the programme, the government 
implemented a geographical targeting mechanism which spread the programme to all districts 
of the country to ensure equal geographical representation of the programme (MFP-01, 
22/4/2016). Later with the HSNP, though evidence generated by transnational agents in 
advocacy recommended a poverty-targeted programme, members of parliament forcefully 
ensured the programme adopted geographical targeting to support their political interests. 
Besides the generation of knowledge and the purposes for which the knowledge was generated, 
the next section examines the social construction of words and meanings, and framing, by 
international organisations as a part of the structures of knowledge in the policy transfer 
process.  
 
7.4 Social Construction of Words and Meanings, and Framing 
Social construction of words and situations is powerful. The idea of social constructivism in 
public policy was made popular through the analysis by Schneider and Ingram (1993), who, in 
their study of social construction of older persons as deserving or undeserving in the 
distribution of benefits in the United States, state that “social construction of target populations 
is an important, albeit overlooked phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public 
policy” (Schneider and Ingram, 1993, p. 334). According to Schneider and Ingram, social 
construction of groups and targets for public policy design decisions is often made by political 
elites with the aim of political expediency. This however does not represent the bottom-up case 
of social protection policy adoption in Kenya. Social construction and reconstruction became 
critical in the selling of policy ideas. To achieve this purpose the process involved not only a 
construction of the target groups, in other words children and people in North-Eastern Kenya, 
but a reconstruction of the situation, namely poverty and vulnerability. The discourse then 
entails ordering and labelling populations in different ways and in so doing frames issues in a 
way that can empower some groups and at the same time marginalise others (Keeley and 
Scoones, 2003). Construction of orphanhood and residents of Northern Kenya centred on 
marginalisation and deservedness, and though poverty and the classes or the categories of the 
groups is not new, its social construction entailed a remaking of the reality and the situation in 
line with the political and socio-economic context at the time.  
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Public policy entails language and accordingly, the language adopted is used in the construction 
of social reality, the problems and the target group. In seeking to advance cash transfers, an 
analysis of data from the interviews demonstrates that transnational agents positively 
constructed the image of the two groups in line with the social and political context, an exercise 
that strongly influenced decisions by the bureaucrats and the government of Kenya. The 
construction evolved around notions of compassion to deservedness. According to a 
respondent, “Socially, there is acceptance within the community that the people receiving the 
cash are poor and that they deserve the money,” as expressed by a government official who 
participated in the study (MDVP-01, 07/04/2016). But in the construction of targets there was 
the exclusion of some group based on how the policy promoter constructed the target groups. 
In their construction of the notion of deservedness, international organisations based the idea 
on the social situation and structure as this was the period when the HIV/AIDS pandemic was 
at its highest. Ideally, in nationally-led bottom-up policymaking processes, pressure to provide 
for the cash transfers emanated from the public sphere as a result of the positive construction 
of a weak group of people. In Kenya, however, as described by one participant in the study 
from civil society, the policy process involved an elitist group defining and constructing the 
groups of people deemed vulnerable with the deliberate exclusion of other actors. 
 
Problem definition is often the first step in social construction in policy processes and design. 
As Bacchi (2012) states, policies “produce problems” in policy analysis, meaning that policies 
construct or define problems. While the definition of a problem always emerges from analysis, 
in this case, policy agents in the policy space skipped this stage, as a definition of the problem 
already existed, based on international actors’ perception of the problems and their ideological 
standing as already described in Chapter 6. The policy solution, cash transfer, did not flow 
from the objective facts of the solution, but as a solution to which a problem needed to be 
found. Therefore, the problem and the preferred solutions were constructed from the ideas 
available (Boswell, Geddes and Scholten, 2011).  
 
It was important that the social construction of the problem align with the solution. By 
assigning new words and meanings to existing problems, the cash transfer narrative challenged 
the existing ways of doing things and specified a new approach to solving the problem. For 
example, “exclusion from participation” according to proponents of HSNP was a key function 
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of poverty. For this reason, social construction involved the use of new words within the policy 
space like “social inclusion, strengthening long-term community capacities and building social 
capital.” Other concepts revolved around “opportunity, empowerment and security of the poor 
and the vulnerable”. The evolution of new meanings links to Foucault’s notion of power as 
productive in shaping not only meanings but identities (Foucault, 1980a).  
 
According to participants, the social reality of the moment needed to be addressed urgently and 
therefore the social construction by international organisations fit in well with the situation at 
hand. In reconstructing the distribution of food aid as a solution, DFID and other donors 
compared the status quo to a “perennial distribution of cocaine to which people had become 
addicted” (IOS-03, 13/3/2016). National agents presented little resistance to the solution 
provided as the government offered no new options in addressing the cyclical hunger in 
Northern Kenya. By also grounding the reconstruction of the idea of cash transfers on facts and 
knowledge, international agents limited resistance from domestic actors. Instead, domestic 
actors viewed them as saviours, as aptly captured by a participant who stated, s/he: 
Who brings us solutions to our problems is a saviour (CSO-05, 28/9/2016).  
According to a participant in the study from the government, UNAIDS statistics presented on 
the magnitude of the effect of HIV/AIDS on children could neither be ignored nor disputed. 
As one of the respondents said:  
The facts were out there in the public and no one could argue that children needed help 
(CSO-03, 12/2/2016).  
Following Schneider and Ingram (1993), the social problems required to be reconstructed 
afresh based on the current social situation which derived mostly from the push for the MDGs, 
which enabled a modification and/or a reconstruction of images of orphans and older persons. 
 
In promoting cash transfers, transnational actors framed them as investments, with a depiction 
of social transfers as an avenue for economic development rather than instrumental tools for 
poverty alleviation. In so doing, international organisations imbued the narrative on cash 
transfers with power by successfully reframing welfare into benefits and away from handouts. 
Moreover, in the advocacy messages, proponents rejected the words “welfare” and “handouts”, 
which generate negative images that make people to reject the need for social assistance. 
Instead, policy agents replaced them with social protection and entitlements to portray positive 
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images. The problems that the cash transfers sought to address were set on moral positions by 
both donors and non-governmental organisations with the problems of orphanhood, 
vulnerability, and poverty among children and those in Northern Kenya constructed as needing 
“moralistic interventions.” As stated by a participant:  
People accepted that somebody needed to do something about this as HIV was tearing 
through society and weakening the capacity to take care of each other. The need for 
that was recognised by citizens and by politicians. We will not let a child die, we will 
not let a very sick person die, we will do things for the poor – so that notion exists. I 
don’t think any politician wants to see that there are orphans hungry, not taken care of, 
older persons or people with disability not receiving cash (CSO_03, 12/02/2016).  
 
The persuasion therefore advocated by international organisations that HIV and hunger needed 
a moral solution in terms of cash resonated with national actors. For both programmes, the 
identification of the problem required a framing of the target beneficiaries for the cash transfers 
as victims beyond their circumstances. For the CT-OVC, policy advocates framed the 
vulnerability of orphans around the fact that they were victims to circumstances, a reorientation 
which tugged at the moral side of policymakers. Meanwhile, in Northern Kenya, advocates 
based their persuasion on the perpetual neglect of the districts by successive political regimes, 
as elaborated as follows:  
People agreed that these groups are actually the most marginalised and because of their 
marginalisation Kenyans were willing to give extra. The country accepts that they were 
left behind, and everybody agrees that the region has been marginalised and is very 
poor. The four poorest counties – Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir and Mandera become 
recipients of the HSNP by design as they are the poorest counties (CSO_03, 
12/02/2016).  
 
These narrations presented as facts empowered the idea of a new solution framing the neglect 
and marginalisation as a moral obligation which the government needed to address.  
 
At the agenda-setting stage, different policy agents competed against each other, with different 
agents elevating their preferred categories or target population to benefit from the social 
protection policies through framing. To be effective, therefore, the “definition competition” 
required alignment and forming of partnership with domestic agents like bureaucracy, 
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politicians and civil society members To compete effectively, agents in the policy process 
manipulated, responded to and perpetuated the social constructions of the target groups 
(Petridou, 2014). The social construction of the target groups was important as it influenced 
public opinion (Shanahan, Jones and McBeth, 2011) and made the idea of giving cash transfers 
to orphans and those in North-Eastern Kenya acceptable among Kenyans. For international 
organisations, the negative image of categories of people in Northern Kenya was positively 
constructed to influence policy perceptions for policy adoption.  
 
International organisations depicted the idea of providing cash to children as an investment in 
the future, a sentiment which resonated with many in the public space. The framing of poverty, 
HIV and AIDS and orphanhood were rightly bestowed with the appearance of problematic 
concepts and reality in society which needed urgent addressing, thereby transforming the 
discourse on the status quo. A reframing of children’s homes as an “untenable solution,” with 
the growing number of orphans led to the elevation of “keeping children in their natural homes” 
as the solution. Later on, however, the narrow framing of vulnerability in relation to 
orphanhood posed challenges in the quest for the expansion of the programme as I will show 
in Chapter 9. This goes to show how narrowly the social construction of targets is normally 
restricted in scope when there is a concentration of organisations seeking to promote their target 
groups out of their plans and programmes rather than the wider needs of society.  
 
In Northern Kenya, the social reconstruction of the target population necessitated bringing a 
shift in the way policymakers addressed poverty in the predominantly neglected areas. Driven 
by the tenets of human rights and social justice, the reconstruction of the marginalised group 
was anchored on the process of writing the Constitution at the time. As confirmed by a 
participant from civil society:  
While civil and political rights are traditionally called rights, social and economic rights 
are called development … but now because of this Constitution, we are starting to see 
a merge in those two constructs. So, the constructs are coming together where there was 
an artificial divide and I think now there is more appreciation of social and economic 
issues as rights and this is where cash transfers come in (CSO-03. 12/2/2016).  
 
Drawing from global rights instruments, another echoed: 
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights had also been crafted and you will find that 
social security is well articulated and very firmly embedded in declaration of human 
rights and as a right. Yet I hear people nowadays say we want to promote social 
protection as a right or right-based social protection … it is in the declaration as a right, 
it is not charity at all (CSO-05, 28/9/2016). 
 
Both statements point to the reframing of the social protection agenda towards concepts related 
to social justice, rights, socio-economic rights and constitutionalism, which were within the 
discourse of rights rather than handouts and welfare programmes. But as cash transfers are 
conditional to a particular identity like orphanhood, it ceases to be a right by virtue of targeting. 
To attain maximum impact, promoters of cash transfers used language and chose words 
codified in national and international law. Benefits to the people were rationalised in a way 
that emphasised orientations towards justice. Members of civil society organisations codified 
their advocacy messages and language along national and international laws and human rights 
instruments in framing cash transfers schemes. A member of civil society expressed the 
institutionalisation of cash transfers for the marginalised in this way: 
 
About the achievement of the legal principle of minimum core-obligation – the 
discussions on cash transfers are about civil and political rights recognised in the 1960s 
that when people reach a certain level and they fall below that safety net then the state 
is accountable (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).  
 
Organisations working with the older persons, on the other hand, based their advocacy of older 
persons as carers on the HIV/AIDS epidemic and were therefore valuable in the care of 
orphans. The framing around giving cash to older persons meant killing two birds with one 
stone. Older persons were framed as morally responsible and that they always share that which 
they receive with members of their household, including children. Furthermore, older persons 
were framed as not wasteful with money, particularly older women. 
 
Social construction of target populations influenced public officials, shaping both policy 
agenda and design. Constructed on deservedness, the idea of cash transfers resonated among 
national policy agents and the public as it aligned with views held of children and those in 
Northern Kenya. Public images of suffering children influenced decisions made by 
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policymakers and domestic actors in adopting both programmes. Both the children and the 
recipients of the HSNP were presented as socially meaningful and worthy of consideration for 
government and donor support. Each group tried to distinguish their group as being able to 
draw the attention of powerful national agents in the policy space. Buffeted by global and 
regional support, and the push from the domestic and global nodes of the international 
organisations, the social reconstruction of target populations and the ideal solution gained 
momentum. The construction was necessary in the selling of the idea to government and 
especially to treasury, as government needed proof of the outcome of the investment. An NGO 
representative explained this viewpoint in the following way:  
They (referring to Treasury) still think that the way to define programmes is through an 
assessment on return on investment… because people who come from an economic 
background would argue that they do not see any change… the human rights approach 
would argue that there is a return in investment in providing cash transfers (CSO-03, 
12/2/2016). 
 
Similarly, the vigour in social constructions involved the understatement of certain descriptive 
constructions of concepts such as handouts, welfare, benefits. This action aimed to establish a 
discursive hegemony of “appropriate words” in the policy change process (Fischer, 2003). In 
cases where domestic actors resisted the ideas, especially the Ministry of Finance, in agenda-
setting international actors used language and discourse centred on investment and even 
indicated that cash transfers could lead to growth in the national economy. Following the 
reconstruction of the different categories of people, poverty and vulnerability and the idea of 
cash transfers, transnational organisations, according to research findings, crafted policy 
narratives as shown in the section below.  
 
7.5 Policy narratives and storylines 
Policy narratives or storylines are important in discursive processes as they serve to bring 
attention to policy ideas. Most people will rely on storylines, as they function to condense large 
amount of information. Moreover, they “position social agents and institutional practices in 
ongoing, competing narratives” (Fischer, 2003, p. 23). They may emphasise certain aspects or 
conceal certain aspects of information or events. Ideas are not simply a plan, projects or 
solutions to a problem, – they carry stories. Ideas are in turn carried through stories and 
narratives – it is the narrative that makes ideas powerful and transportable. Policy narratives 
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often consist of “homologies, creation stories, oppositional dyads, before-and-after vistas, 
metaphors and narrative logics” (Rodgers, 2014, p. 308) and it is these aspects that form the 
power of ideas (Shanahan et al., 2013). 
 
Words, images, and symbols were used to strategically craft the narratives that would bring 
about the adoption of social protection policies. The narratives were constructed to enhance 
“social learning”. Policy narratives are often generated by the advocacy coalitions “based 
primarily on congruent policy beliefs, coordination and desired policy output” (Shanahan, 
Jones and McBeth, 2011, p. 542). Policy narratives therefore carried ideas and were aimed at 
persuading the government of Kenya to adopt cash transfer policies. Policy narratives were 
documented through a number of mediums – newsletters, official documentation, policy briefs 
and even on social media. 
 
To be effective, policy narratives strategically often contain a certain thread, opposers and 
proponents. Policy narratives on the social protection policy process were central where a broad 
set of actors, including the epistemic community, generated policy narratives along 
reconstructed meanings of both poverty and the targeted population. Cash transfer policies and 
programmes were communicated through the narratives as the vehicle for conveying and 
organising information. Policy narratives, according to Petridou (2014), influence opinions in 
two ways. First, they reinforce and galvanise existing opinions for the adoption of programmes. 
To sell the idea to policymakers, international organisations reinforced the narrative of 
suffering children for the policy to be taken up. Second, policy narratives are designed to bring 
about the conversion of previously opposing people with divergent opinions. The economic 
narrative around the cash transfers, as will be shown below, acted to change the views of, 
especially, those with different ideological orientations towards cash transfer programmes, like 
those in Treasury.  
 
As discussed in the sections above, evaluations provided knowledge through which 
international organisations promoted cash transfer programmes. Evidence from evaluations 
and studies were used in the creation of narratives and in learning to promote adoption. This 
was explained by a respondent in the following way:  
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Evidence emerging from the monitoring and evaluation helped to push the government 
forward. It was evidence from research that showed positive outcomes that were useful 
in the adoption of the programmes (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).  
Change occurred when the policy narrative became dominant after the push both at national 
and at global level.   
 
Transnational actors together with policy entrepreneurs employed a new policy narrative that 
portrayed children and those in Northern Kenya as deserving of justice. As noted by Shanahan, 
Jones and McBeth (2011), the power of a good story is likely to shape policy learning and 
outcomes. Narratives by policy proponents were developed along the following lines which 
will be discussed below: the economic narrative, the social justice narrative, and the moral 
narrative.  
 
7.5.1 Economic Narrative  
In crafting the narrative around economic parameters, the idea of cash transfers resonated with 
Kenya’s political economy outlook of social policy as residual as described in Chapter 4. The 
narrative adopted by social agents in the policy space centred around the ideology of neo-
liberalism which drew from the country’s political leadership definition of development. As 
one participant noted:  
 
It is also part of the market thinking – neo-liberal thinking where the answer to poverty 
issues lay in money and getting the poor to access markets. The provision of cash 
transfers has also been ideological. It is the belief that it is only the market that can 
come and sort out issues – hence put money into people’s hands. (CSO-04, 13/5/2016) 
 
In positing cash transfers this way, transnational actors’ over-amplification of markets as 
solutions to social and economic problems resonated with national development plans. The 
economic narrative of the HSNP revolved around giving cash to enable the poor and vulnerable 
to exercise economic freedom in choice instead of the prescription of food aid. In so doing, 
policy entrepreneurs emphasised the economic liberation of the target groups, especially in the 
HSNP, which targeted the poorest districts and counties. Transnational actors argued that due 
to the lack of economic empowerment in the area, the people were unable to buy basic goods 
like food. But most importantly they argued that people needed to get over their addiction to 
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food aid. The idea of cash became powerful for its potency to solve the economic and social 
problems in Northern Kenya. 
 
To discredit food aid as a solution in Northern Kenya, comparisons made equated food 
distribution to the provision of drugs to addicts. Essentially the message aimed at discrediting 
the status quo in order to bring in a more “effective solution” to a perennial problem. A 
participant in the study described food aid as follows:  
The main way in which vulnerability was being handled was through food aid that was 
fraught with leakages, costs, inefficiencies and dependency. Food aid was not seen to 
be sufficiently addressing the needs of the people [in] that place. There was need to 
address this better and therefore unconditional cash transfers were introduced (MDP-
01, 7/4/2016). 
Cash transfers therefore offered a new powerful set of ideas to a policy failure. The social 
construction of words which drove the economic narrative around commodification propelled 
the agenda. Arguments and discursive frames for the economic narrative of cash transfers were 
framed to show that that the area remained poor because the residents lacked money as a means 
of economic empowerment. Giving them cash therefore would not only allow them access to 
their basic needs, especially food, but to other inaccessible services. Cash would give them the 
freedom and the means to access goods and services that they truly needed and not based on 
prescriptions from aid or government agencies. The proponents of cash transfers painted the 
view that cash would open new opportunities for the poor and the underprivileged to engage 
in the market. 
 
Additionally, the narrative emanated from evidence generated from the evaluations related to 
the economic viability towards which the recipients were allocating cash. Evidence pointed to 
the small businesses set up by beneficiaries of the programmes using the cash they were 
receiving. Cash therefore transcended just means of providing for the daily basic needs but 
made economic sense as it provided an avenue for entrepreneurship for the beneficiaries. 
Advocates of cash transfers created and promoted widely a positive narrative around the ability 
of beneficiaries to access credit and thereby financial inclusion of the poor. Evaluation reports 
for example stated that beneficiaries of cash transfers had started or improved their businesses, 
an influx of cash had increased among traders and access to credit from formal financial 
institutions had become possible (Merttens et al., 2013).   
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At a meso-level, the narrative laid claim to a rise in entrepreneurial spirit among recipients, 
and the growth and expansion of the local economy due to the circulation of cash. Spill-over 
effects of the transfers to others within the local economy were highlighted as some of the 
benefits from the cash transfers. The agenda and the social diagnosis of the problem evolved 
around a general lack of economic means among the people in Northern Kenya. As previously 
discussed in earlier chapters, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance were framed as the 
villains in the storyline. This view was shared across many actors who participated in the study, 
with a civil society member and government official stating it as follows:  
Politicians were not interested in the matter of children, because children do not vote 
(CSO-06, 12/08/2016). Planning and Finance were a hindrance, they were not sold to 
the idea and felt it was throwing money away (MGSCD_01,23/03/2016).  
Consequently, the Ministry of Finance was portrayed as an oppositional force at the beginning 
phases of the programmes with no interest in adopting the programmes in the policy transfer 
process and termed as lacking political will and interest. Others deemed to be in opposition 
were academics and scholars producing material questioning the promotion of cash transfer 
programmes. 
 
Transnational actors created the economic narrative debunk, particularly Ministry of Finance 
questions and doubts on affordability of the schemes. Studies on costing and feasibility studies 
crammed the policy space, expressing that indeed the programmes were not only effective in 
promoting national development but also in growing the local economy. Costing of 
programmes for instance in a HelpAge advocacy document illustrated that the government of 
Kenya could afford to provide cash transfer programmes:  
 
Meanwhile, the annual cost of the public service pension in Kenya – covering fewer 
than one in ten older people – is slightly higher than what it would cost to provide a 
social pension to everyone over 60. Cost of a universal pension would be 0.8% relative 
to GDP if provided for those over 60 years and would cost 3 per cent to government 
expenditure (HelpAge International, 2011, p. 4). 
   
In their argument for cash transfers, advocates therefore stated that for the government to 
implement cash transfers, prudent financial management in budget planning, better 
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management of the national resource envelope and political will was all that was required for 
the nation to invest in social protection policies. In keeping with the commodification narrative, 
study after study exhibited and conflated the economic narrative necessary for adoption of the 
programmes. Evaluations and studies from the international organisations showed the resultant 
dividend to be reaped if the government put money into the cash transfer programmes. The 
narrative emphasised that the government would benefit economically by investing in cash 
transfer programmes.  
 
7.5.2 Social Justice Narrative  
In line with the Constitution, and just emerging from the impact of SAPs, the pursuit of social 
justice became a buzzword onto which cash transfers were grafted. International organisations 
and in particular those with ideological orientations towards rights like HelpAge, DFID and 
others anchored their advocacy efforts around the achievement of social justice and the 
promotion of rights in the advancement of cash transfer programmes. The narrative crafted 
evolved around the injustice of poverty and vulnerability among children and those in Northern 
Kenya. The moment also coincided with the global agenda on the MDGs as the instrument to 
achieve social justice for the poor and the vulnerable. The idea of cash transfers as vehicles for 
development and rights resonated with the flavour of the moment. Cash transfers were couched 
in the language of tools for achieving social justice and extending rights, thereby giving them 
power: arguments that drew no resistance. 
 
Drawing from rights documents, transnational agents mentioned the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1945, which considers social security as a social right which each individual 
is entitled to the provision thereof. Other global documents that were drawn from included 
those related to the Millennium Development Goals, which emphasised the need for a 
reorientation of poverty and vulnerability from a rights perspective and addressing it as a social 
justice. In respect to this, national documents that were inclined towards the social justice and 
human rights documents bolstered the campaign for the institutionalisation of social transfers 
as rights instruments. A review of documents indicates that for children, the Children’s Act of 
2001 provides for the safeguarding of wellbeing of the child, and deriving from the Act and 
other documents, advocates crafted the narrative for social justice.   
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To further augment the narrative of cash transfers as rights, the process of drafting the 
Constitution in the country provided an opportune moment to link the international standards 
of human rights and justice to the Constitution of Kenya. There was convergence of opinion 
among respondents that various sections in the Constitution indicated government commitment 
towards the cash transfers upon which they centred their advocacy. Specifically mentioned was 
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Though it may be argued that domestic organisations 
pushed for inclusion of social protection and social security as a right within the Constitution, 
and whereas it is often claimed that the development of the programmes draws from the 
Constitution, programmes were adopted before the Constitution came into effect in 2012. This 
goes to show that at times the institutions that are said to have mediated the adoption of the 
cash transfers were sometimes creations of the very social agents who derived their narrative 
from these institutions.  
 
Within the narrative of the attainment of social justice and human rights, international 
organisations depicted the government as responsible for failing to ensure the attainment of 
social justice among the poor in Kenya. To remedy this and to redeem their image, cash 
transfers offered an alternative to correct past mistakes. In addition, local institutions were 
portrayed as having failed in securing the poor and the vulnerable in the attainment of their 
human rights. Contrary to the perception that the government was not concerned with the plight 
of the poor, a study participant noted: 
 
Contrary to that belief the governments do not care about their people is not true, they 
(international actors) think the government is corrupt, [that] they (government) don’t 
care about us. But to say they don’t care, are selfish is not true – they also want to try 
to help people, they desire to respond to the needs of the people. It is not correct to say 
that they do not care about the welfare of their people – they are also looking for ways 
of alleviating our problems on the continent (CSO_05, 28/09/2016).  
 
Advocates therefore promoted cash transfers as tools to redeem the dignity and promote the 
rights of the target groups. International organisations whose orientation is based on the human 
rights perspective pushed the ideology which resonated with domestic civil society 
organisations that are often considered custodians and defenders of rights and justice. 
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7.5.3 Moral Narrative 
Policymaking is a problem-solving activity. As such the storyline created for the OVC 
programme emanated from the UNGASS report of 2003, which depicted the dire state and the 
increase of orphanhood in Africa because of the HIV pandemic, thereby creating the need to 
solve a problem. According to reports, the number of orphans was nearing 1.6 million, with 
half the number attributed to HIV and AIDS reaching a crisis level in need of an intervention 
to remedy the spiralling crisis (Bosworth et al., 2016). International organisations, therefore, 
created a narrative portraying the situation of the high rise of orphans as a crisis. The numbers 
of children and households presented as suffering provided a moralistic rationale for action. 
Statistics provided by the UNGASS report were alarmist enough to provide the impetus for 
action on the matter. Credibility for the report derived from the fact that UN bodies drafted it, 
which lent it trustworthiness among policymakers.  
 
Transnational agents urged the government to put in place measures to address the situation. 
The storyline that emerged out of this narrative played out in the international arena, providing 
an avenue for the testing of cash transfers to alleviate the situation instead of the previously 
tried out interventions, where orphans were put in orphanages. Emerging from an assessment 
carried out by UNICEF on the state of orphanages in Kenya, advocates of cash transfers created 
a counter-narrative to show that caretakers in orphanages were abusing children and that 
individuals were soliciting funds from donors for non-existent orphanages and programmes. 
To strengthen their argument, promoters claimed that the government did not have enough 
personnel to monitor the dealings of orphanages or even track them down. As stated by one of 
the participants:  
 
This rapid assessment had shown that there were many orphanages and the quality of 
care was very poor and this is something they could do. The Department [of Children’s 
Services] in collaboration with UNICEF decided that children’s homes were not the 
best way of dealing with the growing number of orphans and decided that bringing 
children to their original setting and not homes and rehabilitation centres would be the 
best way of dealing with it and the children homes were not enough anyway. Homes 
were not also the best for child development (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).   
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Through the powerful narrative created by international organisations to this effect, 
government officials felt morally obligated to improve the situation of children and agreed to 
have the pilot start on funds provided by UNICEF. The narrative equally influenced public 
opinion. One of the participants stated: “The reason why this is an amazing story (evolution of 
cash) is that nobody fights against [it] because it makes sense” (CSO-03, 12/2/2016). But pilots 
are used to influence adoption of policies through “the representativeness heuristic”, where 
generalisations are made from a narrow set of observations to infer to a broad population, 
thereby attributing undue success to the programme (Weyland, 2007). Cash transfer promoters 
therefore sometimes overestimated the impact of pilots to exaggerate success.  
 
With the setting of the scene and the narrative having been played out, it became imperative 
that a prescription for the policy problem be offered for the diagnosis. In this case, international 
organisations proffered the CT-OVC as the antidote for the problem with a trial of 400 
households. UNICEF recommended the provision of cash transfers as the new way of dealing 
with the crisis (John, 2012) aimed at averting a catastrophe. A member of civil society 
participating in the study elaborated as follows:     
 
What would have happened if we were not here, thousands of people would 
have died, kids would have died and [become] malnourished? The humanitarian 
and human rights approach would argue that the return in investment has been 
heavy because we have developed human capital (CSO-03, 12/2/2016).  
 
This statement highlights further how actors within the policy space escalated the crisis by 
sometimes exaggerating their role and also by demonstrating the moral obligation of providing 
cash to children. 
 
Socially, the idea of giving cash to households with orphans aligned with normative beliefs of 
kinship and family. According to the findings, there was consensus across the board on the 
matter. A government representative involved in the study commented:  
There was acceptance within the community that the people receiving the cash 
are poor and deserve to be helped; there was not a lot of resistance (MFP-03, 
29/7/2016.  
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Promoters further suggested that cash transfer scheme would be easier for the government to 
monitor, unlike orphanages, and the provision of cash to affected families would ensure 
children stay at home, in their “natural setting” among family and kin instead of being in 
children’s homes. But the narratives entailed only a one-sided and misleading narrative aimed 
at creating hegemonies to facilitate the adoption of cash transfers.  
 
It is along the above storylines that transnational actors influenced the government, other 
agencies and the general public on the idea of cash transfers and in particular the CT-OVC and 
the HSNP.   
 
7.6. Conclusion 
While ideational mechanisms remained key in the transfer of social protection policies, it is 
imperative that in explaining their role we go beyond a description of the mechanisms to 
understand how they became powerful enough to bring about policy change. An analysis of 
the hegemony of discourse that brought this about is therefore key to understanding the policy 
transfer process. Ideas and the discourse around them on their own are not powerful enough to 
bring about change; they only become powerful based on human agency that advocates and 
invests time and energy to push them forward. As demonstrated in the chapter, ideational 
approaches in the policymaking process involved the use of reason, invoking of reconstructed 
concepts, applying values to categories of people and the weighing up of evidence to support 
the solution, an act of power by international organisations. Furthermore, the clustering of 
similar policy models on the continent in a variety of settings with little variation in programme 
design and the rapid spread of adoption “seems to point to vertical imposition rather than social 
learning as the main mechanism of adoption” (Ouma and Adésínà, 2018, p. 6). Though often 
not viewed as such, hegemonic ideas present coercive mechanisms in policy transfer where, 
without exerting force, dominant actors can exercise power through ideational channels. In 
addition, “dominant ideas become rationalised… through theoretical justifications, and 
influence how policymakers conceptualize their problems and order potential solutions” 
(Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2007, p. 456). 
 
By creating a “structure of knowledge” on the efficacy and effectiveness of cash transfer 
policies, drawing on their resources, transnational actors engaged in the process, sought to 
attach meaning to their actions so that they formed part of a discourse. International 
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organisations expressed power through the hegemony of, first, who generated the knowledge 
around which ideas were derived, and second, how the ideas were advanced. Ideas were easily 
passed through a marshalling of evidence which transnational actors used to frame issues, 
knowledge and information for manipulation and persuasion. Transnational actors through 
their expertise presented social learning to fit with the context through a construction of 
meanings, framing and through policy narratives. Policy narratives were employed by 
proponents to persuade and manipulate other policy actors. As demonstrated through the 
research findings, knowledge and meanings in regard to cash transfers were conceptualised as 
systems of discourse within a specific social and political context. Social learning and 
knowledge were therefore an exercise of power as “power transverses and produces 
things….induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 110). 
 
In the Kenyan situation, ideas by themselves were not sufficient to bring about policy change, 
hence the need to analyse the role of international financing and aid in the policy transfer 
process. In the next chapter therefore, I analyse how funding and financial resources were 
employed in the promotion of social protection policies in Kenya.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FINANCING, INCENTIVES AND OWNERSHIP 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Financing for social protection and social policy remains a major hindrance for initiating 
programmes and expanding coverage of the social policy benefits in many developing nations. 
In a number of countries, Kenya included, donor financing provided the impetus in the 
initiation of cash transfer programmes. Coupled with the ideational effects of the global elite, 
the provision of financing towards the programmes made cash transfer appealing to local elites. 
Moreover, as previously discussed in Chapter 5, Kenya’s market-led policy framework is 
ideationally suited for targeted cash transfers making it easy for domestic policymaker to 
embrace the idea.  
 
While governments have increased budgetary allocation towards the schemes over the years, 
donor funding still comprises a significant portion of allocated funds. In 2016/2017 the total 
social protection budget for cash transfers totalled KES 24 billion. Out of this amount, the 
budget for the Government of Kenya  was KES 17 billion, while external financing amounted 
to KES 6.8 billion, representing 25% of the total budget (Office of the Auditor General, 2017). 
Financing of cash transfer programmes from domestic sources like taxation or from mineral 
rents increases ownership of programmes and state-citizen accountability processes. 
Policymakers cite limited fiscal space as the hindrance for expansion of social policies and 
other services, though financing social policy may not always be about available funds. Starting 
with the initial funding for the CT-OVC in 2003, donor financing formed a significant portion 
of funding towards the provision of cash transfers in the two programmes under study but the 
proportion has reduced over the years as shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 below. Government 
funding towards the programmes has increased over the years and in the case of the CT-OVC, 
current national budgetary allocation surpasses donor funding. In 2016/2017 government 
funding amounted to KES 9 billion while donor funding was approximately KES 1 billion. 
 
Donor-driven initiatives, and especially those heavily funded from external sources, generally 
struggle with questions of ownership. Following the Paris Declaration’s emphasis on domestic 
ownership of programmes, donor countries and multilateral organisations have made attempts 
at realigning aid activities with the aspirations and developmental objectives of recipient 
countries but often from the donor’s perspective. However, the experience from the Poverty 
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Reduction Paper Strategy (PRSPs) indicates little success in the endeavour to promote 
ownership. When donor financing for programmes is large, they have greater control over 
decision-making and control of programmes, sometimes through conditionalities. In social 
protection programming, this undermines the country’s capacity to define its own 
developmental path, thereby jeopardising ownership and accountability. The experience in 
regard to financing and ownership in Kenya is somewhat mixed. Study findings suggest donor 
funding was instrumental in adoption of the programmes with little government ownership at 
the beginning. With government funding over the years, levels of ownership of social 
protection vary from high to low, with increasing levels of ownership as more players enter the 
policy space.  
 
In this chapter, therefore, I seek to examine the extent to which financial support from donors 
provided leverage for adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. In explaining funding as a 
structural mechanism of the transfer of the policy, I take into cognisance the political and 
economic context in which donor financing occurred. For a more nuanced analysis, the chapter 
is organised into four sections. First. I trace donor financing trends towards the CT-OVC and 
examine the impact of external aid on its initiation and expansion. I consider the political 
economy factors at different junctures and how they triggered government funding. In the 
second section I carry out a similar analysis for the HSNP, where I examine government 
funding and commitment in the second phase (2012 – 2017) and assess the factors that led to 
government “buy-in”. This leads to the third section, in which I evaluate the current funding 
modality by donors, Programme for Results (P4R), to examine the stimulus of incentive-based 
financing on increased government expenditure on social protection. In the last section is an 
analysis of the perception of ownership among different social agents in the social protection 
policy space.  
 
8.2 Trends and Donor Partnership In Financing of the CT-OVC 
In 2003, UNICEF and the Department for Children’s Services proposed the plan to initiate a 
cash transfer programme for families with children affected by HIV and AIDS. The cash 
transfer programme formed part of a 10-point strategy developed to address child well-being. 
Through financing from the Norwegian Government of KES 500 million (IOS-03,13/03/2016), 
UNICEF used part of the funds to mount a campaign to garner support for the 10-point strategy 
during the 2002 general election period in Kenya (Pearson, Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Through 
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the campaign, UNICEF lobbied aspiring Members of Parliament to sign a commitment to 
support the welfare of children if elected with the initiation of the CT-OVC forming part of the 
strategy. UNICEF, however, had to provide the initial funding for direct cash payments to 
households enrolled in the programme.  
 
According to our findings, the financing for the CT-OVC and its subsequent adoption had three 
broad implications for the social policy regime in Kenya. First, the CT-OVC, being the initial 
cash transfer programme in the country, influenced initiation of other social protection 
programmes like the OPCT and the Persons with Severe Disability Programme, thereby 
bringing greater participation of the legislature into the policy space. Second, initial UNICEF 
funding catalysed aid for social protection programmes both from the government and 
international organisations. Lastly, based on government expenditure, the CT-OVC became 
the largest social protection programme in Kenya. Based on the focus of this chapter, I will 
discuss the last two implications below in relation to how asymmetrical power relations shaped 
policy adoption.  
 
8.2.1 Catalysing Aid for Cash Transfer Programmes 
UNICEF’s initial funding stimulated government and other donor funding for cash transfer 
programmes. There was a convergence of opinion among study participants that without the 
initial funding from UNICEF, the government of Kenya may not have adopted the CT-OVC at 
the time. Scepticism around cash transfers as a policy and programmatic solution was common 
at the time, with government delaying its initial funding of KES 56 million till 2006 (TT/C-04, 
13/04/2016). UNICEF’s action catalysed government funding, with the latter providing 
support for direct transfers to households and for the strengthening of institutional capacity, 
including the development of the social protection policy and strategy at the Ministry of Social 
Development. Accordingly, the funding from DFID increased fiscal space for the expansion of 
the programme to additional households in other districts. The CT-OVC represents a good 
example of how aid can catalyse increased financing from both external and internal sources 
(Gore, 2013).  
 
Key informants in the study and a review of documents indicate that additional funding from 
donors did not come without conditionalities. DFID’s requirements included the expansion of 
the programme to areas with the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates. To access the funding 
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therefore, the programme expanded based on this parameter to 17 districts affected most by the 
epidemic. Financing and commitment from DFID and the government in turn attracted the 
interest of the World Bank, whose direct involvement in the programme was previously 
limited. Following its successful advocacy for conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin 
America, the World Bank sought to replicate similar schemes in Kenya. To provide funding 
for the CT-OVC, the World Bank proposed to introduce conditionalities to the programme. 
These conditionalities related to adherence of households to health and educational 
requirements. It emerged from the interviews that resistance from other actors prompted the 
World Bank to withdraw from the programme. Commenting on World Bank conditionalities, 
a representative of government explained: 
The World Bank was interested in having conditionalities on the programmes, though 
they were only supporting capacity building and providing resources for access like 
vehicles. We tried to resist the conditionalities that the World Bank was interested in 
and we kept on delaying the process. But right now, they are having conditionalities 
tested in some areas. They are able to do this because of the budget support that they 
are offering (MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016).  
 
The observation underlined perceptions of actors of the World Bank’s influence in financing 
programmes. Despite resistance to conditionalities from other actors, based on their financial 
resources, the World Bank wanted to impose conditionalities. Financial resources and their 
position as the global leader in social protection emboldened the Bank’s demands for 
conditionalities.  
 
8.2.2 The World Bank and Conditionalities 
With limited financing for expansion, it emerged from the interviews that other partners agreed 
to the World Bank’s demands for testing of conditionalities in a number of districts. Financing 
was to be linked to an HIV and AIDS programme, Total War on HIV/AIDS (TOWA), which 
had a component related to strengthening the capacity of households affected by the pandemic. 
The Bank rationalised their proposals on conditionalities as part of learning how to effectively 
promote human capacity outcomes in cash transfer programming. Interview sources revealed 
that a year into the discussions the Bank withdrew from the process, citing a change of strategy 
at its headquarters in Washington DC (IOS_03. 13/3/2016). With the withdrawal of the World 
Bank, expansion plans stalled, leading to uncertainty of funding for the programme. The action 
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by World Bank demonstrated how programmes dependent on donor funding can often be 
attached to conditions that the recipient country needs to abide by in exchange for resources 
even though the conditions may be adversarial (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009). Furthermore, it 
demonstrates how donors can manipulate financing to influence policy, especially in situations 
of limited fiscal space (Holmqvist, 2012; Hernandez, 2017).  
 
But aid may not always catalyse funding from other sources. In instances where there is 
competition over funding and incongruence in programme designs, additional financing may 
be difficult to attract. As our study findings indicate, other development partners were sceptical 
of financing a programme providing direct cash to individuals. Joint attempts by UNICEF and 
the  Department of Children’s Services to raise USD 60 million from the Global Fund for 
Malaria and Tuberculosis failed due to competition between government ministries (Pearson, 
Alviar and Hussein, 2006). Resistance emanated from the Ministry of Health and PEPFAR 
who cited little understanding of the CT-OVC. PEPFAR objectives related to health and 
therefore, Global Funds financing could only be accessed through a joint proposal with the 
Ministry of Health. To qualify for funding, the programme needed to target those directly 
affected by HIV and AIDS. In narrowing the targeted population in this manner, the CT-OVC 
would lock out other vulnerable households with children not necessarily affected by the 
pandemic. According to interview sources, however, Ministry of Health officials rejected the 
inclusion of the CT-OVC application into the joint proposal. A key informant explained it as 
follows: 
 
We ran into problems with the Ministry of Health and it was the first time that a 
proposal was put to the committee which included civil society members, begrudgingly 
– I don’t think the government liked to have a large funding given to CSOs. So along 
comes the Ministry of Home Affairs with the 20 million dollars proposal to run the 
PEPFAR programme. Ngilu (the Minister of Health at the time) was not very 
enthusiastic (IOS_03, 13/3/2016). 
 
This statement suggests low levels of inter-ministerial coordination that characterised the 
financing of programmes at the time. According to a government official, MOH agreed to the 
inclusion of the CT-OVC after the intervention of the Vice President at the Cabinet level. 
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The second hurdle to funding arose out of technicalities of directly paying cash to households.  
As reported by a key informant in the study, according to PEPFAR regulations, providing direct 
cash to households posed accountability challenges to the Fund’s financial processes. The idea 
of “giving funds directly to individuals sounded too radical;” therefore their aid modality 
favoured material support to households. He expounded the situation with PEPFAR as follows:  
 
PEPFAR requires that all money is channelled by US-based NGO systems. So not 
programme model where money goes direct from the bank to the people’s pockets, 
there is not much room for NGOs to do anything. The reporting requirements that 
PEPFAR was strict and complex that the various few people that the US government 
had come to a level where they wanted to handle their own things. They did not want 
to handle anything innovative. They were much happier to give money to NGOs to help 
them improve the qualities of orphanages (IOS-03, 13/3/2016).  
 
PEPFAR was not convinced of “the idea of cash” and preferred programmes that provided 
items like clothing, learning material and farm implements to households affected by HIV and 
AIDS. Direct funding to families, according to PEPFAR procedures, as explained by a 
government representative, were provided only through US-registered NGOs and not directly, 
as USAID statutes prohibit it from handing out money to individuals. Failure in securing funds 
from the Global Fund impeded the anticipated growth of the CT-OVC. Expansion plans were 
put on hold till 2005, when Treasury with lobbying from the Parliamentary Committee Group 
on Children made the first allocation to the programme. 
 
8.2.3 Increased Government Expenditure on Social Protection  
Funding allocation from the government of Kenya to the CT-OVC stimulated financing for 
other cash transfer programmes. A review of the major policy documents indicated that the 
government allocated KES 56 million in 2006, which expanded CT-OVC to 2,500 households 
within the project districts. Successive years indicate an increase in government funding for 
the programme, as illustrated in Figure 8.1 below:  
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Figure 8.1 CT-OVC GoK and Donor Funding 2004 - 2017 
 
Author’s own calculations based on Government of Kenya budget statements 2007-2017, Government of Kenya 
(2016b), World Bank (2009), World Bank (2015) 
 
A review of national budget documents indicate that in the first five years, funding doubled in 
each financial year, thereby enabling the programme to grow from the initial three pilot districts 
to seven districts, with combined funding from UNICEF, SIDA and DFID (Bosworth et al., 
2016). In the expansion phase (2009 – 2014), starting in 2008, government funding of the CT-
OVC rose exponentially. Participants in the study attributed the high increase in 2009 to a 
credit facility negotiated between the World Bank and the government. This was confirmed 
through the perusal of documents. As part of the USD 126 million loan agreement, donor 
requirements obliged the government of Kenya’s commitment to increased funding of the 
programme to which government committed USD 30 million. Other financing partners (DFID 
and UNICEF) committed USD 46 million while the IDA loan agreement credit facility by the 
World Bank totalled USD 50 million (World Bank, 2009). The World Bank, due to its 
dominance and heavy financial resources, administered the agreement on behalf of the other 
development partners. According to a government official, the World Bank, leveraging on the 
credit facility introduced conditionalities into the programme.  
 
The loan provided the needed fiscal space for the expansion for additional households into the 
programme. Following the first payment of the IDA credit facility, the CT-OVC expansion 
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rose from 14,000 to 47,000 households. Funding social programmes like cash transfers from 
credit facilities increases national debt. Moreover, it is not sustainable to make direct cash 
payments from loans. As funds from the credit facility were channelled directly to government 
as sectoral budget, it was difficult to ascertain from this study the exact amount of government 
funding towards cash transfers. Documents reviewed indicate that by the end of 2015, funding 
for the programme from the donor pool had increased to USD 157 million of which USD 
97million was in the form of grants, while USD 60 million formed an additional IDA credit 
from the World Bank to the Government of Kenya (World Bank, 2015a).  
 
8.2.4 Politics and Increased Financing  
Other political economy factors coincided with the signing of the credit facility, leading to 
increased government funding in the second phase. The study identified the heightened 
political competition between the different partners in the Grand Coalition Government as a 
stimulating factor during the expansion phase of the programme. With both partners competing 
for attribution in service delivery, existing programmes got increased financing while new 
programmes were started at the time. For instance, the Urban Food Subsidy, a cash transfer for 
households in urban slums, and Kazi Kwa Vijana, a public works programme, were initiated 
through the Office of the Prime Minister. On the other side, the expansion of the CT-OVC 
provided political expediency for the President’s coalition. An observation of the political 
dynamics indicates that increased funding for the CT-OVC and social protection in general 
may have been stimulated by this competition. The observation follows other studies which 
demonstrate that when there is heightened political competition among coalitions of the ruling 
elite, there is a tendency of an increase of financing (Niedzwiecki, 2016). Besides the political 
competition between the ruling coalitions, respondents pointed out that government fiscal 
space for cash transfers expanded due to increased donor funding following rebuilding efforts 
after the post-election violence of 2008.   
 
As is shown in Figure 8.1, the second significant increase in government funding was in the 
2013 financial year with allocation rising to KES 8.8 billion from KES 4.4 billion in the 
previous year. The increase represented the highest allocation of funding in value terms since 
the beginning of the programme. Key informants engaged in the study attributed the 
considerable allocation to the Jubilee Coalition fulfillment of its election campaign in its first 
year in office (Wanyama and McCord, 2017, MP_02, 27/9/2016). In the subsequent year, 
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however, funding from the government reduced by close to KES 1.5 billion, with only modest 
increases in the 2015 and 2016 financial years. In the 2016/2017 financial year, government 
funding for the programme remained modest, rising to 9.02 billion (Government of Kenya, 
2016a).  
 
Though budget allocation through the years has favoured the CT-OVC over the other 3 
programmes, against expectations, in the 2017/2018 financial year, as an election pledge the 
government made the highest increment for cash transfers programmes to the OPCT. With the 
increase came the promise of a universal programme for older persons over 70 years from 
January 2018 (Government of Kenya, 2017). The move by the Jubilee government resonates 
with Niedzwiecki (2016), who notes that government funding for cash transfer programmes is 
likely to increase because of political expediency. Increased government funding towards older 
persons considered a voting bloc is viewed as a political strategy by the government. The 
increase in funding for the OPCT rather than to other donor-funded programmes further 
suggests that national politics and agency of governments often override donor interest and 
pressure.  
 
Besides the political factors identified above, the study identified the introduction of the new 
funding mechanism, Programme for Results (P4R), a results-based financing initiative by the 
World Bank and other donors, as a contributory factor to increased government funding. As 
will be discussed later in the chapter, international organisations introduced the financing 
model with the aim of incentivising the government to commit to increased funding to social 
protection based on specific agreed outcomes against which donors provide more funds 
through budget support. Before discussing the modalities of the P4R, the next section examines 
financing for the HSNP.  
 
8.3 Financing the HSNP - From Donor to Partly Government-Funded  
Since its inception in 2007, DFID has remained the primary funder of the Hunger Safety Net 
Programme (HSNP). In its first cycle (2007 – 2013), DFID and DFAT provided funding of up 
to KES 5.5 billion to initiate the programme (DFID, 2014). Programme costs for the second 
phase (2013 – 2017) were pegged at KES15.8 billion, including administration costs and direct 
cash payments. With the broad aim of reducing poverty, the HSNP is implemented under an 
agreement between the governments of Kenya and UK in Northern Kenya (DFID, 2013). A 
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review of documents indicates that the total cost of the agreement brings the total DFID 
financial commitment for the ten years to GBP 80 million. In February 2012, following 
reported positive impacts attributed to the programme, the Australian Government entered into 
a partnership with DFID to support the scaling up of the second phase and provided 
approximately KES 2 billion (Government of Kenya, 2012).  
 
As previously mentioned, the dominant view among respondents in the study was that HSNP 
was a DFID and not a Government of Kenya programme. A respondent associated with the 
programme explained that the programme started as “a purely DFID programme”, later 
morphing into a partnership programme with the government. He argued that the plan aimed 
at full ownership by the government by the end of the second phase. Perceptions on the “donor 
tag” have not changed over the years, though this may be attributed to continued DFID control 
of the programme. The tactic is not new. As stated by Stubbs, Kentikelenis and King (2016), 
promoters of cash transfer schemes initiated a number of programmes on the continent under 
similar models with the aim of stimulating government funding and expansion. Bearing 
national political economy dynamics, this may not always lead to programme adoption. For 
example, the Government of Kenya adopted the HSNP and the CT-OVC but failed to adopt 
the Urban Food Subsidy Programme.  
 
A number of factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic, motivated DFID funding for the HSNP. 
According to Janus and Paulo (2015), different motivations influence donor funding, including 
the self-interest of the donor, as a response to recipient need or as a reward for the recipient 
country. Donor motivation may also arise out of “a moral vision in international politics” 
(Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo, 2015, p. 156). According to the study findings, three kinds of 
motivations led to DFID funding of the HSNP. First was DFID’s response to the reality of 
vulnerability in Northern Kenya brought about by repeated cycles of hunger and drought. 
Continued DFID partnership with the Government of Kenya over the years involved drought 
mitigation measures in Northern Kenya. Key informants involved in the study identified 
DFID’s motivation to finance the HSNP and noted that it rose out of a need to offer a solution 
to the poverty and vulnerability linked to the perennial drought cycles in Northern Kenya.  
 
Secondly, participants in the study suggested that DFID set up the programme for learning 
purposes and experimentation for Kenya and other countries under similar circumstances. As 
suggested by a civil society member, Kenya’s open political space provides room for all sorts 
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of experiments for international organisations (CSO-04,13/5/2016). Moreover, technological 
advancements in the country like Mpesa enabled interested players like DFID to set up 
programmes for testing different payment methods for cash transfers. Thirdly, DFID’s funding 
and initiating of the HSNP reflected the continued global competition among international 
organisations. Sentiments among respondents indicated that, as a lead development partner 
with the Government of Kenya, and following on the initiation of the CT-OVC by UNICEF, 
DFID initiated the HSNP “to have its own programme”.  
 
8.3.1 Within Government but Not of Government  
The financing mechanism through which the HSNP is handled offers suggestions regarding its 
ownership as a donor rather than a state programme. Unlike the CT-OVC, DFID continues to 
directly fund the HSNP through non-governmental organisations and private sector while 
bypassing government channels. Donor financing and aid in Kenya is channelled along the 
following streams: project support, budget support and sector programme support. Project 
support entails aid flowing directly to a certain project, like in this case to a project of social 
protection. Budget support is channelled through government systems and appropriated 
through National Treasury, while sector programme support is allocated to sectors within the 
national scheme like education or health.  
 
The dominant view among respondents indicated that DFID chose a direct project support 
funding mechanism as opposed to budget support mechanisms to reduce fiduciary risks and 
inefficiencies associated with government systems. The experience of budget support for Free 
Primary Education (FPE) informed DFID’s decision to fund the HSNP through other channels 
and not the government. Allegations of fraud, corruption, and inefficiencies in the management 
of the FPE prompted a withdrawal of financing by DFID to the sector. A government official, 
however, termed the fear of fiduciary risks a scapegoat through which donors wanted to 
perpetuate and legitimise their continued control over the programme (MGCSD-01, 
23/3/2016). With the control of the HSNP, the resultant outcome as illustrated in Chapter 6 
was to minimise the policy space and government’s involvement in the programme, which 
undermined ownership and damaged citizen-state contracts.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, as the primary funder of the HSNP in the first cycle (2007 
– 2012), DFID wielded a significant amount of influence in shaping and implementing the 
  
 
173 
programme by excluding the involvement of other players. This resonates with findings from 
studies which indicate that when powerful donor agencies provide funding for programmes, 
the participation of other players in shaping the policy agenda often gets compromised, with 
decision-making processes left in the hands of a few players (Swedlund, 2013). As indicated 
by participants in the study, decisions regarding programme implementation, design, including 
targeting, and setting payment amounts were the prerogative of DFID. An analysis of power 
dynamics within the policy arena indicate that this scenario led to strained relationships with 
government agencies whose role was reduced to that of “providing a conducive terrain for 
implementation of a donor programme” with no real participation from other players. This was 
corroborated in programme documents which indicated that “government’s contribution in the 
first phase comprised hosting the secretariat, and providing broad policy direction and 
facilitating work on the ground through the former District Steering Groups (DSGs)” (HSNP 
Secretariat, 2010).  
 
8.3.2 Phase 2: Increasing Government Funding for HSNP 
The government started funding the HSNP in 2013 according to terms reflected in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the National Treasury and DFID on 
20th February 2013. Based on the MOU, the government committed to progressively increase 
its financial contribution to a total of KES 4.62 billion over the four financial years between 
2013/14 and 2016/17. The P4R mechanism based on the disbursement-linked indicators, 
specifically DL 9 “the government finances the HSNP in line with budget and policy 
commitments”  pressurized government to initiate funding for HSNP Meanwhile DFID and 
AusAID committed GBP 81.5 million (approximately KES 11.64 billion) (DFID, 2013). 
Government funding towards the HSNP has been channeled through the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA) while donor funding was primarily administered by PILU, 
and through non-governmental organisations like HelpAge International.  
 
Following the agreement and as indicated in the Figure 8.2, DFID funding reduced in 
2014/2015, though its total contribution remains higher than that of the government. 
Government funding has increased over the four-year period. Findings suggest that two 
significant factors may have stimulated the increase from the government. First, since 2013, 
the Jubilee government has significantly increased resources towards cash transfer 
programmes in general following its manifesto. As suggested by a Member of Parliament, 
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increased political competition and heightened citizen demands have increased pressure for 
increased government expenditure in social services (MP_02, 27/9/2016). This is evident in 
other social services, for example where government expenditure has increased.  
 
Figure 8.2 HSNP – Government and donor funding 2011- 2016 
 
 
Author’s own calculation based on Government of Kenya budget statements 2011–2017, (DFID, 2013), 
(Government of Kenya, 2016b) 
 
The second factor, attributed to government funding to the HSNP, relates to the Programme 
for Results (P4R). As indicated in the result, DL 9 of the performance payment agreement 
requires that the government increases its funding towards the HSNP in return to a tranche-
based disbursement amounting to USD 5 million (Government of Kenya, 2016b). Expounding 
on why the government was incentivised by the “carrot-stick approach”, a participant from the 
government explained as follows:  
Part of the agreement is that the government would fund it 100% in 2018. There are 
targets now for the government to start funding it. The WB funds via the national 
programme and it is about the performance for results. The results for the HSNP 
programme are that the government must put in their money so the result has to be 
delivered by 30th of June every year. In order to release the WB contribution to the 
budget, GOK has to release its money. GOK has to release its quota of funds by the end 
of March. For the World Bank to be able to release their money by June the government 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Governmemt Donor funding Total excluding contigency
  
 
175 
must have their result delivered by April latest. When the P4R was planned, there was 
a sense that the government was wavering in its commitment to put in funds to the 
HSNP and they kind of regarded it as kind of a project that had been thrust down their 
throat without too much consultation and therefore they thought then this is the way we 
will get the government to put in money (IOS_03, 13/3/2016). 
 
The above statement shows how international organisations used coercive mechanisms to get 
the government to finance the HSNP through force. Subsequent funding would only be availed 
if the Government of Kenya provided a budget for the programme. As per the disbursement-
linked indicator, if the Government of Kenya finances the HSNP in line with the Programme 
for Results commitments, the World Bank releases US$5 million.  
 
However, the Government of Kenya’s commitment to the funding mechanisms and 
conditionalities has been lukewarm. In 2013/2014, the Government of Kenya contributed less 
than the amount agreed upon in the MOU (KES 249.6 million against KES 312 million) with 
the shortfall covered by DFID. In the 2014/2015 financial year, the government met its 
contribution in full (KES 624 million), though in 2015/16, at the time of the study, it had only 
provided 50% of its contribution (HSNP Secretariat, 2010). Interestingly, as previously 
mentioned, the Government of Kenya increased funding for the OPCT, thereby selecting 
political expediency over monetary incentives. Yet despite increased government funding, a 
perusal of documents and participants’ views indicated no clear long-term plan of government 
takeover post-2017 (MDP_01, 7/4/2016, MP_02, 27/9/2016, HSNP Secretariat, 2010). 
Participants from government generally expressed doubt about a 100% takeover by the 
government, with others suggesting a possible winding down in the absence of donor financing 
or a merger with other programmes. The following section examines the Programme for 
Results modality with the aim of demonstrating its effect on government funding towards the 
two programmes.  
 
8.4 Programme for Results/Disbursement-Linked Financing 
Due to shrinking donor funding and change in the aid industry, donors are moving from placing 
conditionalities on aid to more consensual funding mechanisms. Kenya, traditionally, receives 
substantial amounts of aid (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001)  and with changes in donor strategy, the 
aid architecture in the country is changing. In the 2000s, bilateral aid accounted for 72% of 
total aid following changes in the 1990s and 1980s as World Bank aid went up primarily as 
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part of adjustment lending under SAPs (Mwega, 2009). This was however reduced to 64% of 
gross aid by 2012 (OECD – DAC World Bank), although bilateral aid remains substantial, as 
shown in Chapter 5 of this study. Budget support remains the most dominant mechanism 
despite challenges related to the payment modality. Swedlund (2013, p. 357) describes budget 
support mechanisms as “fungible, delivered with conditionalities and failing to deliver on 
results”. In a shift from the inefficiencies of budget support towards the financing of social 
protection in Kenya, the harmonised donor approach adopted the Programme for Results (P4R) 
modality. Arguments for performance results-based disbursements and mechanisms are that 
the modality will increase national ownership of donor-aided programmes, as it follows on 
principles of Paris and the Busan Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Performance results 
disbursements are based on a system where the recipient country meets a range of targets upon 
which tranches of funds are released following the achievement of agreed-upon results 
(Molenaers and Nijs, 2009; Booth, 2012; Holmqvist, 2012). It presupposes that the country 
decides on its own how best to achieve their goals. Moreover, tranche-based payments are 
meant to incentivise the recipient to reach certain targets believed to be espoused in its 
development strategies.  
 
As the first country testing results-based financing in social protection, the shift brings changes 
in the sector’s financing architecture. Participants from international organisations in the study 
indicated that lessons derived from the test would inform donor financing for social protection 
programmes in other countries. Based on a contract between the World Bank on behalf of the 
other developing partners and the Government of Kenya, the P4R defines the “mutually desired 
outcomes” with tranche payments indicated against the achievement of each of the results 
(Government of Kenya, 2016b). Literature sources, however, indicate that results-based 
instruments in aid provisioning is not new. It was promoted and used by the European 
Commission in 2006 in relation to promoting governance reforms in recipient countries and in 
developing countries (Molenaers and Nijs, 2009), yet such programmes show little tangible 
evidence of effectiveness (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Swedlund, 2013).  
Reactions to and views of the funding model varied among participants in the study. Those 
from donor organisations supported the funding mechanism, viewing it as a means through 
which effectiveness, donor coordination, and harmonisation would be improved. The issue of 
donor coordination, as they recalled, continued to come up with the government. Participants 
within government, on the other hand, perceived the mechanism as a form of soft pressure on 
the government to achieve certain results. There was consensus however among the players 
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that the results agreed upon may improve implementation of the programmes, with most citing 
the development of the Single Registry in enhancing targeting of households. Birdsall, 
Mahgoub and Savedoff (2010) propose that results-linked disbursement, besides boosting the 
effectiveness of financing, also improves donor harmonisation and promote accountability and 
ownership of programmes by recipient governments.  
 
Several expected outcomes are highlighted as results to be achieved before the release of 
finances in tranches. As indicated in policy documents, the aims of the tranche-based payment 
mechanism are to incentivise government to increase financing for social protection 
programmes and to enable government set up systems and procedures for delivery of 
programmes (Government of Kenya, 2016b). A total of four key result areas were agreed upon, 
with nine disbursement-linked indicators which the government needs to achieve before the 
release of funds. The box below shows the result areas and the disbursement-linked indicators 
against funds to be released by the World Bank upon achievement of the indicator. 
 
At the time of the study, however, only one result indicator - the harmonisation of the single 
registry - had been achieved as part of the South-to-South cooperation with Brazil. This result 
was easy to achieve as the development of the single registry had started before P4R. A 
participant in the study described it as a “low-lying fruit that easily achievable by the 
government” MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016) The P4R is considered to have stimulated the payment 
and concretised government commitment towards the payment, without which the government 
would have not been committed to the payment of the funds.  
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Box 8.1 Disbursement-Linked Indicators 
 
Disbursement-linked indicator  Amount in USD 
millions (2013–2017) 
Result 1  
DL 1: A set number of additional households have been enrolled in 
the NSNP according to the expansion plan 
100 
DL 2: A set percentage of programme beneficiaries meet the 
targeting criteria for the programme in which they are enrolled 
20 
DL 3: The single registry is fully operational and programme MISs 
are using agreed standards for internal payment controls 
25 
DL 4: A set percentage of NSNP payments are being made 
electronically using two-factor authentication  
15 
DL 5: A set percentage of payments are being disbursed to payment 
service providers on time 
15 
DL 6: Functional complaint mechanisms have been created  35 
DL 7: Systems of scaling up the NSNP as part of the national 
drought risk management system  
20 
DL 8: Strategy for consolidating the cash transfer programmes 15 
DL 9: The government finances the HSNP in line with budget and 
policy commitments 
5 
Adopted from Government of Kenya  (2016b) 
 
8.4.1 Stimulating Funding Through the Programme for Results  
Participants in the study identified the P4R as having played a contributory role in government 
financing of the HSNP. As indicated in the World Bank Status Report:  
The World Bank will support the National Safety Net Program through a Program for 
Results. The World Bank approved a US$ 250 million credit on July 23, 2013 to support 
the NSNP Program for Results (PforR) operation. The PforR operation has been 
designed to help the government to achieve the key results required to deliver the 
objectives of the NSNP, specifically to (i) expand the coverage of cash transfers in an 
equitable manner; (ii) strengthen the implementation and oversight of the five programs 
that constitute the NSNP to ensure good governance; and, (iii) increase coordination 
among the five programs and thus improve sectoral harmonization (World Bank, 
2015a, p. 2). 
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While the P4R provided the impetus for the increased government financing of the HSNP, the 
claim of how far the modality has promoted ownership remains an issue to be explored further. 
Respondents within the donor community termed the aid mechanism as ideal as it moved away 
from conditionalities and also aimed at promoting ownership by the government of both the 
process and implementation of social protection, and the outcomes. According to an adviser 
from an international organisation, the P4R is not a conditionality, as it remains the prerogative 
of the Government of Kenya to choose how to achieve results. The “how” is left to the country 
to decide but disbursements are made after delivery of the result indicator. With increased 
government funding, as discussed in the chapter, the government’s participation and decision-
making have increased. This may suggest that unintended benefits have accrued from the 
financing model, where a shift in power dynamics has occurred with government participating 
more in decision-making. Policy autonomy, however, remains compromised. Through the P4R 
the government is bounded within pre-determined World Bank policy positions, constraining 
national social forces and dynamic opportunities for policy determination. The P4R constricts 
national agendas by determining externally the milestones to be achieved. In addition, the 
“how” is not within national prerogative but is within the framework of “learning” pushed 
through “knowledge sharing”. 
 
Among other benefits mentioned by international organisations was that results-based 
payments lowered transaction costs as a result of the harmonisation of donor funding. 
Moreover, in addition to promoting harmonisation, as noted by other scholars it ensures both 
public accountability amongst donors, as the aid contract is credible when it is open and avoids 
fragmentation that is often characteristic of having multiple streams of aid from different 
donors. Another advantage accrued from the funding mechanism mentioned by participants 
was the alignment of donor support with government priorities as the funds pass through 
general budget support. In addition, the P4R shifts focus from inputs and policy actions to 
output and outcomes, which, as suggested by a participant, eventually leads to stronger 
programming (IOS_01, 13/3/206). Participants from government confirmed that the P4R was 
based on consensual agreements with donor agencies, with the acknowledgement that 
incentives for broad budget support were instrumental in governments acceptance of the result-
based modality.  
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8.4.2 Limitations of the Programme for Results 
Although the funding mechanism is still in its early stages, concerns arose among the players 
as to whether the government would follow through with its commitments in achieving the 
results. The lack of commitment by the government was cited as one limitation of the financing 
arrangement. Participants expressed that while government commitment was easy to secure, 
according to an official within government, follow-through has proved difficult with the 
government failing to honour its commitments either in part or in full (MGSD, 23/3/2016). 
Documents reviewed indicate that for Disbursement-Linked Indicator 7 (DL 7) for example, 
the government failed to set up a scaled-up system for management of drought by January 2016 
despite the guarantee that would release USD 20 million from the World Bank. As already 
mentioned, the government only achieved its funding target in the first year. 
 
Several scholars highlight other limitations of the funding mechanism. Perverse incentives, as 
highlighted by Holmqvist (2012), commits a government only for a while. Yanguas, (2017, p. 
222) describes the payment modality as a “hyper-teleological approach to development 
assistance” as it is based on the idea that “an act that produces good outcomes is considered to 
be morally upright”. He further adds that in consideration, the results-based modality is fixated 
on results and goals and may fail to take into consideration the underlying political settlements 
of countries. In addition, cash on delivery mechanisms are based on conditionalities (Molenaers 
and Nijs, 2009); the only shift is that the conditionalities are ex post as the actions are 
accomplished before the aid is delivered. Participants from both government and donor 
organisations, however, insisted that the arrangement emerged from consensual agreements 
based on dialogue and agreements with the government and not conditionalities. In the last 
section, we consider ownership in regard to the two cash transfer programmes.  
 
8.5 Ownership and Control in Donor-Funded Programmes  
As demonstrated above, provision of funding for the CT-OVC and the HSNP, provided soft 
pressure to the Government of Kenya to take up on the two cash transfers programmes while 
the P4R was a coercive mechanism to force government financing. On the other side of 
incentives is the question of ownership of donor-initiated and financed programmes. Findings 
from the research indicate varying levels of ownership of the two programmes, ranging from 
perceptions of high levels among the political elite to low levels among members of civil 
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society organisations. Ownership is understood as it is constituted among the principles in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
 
In seeking to understand perceptions of ownership among different social agents in the policy 
arena, we draw from Booth (2003, p. 45), who applies Killick’s dimension in assessing national 
ownership of PRSPs in some developing countries. In the assessment, we consider four 
dimensions:  
i) The intellectual conviction of key policymakers or ministries (the technocratic 
dimension)  
ii) Support of the top political leadership, as demonstrated by dramatic up-front actions 
(the political dimension) 
iii) Broad support across and beyond government, for example, derived from a broad-
based campaign to elicit support 
iv) Institutionalisation of the measures within the policy system (stabilising 
expectations around a new set of incentives and convincing economic agents that 
they cannot easily be reversed). 
 
8.5.1 Bureaucratic Conviction 
Research findings indicate high levels of ownership among senior and mid-level government 
officials, largely attributed to their direct involvement in the policymaking and implementation 
of the programmes. Within other sectors of government not directly involved in the 
programmes, technocrats regarded the cash transfer schemes as donor programmes. Lack of 
knowledge, distance from the programmes and perceptions of international leadership led to 
such views. Perceptions of ownership among government employees varied depending on the 
level of involvement in the programme. Participants who reported high levels of ownership 
were most likely engaged in the implementation of the programmes or had participated in 
meetings or training sessions. State agencies charged with the responsibility of implementation 
and provision of social policy programmes like the Ministry of Gender and Social 
Development and their counterparts at the NDMA formed the first line of contact with 
transnational actors in the policy process, hence the high sense of ownership among them. 
 
Where government departments were left out of the policy process, perceptions of ownership 
were lower. For instance, sentiments within the National Economic and Social Council 
indicated low levels of ownership of the schemes as they were not participants in the 
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policymaking process. Interviews with members of the Secretariat, however, revealed that the 
social protection policy was not brought up to the Council at the time of its development, 
though its mandate as stated required participation in the policy process. Ironically, the Council 
is an advisory body to the government on policies to accelerate development in the country. 
The process followed in developing the policies, as explained by key informants, lacked 
inclusivity of vital government departments. 
 
Bounded rationality, learning while implementing, enhanced the sense of ownership of the CT-
OVC. According to research findings, apart from the learning, other factors that contributed to 
the high sense of ownership within technocrats at the Department of Children’s Services are  
(1) the initial joint assessment and the design of the programme by both UNICEF and the 
Department (2) the embeddedness of the programme within the department, and (3) the 
implementation of the programme within the department and other government structures. 
Each of these factors is discussed below. 
 
First, though the initial conceptualisation of the CT-OVC was by UNICEF, both UNICEF and 
the Department of Children’s Services conducted the joint assessments on the viability of the 
programme, thereby creating initial ownership among staff in government. The assessment 
regarding the effectiveness of orphanages, based on previous joint work on child protection, 
formed the basis of the programme. According to staff at the department, pilot districts were 
selected based on ongoing work between the two organisations and therefore did not seem new 
but a continuation of programme activities, albeit with a new component to it: cash transfers. 
Expansion plans for the programme, design features, and even funding activities, for instance 
the proposal to PEPFAR, were developed in partnership between the two organisations. 
 
Secondly, the embeddedness of the CT-OVC within the department fostered ownership for the 
programme. Participants in the study highlighted this aspect as the key reason for their 
enhanced perception of ownership. As discussed, most of the aspects related to the programme 
were carried out by staff members within the ministry, including targeting and payments. Apart 
from ownership, the directors and other senior members at the department, like permanent 
secretaries, reported that they had control over decision-making, leadership and 
implementation of the programme.  
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Lastly, ownership of the CT-OVC was fostered through the involvement of staff at the 
department in the implementation of the programme. As one of the participants in the study 
explained, “When we started the programme, we did not consider it additional work, it fell 
seamlessly into what we were already doing” (MGSD_03, 25/4/2016). Study findings indicate 
that staff at both national and district level in the Children’s Department were not involved. At 
district level, the Area Children Advisory Councils participated in the identification and 
recruitment of households. Targeting, payments and the administration of the programme were 
carried out within the department, albeit with initial challenges. In implementing the 
programme and overcoming the challenges, technocrats and civil servants within the 
department and the ministry perceived they had built a programme from the beginning, hence 
the increased ownership and attachment.   
 
The dominant view among participants in the study implied that DFID failed in promoting 
national leadership, and it has low perceptions of ownership among government officials. As 
has been discussed in the previous chapter, when decision-making and implementation are 
carried out by organisations outside government in a heavily donor-funded environment, 
national ownership may be compromised. Commenting on perceptions of ownership, a key 
staff member at the Department of Children’s Services offered a contrasted perception of the 
HSNP as follows:  
When there is an international conference, you see us at the department attend to make 
presentations on the programme, which is unlike the HSNP, where it is the consultants 
who will be making the presentations and speaking – not even the NDMA (MGSD_02, 
12/5/2016). 
 
These sentiments reflect the contrary sense of perception in regard to the HSNP even in 
government circles. As expressed by a majority of the respondents, DFID did little to promote 
ownership of the HSNP to other actors within the policy space or even to the government.  
 
Commenting on this, a participant spoke about the lack of leadership within the government in 
administering the programmes especially in decision-making. In comparison to Ethiopia, one 
participant stated: 
The complaint I have is that the leadership is not so strong among the civil servants. 
They should be leading the way. In Ethiopia, the senior level civil service is much 
stronger than Kenya’s, they wouldn’t let themselves get bullied around the way Kenyan 
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civil servants get bullied because it is their country, they are in charge, they will take 
advice, go away and think about it and make decisions (IOS_03, 13/3/2016).  
 
In addition to suggestions on the lack of strong leadership among government officials in 
general, the statement points to the control and power wielded by international organisations 
in the policymaking process which in some aspects undermined ownership of the programmes.  
 
8.5.2. Political Leadership 
President Uhuru Kenyatta’s statement in January 2015 during the Social Protection Week 
signalled the highest level of political ownership and support of the social protection agenda. 
Noting the state of poverty in the country, he said:  
Forty-six per cent of Kenyans live below the poverty line and 19 per cent in chronic 
poverty. This is wholly unacceptable. There is little dignity for the destitute. We must 
take care of the vulnerable in our society and that is why as Government we are doing 
everything we can to empower our people. There’s little dignity for any nation that 
allows nearly half of its people to live in abject poverty.2 
 
The president in his statement further articulated the government’s intention to increase 
budgetary allocation to social protection programmes. Drawing from key institutions which 
form the foundational tenets of social protection in Kenya, like Vision 2030 and the 
Constitution, the president pledged his support for the cash transfer programmes. The 
endorsement by the president indicated new levels of ownership by the political class that past 
leadership had previously not exhibited publicly. While a steady national budgetary increase is 
often cited as a measure to national ownership programmes, political statements from the elite 
further buffet budgetary funding efforts, thereby steering programmes into new directions of 
ownership. This follows on Booth (2012) who states that a country’s leadership articulates the 
national development objectives, thereby forming the centrality of ownership. His argument is 
that the core of ownership of programmes and activities in a country “is the orientation of the 
country’s political leadership” (Booth, 2012, p. 552) which in this case is reflected in the 
president’s statement and in the commitment to increased financing since 2013.  
 
 
2  (President Uhuru Kenyatta, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000149498/president-uhuru-kenyatta-
launches-multi-million-shilling-programme-for-the-poor). 
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Beyond President Kenyatta’s statements, an analysis of political support among the different 
political parties indicated strong support and ownership across the board. This was evident first 
in the political manifestos by the different parties perused during the study. Both the Jubilee 
Party and the Orange Democratic Movement promise in their manifestos to increase funding 
for cash transfers. Ideologically, both the major parties show no differences in their support for 
social protection programmes. The rise of funding since 2003 even with the change in 
government indicates long-term political support for the schemes. Among the political class, 
as stated by a Member of Parliament in the study in reference to the HSNP:  
The programme is now popular with MPs and they are very excited about it. Even the 
Deputy President has been talking and asking for an increase in the funding for the 
programme (MP_02, 27/09/2016).  
This finding contradicts Booth (2012) and Kelsall (2013), who describe Kenya’s politics as 
short-termist, high political patrimonial politics that can render country ownership of 
programmes difficult even in situations where aid is a catalysing factor.  
 
Within the CT-OVC, the inclusion and involvement of Members of Parliament through the 
Joint Committee on Children as advocates and champions at the initial stages fostered high 
levels of ownership of the programme. A Member of Parliament in the study indicated that the 
HSNP tried to adopt the idea of champions for the programme. However, the process, as 
explained by the legislator, involved developing champions among individuals and not 
ownership among the political class. With the government funding of the HSNP, Members of 
Parliament, previously excluded from the policy process, are now re-engaged following 
increased budgetary allocation from the state. Participation of politicians is often viewed as 
avenues of gaining political expediency; however, in donor-funded environments where 
attribution of “owners” may not be clear, it can lead to support for the programme for political 
gain (Niedzwiecki, 2016). Beyond rhetorical statements, Members of Parliament have 
exhibited support and ownership of the cash transfer programmes through the steady allocation 
of more funds in the budgets for the programmes and the passing of Bills on policies for 
institutional support.  
 
8.5.3. Institutionalisation within Policy Systems 
Various institutions set up by the state and Parliament signify some level of ownership of social 
protection. As mentioned above, a perusal of political manifestos and other policy documents 
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reflected the aspirations of different players within the social protection arena for 
institutionalisation. The inclusion of cash transfers into the MTEF and the budget support to 
implement ministries further strengthened support for CT-OVC and the HSNP. 
Institutionalisation included the establishment of both legal, and implementation and 
coordination structures related to the programmes. The adoption by Parliament of the Social 
Protection Policy in 2012 was viewed by actors towards institutionalisation in the country’s 
policy systems. Other Acts of Parliament related to social protection are the National Social 
Security Act 2013 and the National Health Insurance 2015. Despite the protracted bureaucratic 
process that delayed the development of the policy, findings indicated that within political 
circles there was broad support as the policy was passed with no objections. The Social 
Assistance Bill 2012 was the first step to legally institutionalise cash transfer programmes, 
even though, according to participants in the study, its implementation remains problematic.   
 
The legal instruments of social protection stipulate implementation and coordination structures 
necessary for running the programmes. One such institution based on the National Social 
Protection Policy is the National Social Protection Secretariat at the Ministry of Gender and 
Social Development (Government of Kenya, 2011b). Charged with coordination 
responsibilities, the Secretariat aims at enhancing programme coordination and providing one-
stop contact with donors and partners. Commenting on the coordination role of the Secretariat, 
a key informant at the Ministry within the Department of Labour indicated that the Secretariat 
lacks a mandate in coordinating social insurance and the health insurance components which 
are set up under different Acts of Parliament. Views regarding the Secretariat conflicted with 
some participants’ claims that international organisations pushed for its set-up even before the 
policy was passed, while those within the Secretariat were of the opinion that the multiplicity 
of programmes and activities necessitated the hurried establishment of the Secretariat for 
coordination purposes.  
 
Even though donor advocacy may lead to the formation of such institutions, bureaucratic 
agency and political processes often supersede external influences in setting up institutions and 
running them effectively. In examining the New Public Management reforms in Malawi for 
example, Tambulasi (2013) demonstrates resistance by national agencies in implementing 
donor prescriptions in health sector reforms in Malawi.  In addition, even if financial aid is the 
impetus for the setting up of institutions, their influence in political processes, like the passing 
of policy, remains limited unless they form a partnership with domestic players like civil 
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society organisations. Local and domestic agency becomes imperative in the setting up of 
institutions within government systems that provide an institutional base upon which 
programmes are implemented and shaped. A more detailed analysis of institutions in the policy 
process will be presented in Chapter 9. 
 
8.5.4. Civil Society and Broader Societal Consensus 
From interviews with members of civil society, it emerged that there were lower levels of 
ownership among them in comparison to the other actors. While the scores on political support, 
bureaucratic support and institutionalisation point to high levels of ownership of the 
programmes, participation and ownership remain low among members of civil society 
organisations. This was attributed to several factors. First, the inclusion of civil society was 
delayed. Perceptions of exclusion from the policy process spread beyond the narrow definition 
of NGOs to civil society as other actors expressed similar sentiments. Representatives of trade 
unions shared similar views, pointing to an example at the Social Protection Week in January 
2015 when they expressed their concerns at being excluded from planning for the event. The 
second attributive factor identified in the study relates to the “top-down elitist process” of the 
policy development, which provided little room for meaningful participation of grassroots 
organisations. The esoteric process locked out those perceived to be deficient in knowledge on 
social protection as stated by a participant from civil society. Lastly, financial resources also 
hindered the participation of civil society organisations, restricting their involvement to the 
endorsement of agreed-upon processes.  
 
Findings from the research, however, indicate some level of ownership by international NGOs 
involved in implementation, like HelpAge International and Oxfam. The result of the limited 
ownership and participation of civil society organisations resulted in low levels of 
accountability and little knowledge of the programmes among citizens. An analysis of this is 
however beyond the scope of this study. In seeking to address these limitations, programmes 
like the HSNP have an in-built accountability structure implemented through HelpAge 
International as the Rights Component. This is not an ideal situation as it continues to 
perpetuate top-down processes that do not provide appropriate and effective accountability. 
Efforts by national organisations like SPAF at creating accountability structures were 
lacklustre and did not create a sense of ownership among national and domestic civil society 
organisations.  
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8.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented empirical findings demonstrating the effects of external financing 
in influencing the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. The presentation tracked financing 
trends in both the programmes, taking into consideration political dynamics that contributed to 
domestic financing. To further understand the role of donor financing in shaping policy 
processes, I examined the Programme for Results (P4R), and how its coercive elements forced 
government action towards increased funding for programmes and for the setting up of 
structures for effective implementation of social protection. In the final section, I examined 
perceptions of ownership among domestic actors in regard to the cash transfer programmes.  
 
Evidence suggests that the initial financing of the two cash transfer programmes from external 
findings contributed to their adoption, without which the Government may not have started the 
programmes. The findings corroborate the theoretical argument of this thesis that external 
actors were instrumental in the adoption of social protection in Kenya, and Shearer et al.'s 
(2016) opinion that funding is important in developing countries and may as well be the 
principal impetus for policy change. Apart from influencing the adoption of the cash transfers 
programmes, donor funding shaped the design and architecture of programmes and influenced 
social relations in the policy space. Financing from donors provided leverage for international 
actors to control the agenda though domestic agency found expression with an increase in 
government funding.  
 
In the chapter, I highlighted the catalysing impact of aid in stimulating other donor financing 
and government funding from domestic sources. The initial financing for the CT-OVC from 
UNICEF, for example, stimulated funding from the Government of Kenya, and thereafter 
DFID and the World Bank. In the HSNP, financing from DFID in the first phase of the 
programme stimulated government funding for phase 2 of the programme. The process that 
was followed in achieving this in the HSNP, as demonstrated, appeared incentivised by the 
results-based funding mechanism. These cases show that financing from donors can catalyse 
domestic funding for programmes depending on political moments and capitalising on 
windows of opportunity. The P4R follows a carrot-stick approach in stimulating government 
action, where despite endorsement of the funding model there seems to be reluctance in 
following through the agreement on the government’s side. The funding mechanism, though 
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instrumental and effective in achieving some of the agreed indicators, like DL 3 for setting up 
of the MIS system, however, is deficient in ensuring government compliance.  
 
With increased government allocation of funding to the programmes, domestic actors exhibited 
increased levels of participation, leadership, and decision-making as compared to periods when 
donor financing is its highest. The resultant outcome of increased government funding is 
increased perceptions of ownership among government and political actors. As demonstrated 
in the chapter, levels of ownership varied among different domestic players. The political elite 
exhibited high levels of ownership, and among bureaucrats there were varied views while civil 
society organisations had low levels of ownership. The setting up of both legal, and 
implementation and coordination institutions to strengthen the programmes is indicative of 
political ownership of the policies. The next chapter explores mediational and facilitative 
factors that enabled the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP.  
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CHAPTER NINE: MEDIATIVE AND FACILITATIVE FACTORS IN 
POLICY ADOPTION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined financing as a structural mechanism used by transnational 
actors in coercing the government to adopt the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya. In as far as 
structural mechanisms of policy transfer may be powerful in driving policy adoption, national 
factors often mediate the adoption of policies. Béland (2009), in discussing the role of ideas 
and institutions in policy change, notes that national politics and institutions are key in policy 
change, emphasising that institutions, path dependencies and nation politics often facilitate 
policy uptake. In policy transfer within the framework of power, however, where policy 
entrepreneurs and policy promoters use coercive mechanisms for policy uptake, institutions, 
conditions, windows of opportunity and context (political, social and economic) are often 
conditioned or manipulated to fit within the framework of the idea or policy solution. Though 
participants in the study considered some institutions, contexts and windows of opportunity as 
mediative factors that enabled the uptake the CT-OVC and HSNP, the study demonstrates that 
in some cases, policy promoters created the opportunities to align with their agenda so as to 
facilitate adoption. And though it is argued that domestic factors are key in mediating the 
adoption of policies, social reality is complex and sometimes those very institutions may be a 
result of historical processes or sediments of prior diffusion (Solingen, 2012) 
 
To examine national factors that mediated the adoption of social protection policies in Kenya, 
this chapter is divided into five sections. First, I examine the institutional frameworks that 
enabled the adoption of the policies. This is followed by the section where I examine the socio-
economic context at the time of promotion of the policies with the aim of presenting the social 
reality of the effects of HIV and AIDS and poverty as facilitative factors in the adoption of the 
programmes. In the third section is a discussion on faciliative political processes in which I 
discuss the various windows of opportunity and political junctures that transnational actors 
took advantage of in promoting the programmes. In the last section before the conclusion, I 
pay attention to the role of individual champions, both politicians and bureaucrats, in 
promoting the uptake of social protection policies in Kenya. Lastly, I examine the factors that 
constrained adoption and expansion of the policies, before concluding the chapter.  
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9.2 Forging Institutional Compatibility 
National institutions are key shapers of the types of policies adopted as they mould the 
discourse upon which policy change occurs. Policy change tends to be path dependent, with 
countries easily adopting policies when they already have similar or compatible policies in 
place (Schmitt et al., 2015). Institutional compatibility refers to a situation where policies that 
are already in place influence the adoption of another policy if the present policy is compatible 
with the new policy under transfer. Institutions as public policies and formal political 
frameworks create opportunities for individual action but also constrain agency. In light of the 
study, several national policies and frameworks are considered to have enabled policy agents 
to propose policy change within specific existing institutional frameworks. Though study 
participants stated that institutions related to social development gave impetus and justification 
for government adoption of cash transfers, most of the institutions mentioned were set up 
before the introduction of cash transfer programmes. The Constitution of Kenya, mentioned by 
participants as the key document from which social protection and cash transfers derive, was 
only promulgated in 2010. This was after all the four cash transfers under the National Safety 
Net Programme, CT-OVC, HSNP, OPCT, and the PWSDP, were already under 
implementation. And though actors referred to several institutions as the main reason for the 
initiation of the cash transfers, this study shows that reference to these documents aimed at 
legitimating views and actions already taken. The institutional frameworks mentioned during 
the interviews were the Constitution of Kenya 2010, Vision 2030 and the Children’s Act of 
2001. Principles underlying these documents in relation to human rights, welfare and well-
being, and equality facilitated the compatibility with the principles that cash transfers were 
based upon. Each of the three institutional frameworks will be examined below in view of their 
mediational role in the adoption of the cash transfer programmes.  
 
9.2.1 Alignment with the Constitution of Kenya 
The Constitution of Kenya in Article 43 (1) (e) (3) states that “Every person has the right… to 
social security… the State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable 
to support themselves and their dependents” (Government of Kenya, 2010, p. 31). This article 
in the Constitution provides the highest articulation of social protection and social security in 
Kenya. Other articles closely linked with social security are health, education, reasonable 
working conditions and access to justice (Government of Kenya, 2011b). Participants in the 
study, particularly those from civil society and bureaucrats involved in the development in 
social protection policymaking, repeatedly invoked this section of the Constitution to justify 
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the adoption of the cash transfers. But this is actually not a right. Right accrue from being a 
citizen or a human being. In this case, this constitutional provision - as in case of South Africa’s 
constitution from which Kenya borrows - makes public social security conditional on the 
demonstrable inability to provide for oneself and one’s dependants. Additionally, as mentioned 
above, the cash schemes preceded the 2010 Constitution and therefore the Constitution played 
no role in the adoption process happening in the early 2000s. As a document born out of years 
of political and social struggle and discontent since independence (Mati, 2013a), the 
Constitution was expected to form a foundation to address socio-economic rights more 
universally. Rather the Constitution seems to “reinforce a residual approach to social policy”. 
Further, the ex-ante manner of provision – after a household falls into poverty – negates the 
principles of rights the Constitution purports to be promoting through social protection. The 
design of the programmes, as articulated in the Constitution, provides support only to those 
unable to support themselves in case of market failures. As Lavinas (2013, p. 24) contends, 
cash transfers “provide some compensation to the needy yet they remain disconnected from 
the anti-cyclical and permanent redistribute policies – a constitutive element of any system of 
universal social protection.” 
 
In reference to the principles deriving from the Constitution, participants highlighted norms 
related to quality, human rights, dignity and improvement of human capabilities as tenets 
providing guidance in the development of policies and design of programmes. The National 
Social Protection Policy 2012 mentions these principles drawn from the Constitution, which 
provided a strong rationale for cash transfer programmes. Members of parliament in the study 
highlighted that decisions on expansion of programmes and passing of Bills related to social 
protection aligned to the spirit and the principles espoused therein. The view that the cash 
transfers promote and are based on the said norms are contestable. First, both the CT-OVC and 
the HSNP cash transfers schemes are targeted to specific categories, leaving out a great 
proportion of people in need of social protection. The CT-OVC for example, provides cash 
transfers to orphaned children, leaving out other children in need who may not be orphaned. 
Second, cash transfers are set at low levels based on “a basic need” amount, making it 
insufficient for promoting well-being or dignity.  
 
Besides the principles of the Constitution, participants attested to the Bill of Rights as the 
cornerstone for social protection. As stated by one participant in reference to the alignment of 
the HSNP with the Constitution:  
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The programme is guided by the Constitution which gives it direction. This is especially 
from the Bill of Right Article 43, that emphasises human dignity and social justice and 
protection of the marginalised. Each time one comes up with a programme the 
government asks how it relates to the Constitution (CSO_03, 12/2/2016). 
 
As suggested in the statement above, proponents from civil society organisations drew 
particularly from the human rights language of the Constitution in advocacy for the 
programmes. The government was increasingly seeking for and questioning programmes’ 
justification for the cash transfers and to do this, programmers adopted concepts and advocacy 
in line with concepts from the document to show alignment. Programmes that were already 
under implementation before 2010, like the CT-OVC and the HSNP, adopted the concepts to 
ensure “post-fit” with the Constitution and to incentivise the expansion of the programmes and 
“ownership” by the government. CSOs and humanitarian organisations were particularly keen 
to reference the Constitution in advocacy work. 
 
Article 19(1) of the Constitution states: “The Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s 
democratic state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies” (Government 
of Kenya, 2010, p. 19). As mentioned by participants, the National Social Protection Policy 
derives from this article to promote the well-being of Kenyans. Besides this clause in the 
Constitution, state officials pointed to Article 21(3), which states as follows:  
 
All State organs and all public officers have a duty to address the needs of vulnerable 
groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons with 
disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalized communities, and 
members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities (Government of Kenya, 
2010, p. 20). 
As explained further by a state official, the Constitution makes provision for certain rights for 
vulnerable people and groups, and the duty of the Ministry of Planning includes translating the 
provisions in the Constitution to implementable projects. According to the economic adviser 
at the Ministry of Planning and Devolution, the adoption of the cash transfer programmes was 
imperative as it translated the Constitution into programmes (MFP_03, 29/7/2016). In 
highlighting their role in promoting the programmes, state officials in the implementing 
departments further explained the focus on children and the marginalised.  
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Reference to the categorisation of different groups for social protection was drawn from 
Articles 53 through to 57, which highlight the role of the state in provision to children, 
minorities and marginalised groups, older persons and people with disabilities. International 
NGOs and civil society organisations like HelpAge International, Save the Children and the 
Africa Platform for Social Protection highlighted these articles as providing the basis of their 
advocacy for social protection for the different groups. NGOs in Northern Kenya referred to 
several articles, especially Article 56, which seeks to address the continued marginalisation of 
the area. Respondents highlighted the contribution that the HSNP could play in reducing 
marginalisation, with some respondents referring to other sections of the Constitution on 
devolution and affirmative action as central processes in addressing poverty and vulnerability.  
 
It is, however, important to note that the Constitution was adopted in August 2010, seven years 
after the beginning of the CT-OVC and three after the initiation of the HSNP. Therefore, the 
idea that the Constitution provided the impetus for the cash transfer programmes is 
exaggerated. As stated by a respondent in the study in reference to this, it means that rather 
than being the basis upon which the cash transfers were grounded, programmes realigned with 
the Constitution after their initiation. The reality is that policy entrepreneurs contributed to both 
creating the pre-condition for mobilisation and creating a setting for the adoption of the cash 
transfers. Later on, they sought to align the programmes with the Constitution.   
 
9.2.2 Vision 2030 as a Development Blueprint 
Vision 2030 provides yet another institutional framework that participants mentioned as 
compatible with social protection. This basis of Vision 2013 is however based on retrospective 
rationalisation, where actors especially bureaucrats and politicians tried to justify decisions 
made. At the time of the development of Vision 2030, the four cash transfers were already 
under implementation. The cash transfer schemes therefore informed the sections of Vision 
2030 related to social protection, and not vice versa. Developed in 2007, Vision 2030 strategy 
offers a long-term perspective towards the country’s development. Vision 2030 developed 
around three pillars: economic, social and political (Government of Kenya, 2007b). The social 
pillar’s target is a just and cohesive society with social protection mentioned as one of the 
flagship programmes. In stressing the relevance of social protection in Vision 2013, a 
participant in the study stated:  
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Within Vision 2030 there are constituencies that have been mentioned as facing 
vulnerability and poverty which need to be addressed. Cash transfers sit squarely within 
these efforts in Vision 2030 (TTC_03, 26/1/2016).  
 
In line with the selectivity that characterises cash transfer schemes on the continent, a perusal 
of the document indicated government’s plans for setting up a fund for older persons only with 
no reference to other groups of persons. Further scrutiny of the document revealed that though 
Vision 2030 claims the equal importance of the three pillars for the achievement of 
development, like Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the framework takes a neo-liberal approach 
to development, where markets and the private sector play a major role, with the document 
stating that economic development is the foundation for social development. According to the 
participants, the government was interested in the establishment and expansion of social 
protection to fulfill its long-term strategy on development as articulated in Vision 2030. The 
statement however is discrepant with the way the social protection paradigm emerged in the 
country as discussed in the previous chapters. In relation to the HSNP for example, the 
programme was developed without government participation. DFID insulated the programme 
from the government and the political class. The reality of the social protection policy transfer 
is that it was based on coercion and soft pressure.  
 
Though Vision 2030 states that the government will by 2012 “establish a consolidated fund for 
social protection” (Government of Kenya, 2007b, p. 21), by the time of this study the 
government had not set up the fund. Participants were sceptical of government setting it up and 
were doubtful that it would happen. Staff at the Secretariat were equally doubtful and outlined 
that “though the issue of coordination of the programmes is ongoing we doubt as Vision 2030 
if this will lead to the setting up of the funds as envisaged in the Vision 2030” (MFP_01, 
22/4/2016). Participants mentioned political hindrances to setting up the fund, pointing out that 
the current government, though interested in the expansion of social protection programmes, 
had paid little attention to Vision 2030 as the country’s development blueprint. Other 
participants mentioned that continued donor funding for social protection reduced pressure for 
the government to set up the fund, thereby highlighting the issue of a lack of ownership by the 
government on the imposed programmes.   
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9.2.3 Children’s Act and the National Plan for Action for OVC 
Participants within the study identified the Children’s Act (2001) and the National Plan for 
Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (2008) as key institutional frameworks on which 
the CT-OVC was founded. As stated by a participant in the study:  
 
The programme is anchored on the Children’s Act of 2001 where the government has 
a mandate to safeguard children. Particularly after the vagaries of HIV and AIDS there 
was a need for the government to provide coping mechanisms for children 
(MGCSD_03, 25/4/2016).  
 
A perusal of the Children’s Act and the National Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children 
shows no mention of social protection programmes or cash transfer schemes. Rather the 
documents have sections related to child well-being and welfare. The Act was developed in 
2001 under the leadership of the Children’s Council with the broad aim of safeguarding the 
rights and securing the welfare and well-being of children in Kenya (Government of Kenya, 
2001) at a time when there was “widespread suffering of children on a number of issues with 
orphanhood being the main source of the suffering” (MGCSD_03, 25/4/2016). The targeting 
model for the CT-OVC is inefficient in itself to promote the welfare and the well-being of 
children. In addition, it reinforces selectivity, as unselected families may be poorer than those 
with orphans. From the interviews, a member of the Council stated that their participation in 
the design of the CT-OVC was limited to the initial phase of the programme and therefore they 
could not influence the targeting mechanism (CSO_06, 12/8/2016). Though council members 
participated at some point, their role was peripheral and restricted to advocacy with Members 
of Parliament for increased budgetary support for the programme. The council member who is 
also a member of civil society confirmed that even up to the time of this study, their 
participation in strategic aspects of the programme is limited. 
 
The National Plan for Action for OVC was much more explicit on addressing problems of 
vulnerability. In the document, social protection is highlighted as one of the strategies to “… 
enhance support of orphans and vulnerable children through policy development and support 
of safety nets such as cash transfer schemes for OVC” (Government of Kenya, 2008, p. 8).  
The strategic plan laid down the basis for the CT-OVC, based on orphanhood and vulnerability, 
and provided a framework for adding an increasing number of households into the already 
existing programme. With the first plan of action developed in 2004, the CT-OVC drew from 
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the Act in reaching out to orphaned households through the cash transfer programme. The 
National Plan was developed with the participation of the Department of Children and the 
Ministry of Health, and was therefore skewed in addressing the issue of vulnerability among 
children from an HIV/AIDS perspective, leaving out other factors that contribute to child 
vulnerability. From the interviews conducted, it was evident that the document was influential 
in justifying the expansion of the CT-OVC later after adoption. The plan was developed at the 
same time as the beginning of the CT-OVC. In addition, its development was facilitated by 
UNICEF, that had an interest in setting up the CT-OVC. The document was therefore created 
to fit with UNICEF’s preferred prescription.   
 
Beyond compatibility of the HSNP and the CT-OVC with existing frameworks, the study 
examined how the socio-economic reality of the country mediated the adoption of the 
programmes. The examination of these factors focusses on four aspects: persistent national 
poverty, the effect of HIV and AIDS, marginalisation and vulnerability, and the popularity of 
cash transfers.  
 
9.3 National Context as Windows of Opportunity  
The national or domestic context provides windows of opportunity that enable successful 
policy transfer. As will be demonstrated, however, windows of opportunity themselves are 
dependent upon actors’ constructions (Schmidt, 2010). Transnational organisations hinge their 
policy advocacy around these circumstances. As has been demonstrated in Chapter 7 of the 
thesis, transnational actors framed policy narratives along social and economic lines to 
influence policy adoption. In this section, the aspects of poverty, HIV and AIDS, 
marginalisation in Northern Kenya, and the global popularity of cash transfers within 
international development circles are considered to highlight their mediative role in the 
adoption of the programmes. 
 
9.3.1 The Poverty Situation in Kenya 
Poverty and its manifestations were one of the dominant factors that accounted for the adoption 
of cash transfer programmes in Kenya. As mentioned previously in the thesis, coming out of 
structural adjustment programmes, poverty levels had grown and deepened (Government of 
Kenya, 2003) to levels that required urgent resolution. Following the harsh consequences of 
SAPs, poverty levels had risen to high levels as scores of the population could not afford basic 
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services and goods as a result of a loss of jobs. Emanating from the powerful global discourse 
and financial provisioning from international organisations, the idea of cash in alleviating 
poverty resonated at national level. International organisations conducted studies on the effects 
of poverty on different categories of the population. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
organisations promoting cash transfers for specific groups of people conducted studies to 
validate their advocacy and to create policy narratives.  
 
Cash transfer provision as promoted by international organisations as a solution to poverty 
appealed to governments in the region and in Kenya too. Evidence was used to buffet the 
schemes and valorised the effects of studies on early adopters like Latin America and South 
Africa. Following on impact assessments from South Africa and other Southern African 
countries, it became easy for Kenya to adopt the CT-OVC and the HSNP as new policy 
solutions to poverty.  In this respect, a representative of civil society in the study stated:   
 
We are poor – there is poverty which has to be addressed. So, anyone who could come 
with what looks like a solution, people will go to them for solutions. It is just the same 
situation in our countries, we are poor – anyone who brings us a solution is a saviour. 
It is not because people are silly, they have seen people who can deal with their 
problems (CSO_04, 28/9/2016).  
 
In acknowledging the issue of poverty, his sentiments reflected the continued quest by the 
Government of Kenya in seeking solutions for national problems of poverty from other places 
considered successful in poverty reduction. The idea of “a saviour with a solution” provided 
another opportunity for the government to test out a programme for poverty reduction. 
However, from past experience and as demonstrated in Chapter 5 of this study, policy solutions 
in Africa are exogenous. African countries and leaders do not seek policy solutions; rather, 
prescriptions are imposed upon them with little understanding of the domestic context, thereby 
having little impact on poverty reduction. Past policy options which have not yielded much in 
poverty reduction include but are not limited to Focus on Rural Development and the PRSPSs. 
In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 8, the fact that donors were providing funding for the 
programmes at the initial phases of the programme made it easier for the government to accept 
the piloting of the programmes.  
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Participants in the study recognised that society accepted that poverty levels were high and in 
need of a solution. Following normative structures of care, communities therefore accepted the 
idea of cash transfers. As one participant in the study put it: 
 
There was acceptance within the community that people needed to be helped based on 
the poverty they were experiencing at the time. In addition, the selection criteria of both 
the HSNP and the CT-OVC based on some levels of poverty was an indication of 
acceptability of the programmes within the wider society (CSO_3, 12/2/2016).   
 
Thus, the programmes not only resonated with the government but also within the communities 
where cash was to be distributed. Programmes, however, were based on targeting and in this 
case enforced selectivity thus worked to diminish social solidarity and cohesion (Lavinas, 
2013; Adésínà, 2015). Sharing and caring for the destitute has since pre-colonial periods been 
part of long-established kinship traditions where people take care of each other in times of 
need, as espoused by among others Mwalimu Julius Nyerere through Ujamaa (Ferguson, 
2015). The idea of providing for the need in times of need, though with a significant change in 
kinship relations, was considered a key feature of social protection and remains ingrained in 
communities, thereby explaining the acceptance of cash transfer programmes as poverty 
solutions. Cash transfers themselves were primarily financed by international organisations. In 
addition, support for the destitute in African settings required those who could work to meet 
their needs – therefore social provisioning was in the context of full employment.  
 
9.3.2 HIV and AIDS – Orphanhood Societal Social Fabric 
Child vulnerability due to HIV/AIDS provided one of the national factors that propelled the 
acceptability of the CT-OVC. In an attempt to respond to the vulnerability brought about, 
Kenya tested the scheme and provided families with orphans with an initial monthly cash 
payment of KES 500 (Bosworth et al., 2016). Based on figures provided in 2003, the number 
of orphaned children in the country was close to 1.6 million and those estimated as due to HIV 
and AIDS approaching 892,000 (UNAIDS, UNICEF and USAID, 2002). The programme was 
designed to target those orphaned from HIV and AIDS. The rationale behind targeting those 
orphaned by HIV and AIDS is problematic. First, it was difficult to ascertain the circumstances 
under which the parents had died. It could only be inferred which cases were a result of HIV 
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and AIDS, and therefore this mode of qualification was later abandoned. In addition, it 
provided a moral contradiction when asking families about the cause of death. This shows the 
problems with the initiation of the cash transfers schemes; it was about landing on the most 
convincing narrative upon which to create a compelling narrative. Orphanhood was not a new 
phenomenon, but it suddenly became imperative to find a solution to it. The HIV and AIDS 
pandemic provided an opportunity to provide the solution of cash transfers.  
 
Considered the worst epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa, with high numbers of children and 
households affected, a solution had to be arrived at to address the rising vulnerability among 
children. In explaining the reason behind decisions leading to the adoption of the programme, 
interview sources highlighted that the effect of HIV and AIDS on children brought to the fore 
the issue of orphanhood among children, with the prevalence rate of the epidemic making a 
solution to address the situation an urgent matter. The concern for the initiation of the 
programme was with the issue of HIV and AIDS rather than orphanhood, with the false 
assumption that all orphanhood was a result of the pandemic. One of the respondents 
expounded on this at length as follows:  
 
At that time in 2002 there had been what is called the rapid assessment of OVC issues 
that had been conducted virtually in all countries in Southern Africa, so it was a rough 
and ready assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS and its predictive impact on the 
numbers of orphans and what was currently ongoing to help states handle this crisis. It 
was very much spurred by the great sense of a crisis in Southern Africa where cases of 
HIV/AIDS were greater than the rest, but the rest of Africa was sort of swept up. In that 
general sense of Southern African crisis these rapid assessments were carried out and 
you can find them on the internet – each country had a separate report put together 
(IOS_04, 13/3/2016). 
 
Beyond the flawed targeting approach employed in the CT-OVC, another salient issue that 
emerges in policy transfers is the nature in which policy promoters presented the phenomenon 
as a crisis. Creation of a crisis is necessary in creating windows of opportunity where the 
problem is presented in a dramatic manner in need of urgent attention, thereby creating an 
opportunity for policy ideas (Howlett, McConnell and Perl, 2015).     
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HIV and AIDS provided a strong impetus upon which the CT-OVC was designed and initiated 
by UNICEF and the Department of Children’s Services. The prevalence rate in the country at 
the time was estimated at 9 per cent, with some districts being as high as 15 per cent (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2003). A government official acknowledged that the dire situation of 
children at the time necessitated the adoption of the cash transfer programme by stating that: 
 
The programme came about as a response to the UN declaration and the UNGASS 2002 
response to the after-effects of HIV. As a result, there were a lot of OVC and the number 
of growing children without parents as HIV had grown to a great proportion. We sought 
out for friends who included UNICEF. They thought they needed to find a way to 
support the growing number of orphans (MGSCD-02, 12/5/2016). 
 
In stressing the point, one of the participants pointed out that: 
For UNICEF, it was more of mitigation for the then situation of OVC and the 
overstretch of kinship ways of taking care of orphans and street children (IOS_04, 
12/4/2016). 
 
The reality of the effect of HIV on children by the number of orphans and the increase of 
children living on the streets was evidence of the breakdown of the social fabric and the lack 
of proper coping mechanisms within households affected. The respondent from UNICEF, in 
explaining the situation, further pointed to the inadequacies and the deficiencies of alternative 
mechanisms like orphanages in addressing the situation. According to the National Plan for 
OVC, orphanages were recommended as the last resort as coping mechanisms for children. To 
support families and households affected, proposals included the provision of support through 
cash transfer programmes to enable households to take care of children. A look at the amount 
being offered shows that the strategies of employing cash transfers are not about poverty 
reduction. At the beginning of the programmes, cash transfers amounted to KES 500 per 
household and were later increased to KES 2000.  
 
The logic advanced by promoters of cash transfers was that starting from a high amount of 
funds would not be accepted by the government. It was better to start at a low amount and get 
the government “trapped”. Once the programme was rolled out and in implementation, the 
perception was that the government could not stop the programmes for fear of reprisal; the only 
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way possible was for the government to increase the amount. The strategies and tactics 
employed by international organisations were therefore unorthodox and not policymaking 
strategies. In some cases, it bordered on deceiving governments to accept programmes. The 
design of the programmes set the amount of cash transfers at low levels and were therefore 
insufficient to raise recipients’ income even to the poverty line. The long-term effects on 
poverty reduction would be minimal. In addition, the poverty thresholds and the benefits paid 
are not adjusted for inflation making the value of the benefits erode over time.  
 
9.3.3 Marginalisation and Vulnerability  
Equally persuasive on the issue of the adaptability and adoption of cash transfer to the Kenyan 
context was the marginalisation of populations living in Northern Kenya. Evidence points to 
the marginalisation of the region since the colonial period. Due to its desert-like nature, the 
region was classified as a “low potential area” at independence, with Sessional Paper No. 10 
further relegating the region to the periphery of economic and social development  (Kochore, 
2016). The post-colonial government made no attempt at addressing the marginalisation, even 
classifying the region as unproductive; a situation which has persisted to a great extent to date. 
Several scholars have documented this marginalisation in Northern Kenya, linking it to poor 
infrastructural development, low service delivery in health and education, low political 
representation and recent attempts at reintegration and inclusion (Wario Arero, 2007; 
Odhiambo, 2013; Mosley and Watson, 2016).  
 
Participants in the study recognised the marginalisation of the Northern part of Kenya and 
viewed the HSNP’s provision of cash to households in the area as a remedial solution to the 
economic exclusion in the region. To this end, a member of civil society expounded that:  
The reason why the evolution of cash is an amazing story is that nobody fights against 
that because it makes sense. People were gripped by the changes that were happening 
in this country, including constitutional changes that these groups (in Northern Kenya) 
are actually the most marginalised and because of their marginalisation Kenyans were 
willing to give extra; Northern Kenya actually has a marginalisation fund that is 
different from the HSNP. The country accepts that they were left behind. So the country 
accepts the idea of a cash programme for the region (CSO_03, 12/2/2016). 
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But this idea is an ex post factum rationalisation of the policy decision, as the efficacy and 
efficiency of the programmes can only be judged after implementation. In addition, the idea of 
providing cash transfers was explained by a participant as part of the food crisis happening 
around the time and donors were unable to provide food (IOS-03, 13/3/2016). The sentiments 
of the participant were echoed by others in the study who referred to the rampant government 
neglect of the region. In his response, the participant added that the marginalisation of Northern 
Kenya, as was highlighted during the Constitution-making process, offered sufficient evidence 
to support the HSNP in the region. But the participant’s sentiments are a revisionist account 
(the rationalisation dependence – ideational and pecuniary – is problematic). The programme 
had to be shielded from the political class for fear that it may not be accepted. The tactics and 
strategies used in promoting the programmes were forceful and a manipulation of facts, 
circumstances, and conditions to ensure policy acceptance. Buffeted by the language in the 
Constitution that recognised the marginalisation of the region, the idea of a solution aiming at 
addressing the problem was accepted across the board by policymakers. In linking the problem 
of marginalisation of some section of Kenyans with the constitutional moment, proponents of 
the cash transfers provided sufficient and plausible data to drive up advocacy for adoption of 
the HSNP. But, as mentioned above, the idea of cash instead of food aid was brought about 
following the food crisis, making it easier to provide cash rather than food.  
 
To further make the case for the HSNP, proponents of the HSNP attributed the vulnerability 
and poverty levels of the region to marginalisation. But the targeting levels of those enrolled 
in the programme – equivalent to USD 0.67 per day per household – is lower than poverty 
levels applied by the World Bank of USD 1.90 per day and insufficient even to meet the daily 
food needs of a household, especially in times of famine and drought when the price of grains 
and other food rises. As alleged by HSNP that the programme aims at providing a “cushion in 
times of drought”, the amount provided is insufficient to cushion against the vagaries of famine. 
In Turkana, the poorest county, the issue of marginalisation was highlighted as the prime cause 
of poverty. However, while marginalisation of Northern Kenya is a political consequence, 
proponents of cash transfers ignored this aspect by excluding politicians from the initial phases 
of the programmes as has been demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The solution to the 
problem of marginalisation as cash was framed as a technical solution that politicians were 
kept out of so as not to “politicise the programme”. By excluding politicians in Northern Kenya 
from the process, the action by the international organisations is consistent with studies by 
Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007) on how development actors frame political problems in 
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technical solutions as a way of excluding other actors. Interestingly, years after Ferguson’s 
ground-breaking study in Lesotho, international organisations continue to deal with 
development problems in the same manner by suggesting “technical solutions to political 
problems”.  
 
Coupled with political marginalisation in the area, Northern Kenya experiences perennial 
drought and famine which is cyclical, thereby compounding the region’s vulnerability. As one 
of the participants in the study remarked:  
 
DFID saw the HSNP as a response to vulnerability and poverty in arid and semi-arid 
areas. This was because the government was interested in long-term development rather 
than the sporadic response that was happening as a result of one-off support during the 
drought. The main way in which vulnerability was being handled was through food aid 
that was fraught with leakages, costs, inefficiencies and dependency. Food aid was not 
seen to be sufficiently addressing the needs of the people at that place. There was a 
need to address this better and therefore unconditional cash transfers were introduced. 
The programme was modelled along the OVC programme that had already been started 
earlier (MDP_01, 7/4/2016). 
 
The HSNP easily found acceptability by the government under these circumstances of 
perennial hunger and drought. Acceptability from the political class and the bureaucrats also 
came easy because its adoption would not upset the financial equilibrium within the budget. 
Acceptability also came from the fact that domestic actors, especially the political and 
bureaucratic class, are still caught in the neo-liberal frame of thinking which accepts markets 
as solutions to social provisioning. The advocacy around cash transfer programmes promised 
to address not only the poverty and vulnerability, but to “promote development through 
economic empowerment of households” and it is upon these sentiments that countries have 
adopted cash transfers. The claim is that cash transfers have the prospect of developing skills 
can rectify underinvestment in capital, thereby “killing several developmental birds with one 
stone” (Lavinas, 2013, p. 5). Cash transfer provisioning is considered a process through which 
the economically disengaged can be engaged back into the economic sphere. However, this 
thinking is contrary to the workings of development where economic empowerment of a 
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household is a consequence of development and inclusivity. In addition, the statement is a case 
of ex post factum rationalisation. 
 
9.3.4 Popularity of Cash Transfers as a Global Norm 
In response to the social reality and the context, cash as an alternative to previous techniques 
of poverty reduction proved popular with policymakers. Four main reasons were identified 
during the study as having popularised cash transfers. First, from the perspective of a 
government official, the popularity stemmed from what he termed “the nature of the social 
protection provided it. The form of cash promotes the dignity and self-respect of beneficiaries” 
(MFP_03, 28/9/2016). Impact evaluations conducted equally pointed to this as one of the 
reasons for the wide support of the cash programmes. As indicated by participants, studies from 
within and outside of Kenya demonstrated that unlike other development assistance 
programmes, the provision of cash was perceived to promote the dignity of the people who 
received the benefits as it allowed them to choose how to meet their needs. This resonates with 
neo-liberal sentiments as promoted by Hayek. Previous support programmes like food aid were 
described as rigid and prescriptive, leaving no room for choice for beneficiaries. Promotion of 
dignity and self-respect together with positive impacts of cash formed part of the advocacy 
messages by human right organisations. This statement however is a justification for starting 
the cash transfers rather than the reason. The design of cash transfer itself through targeting is 
undignified to those enrolled in the programme. Moreover, the amount that is provided is 
insufficient to provide a life of dignity. Late payments, at times stretching to more than eight 
months, make the poor more vulnerable as they have to borrow money and later pay back when 
the stipends are paid. 
 
Second, besides promoting dignity, other participants considered the acceptability of cash 
transfers as emanating from normative values of society in Kenya and in what they described 
as the African way of life. The key element of this description is that communities in Kenya 
have always taken care of the disadvantaged and therefore providing cash to the poor was in 
keeping with these principles. One of the respondents in the study explained it as follows:  
I think that the need to support poor and vulnerable people is ingrained in our African 
cultures deeply, so essentially the support mechanisms came from individuals to 
people who had problems and lately from politicians. So, they took on the burden of 
being the cash transfer, if there was a problem the politician was expected to provide 
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in death, for medical treatment, school fees so the idea of cash was based on helping 
out people already were already doing this. The need for this was recognised by 
citizens and by politicians (CSO_03, 24/3/2016). 
 
Therefore, in following normative traditions the idea of cash transfers as a means of support to 
kin was easy to sell to politicians and the public. For the wider society, the spirit of helping 
those in need was not foreign; money was simply the new way of helping those in need. Social 
protection, though not in the form of cash transfer programmes, was also not a new 
phenomenon among communities, as other studies have shown (Ferguson, 2015). Third, 
participants in the study mentioned that the popularity and acceptance of cash drew from the 
political economy context of Kenya. Since independence, Kenya has centred on economic 
development supported by the idea of markets for access to basic services. 
  
Cash transfers for the poor were equated to other schemes like the Youth Fund and the 
Women’s Fund, making it more acceptable to the government, by a participant in the following 
way:  
The reason why again this is not a problem is that cash-based interventions in 
development are not only a cash transfer thing. The ability of people to take cash and 
do whatever they want to do with it is something that runs through the veins of this 
country since independence. We know if we give people money, they make better 
choices, so we have a youth fund. So, the youth may not be recipients of cash transfers, 
but they get quite a lot of money to set up businesses. We have a women’s fund, so the 
women may not be receiving cash transfers, but they have money. Over and above this, 
all these groups again have constituency-based funds that they can tap into that these 
groups that are marginalised have no capacity to tap into but other groups can tap onto 
(CDF) [Constituency Developments Funds], the constituency bursary fund, so the sense 
about using money to support development does not create uproar in the country 
because it seems to be an acceptable way of developing (CSO_03, 12/2/2016).  
 
With government intervention often geared towards this market orientation, providing cash to 
the poor was not foreign, according to the respondent. It is estimated that for example the Youth 
Development Fund received KES 385 million as a revolving fund, while for the Women’s 
Enterprise Fund, the government allocated KES 440 million to be provided to women and 
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persons with disability as credit to facilitate starting businesses in the 2011/2012 financial year 
(Government of Kenya, 2011a). Cash as a response to the poor and vulnerable was therefore 
not foreign as it aligned with the country’s market-oriented trajectory. The idea of politicians 
providing money to their constituency is however different from the idea of cash transfers, as 
political handouts stem from a system of political patronage. In addition, the comparison with 
the Youth Fund is false, as the Youth Fund is provided for productive purposes with recipients 
expected to repay the funds they receive. Lastly, arguments that cash gives people choices 
stems from the same neo-liberal ideas about free markers espoused by the Hayek and 
Friedman’s visions of free markets. In addition, unlike the welfare states model advanced in 
the 20th century in Europe, the doctrine of cash transfers is an advance of finance-led 
capitalism, where the poor are expected to get provisions from markets, therefore reinforcing 
residual tendencies (Lavinas, 2013). 
 
Lastly, participants in the study described cash as “neutral” meaning that beneficiaries could 
use it as they wished. Participants agreed that while other forms of assistance to the poor were 
helpful, cash was considered neutral in the sense that it did not seem prescriptive and binding 
to the recipients and therefore presented a better option from the human rights perspective. In 
addition, the cash transfer programmes were seen to be benefitting a wide spectrum of people 
beyond the poor and the vulnerable. One of the participants in reference to this stated that “the 
programme is also popular because people are making a killing out of them – private sector, 
NGOs, politicians and others” (CS0_05, 28/9/2016). Apart from the beneficiaries receiving the 
monthly stipends and the NGOs involved in the programme, this was in reference to service 
providers from the private sector like banks and telecommunication companies that were part 
of the payment systems for the cash transfer programmes. But this idea is tied to Hayek’s idea 
of freedom, where people are free to choose from markets. The current social protection 
agenda, which is about the financialisation and incorporation of the poor into markets, makes 
the individual responsible for their fate as the schemes extend commodification through their 
design, disbursing monetary rewards in exchange for the poor’s participation as consumers. 
They therefore do not promote the expansion of rights, but rather the retrenchment of welfare. 
Sentiments of popularity of cash transfers were largely within international organisations in 
direct implementation of programmes such as HelpAge International who were keen promoting 
the policies. The next section therefore is a discussion on the role of politics and politicians in 
mediating the adoption of the programmes.  
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9.4 Political Processes and Bargains as Mediative Factors  
The following section considers the contribution of politics and its dynamics in shaping 
adoption of the social protection policies. The section provides highlights of how politicians 
seeking to gain political mileage afforded acceptability to the programmes. In the section, is a 
discussion of perceptions of government rationality and responsibility to citizens as a mediative 
factor in adoption. 
 
9.4.1 Gaining Political Mileage  
Politics matters for social protection uptake. This is demonstrated in the adapted political 
settlement framework for social protection which considers how different forms of ruling 
coalition redistribute social public goods in the form of social protection benefits. A political 
settlement “refers to the balance of distribution of power between contending social groups 
and social classes on which any state is based” (Lavers and Hickey, 2016, p. 4). That the 
political settlement configuration of a country matters in the adoption of cash transfer 
programmes has been studied by various authors with a view to demonstrate the role of politics 
in social protection adoption in Africa. To understand political acceptability of social 
protection in Kenya, it is key to understand Kenya’s political architecture, which has been 
described variously as “neopatrimonialism” (Kelsall, 2013) and based on competitive 
clientelist settlements (Lavers, Hickey and others, 2015). But rather than consider political 
settlements as the key to the adoption of social protection, I consider the kind of politics as a 
mediative factor in Kenya in the adoption of the two cash transfer schemes. Further, political 
association with cash transfers did not play a role at the adoption stages as explained in xxxx.  
 
In this regard, political support and acceptability of the programmes emanated from the likely 
political mileage that would accrue to the political elites both at national and constituency level. 
Although both the public and Members of Parliament recognised that the government has only 
been putting money into the programme for the last three years, participants in the study 
acknowledged that the HSNP in particular had been used as a campaign tool in Northern Kenya 
where aspirants promised to ensure an expansion of the programme if elected to various 
political positions. While the study found that Members of Parliament and politicians supported 
the HSNP, representatives from international organisations added that this could be attributed 
largely to client-based patronage politics (IOS_02, 24/3/2016). Citing the rejection of the 
targeting model proposed by donors for HSNP by MPs for a geographical targeting approach, 
a participant stated that politicians regarded the programme as a campaign tool and therefore a 
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wide geographical distribution of the programme was to their political advantage (TTC_01, 
1/4/2016).   
 
At national level, according to participants in the study, it was easy to gain political mileage 
out of the programmes. In reference to the current government, a participant pointed out that 
the Jubilee administration had used the programmes to gain political mileage over their rivals. 
As explained at length by a respondent:  
In Kenya, you cannot draw a line between government and political party of the day. 
So, government work is used towards the manifesto of the party. The government is 
saying the Jubilee government has done this… is it the party or the state? With time the 
line is so blurred. People use government programmes for political mileage, and I think 
it is one of the reasons that social protection is receiving a lot of political support 
because it is like the government is doing you a favour – read the political party. Most 
of these programmes came in during the time the NARC government was on and when 
the grand coalition was on. Maybe they did not spell it out as much as it is being done 
now by Jubilee government – but it was for political mileage. It is not Jubilee party 
doing it but the Government of Kenya. Kibaki (former president) launched the projects 
then but Jubilee has relaunched the programmes many times like it is a new thing – but 
just to gain political mileage out of the programmes (CSO_01, 6/4/2016).  
 
The statement resonated with those of other participants in the programme, with some stating 
that they did not consider it wrong for politicians to use the programme for political reasons as 
long as the programme was receiving an increased budgetary allocation from Parliament.  
 
But unlike the CDF which MPs have control over, political mileage from cash transfers was 
not considered as providing direct political mileage. With CDF, Members of Parliament have 
decision-making control which enables them to manipulate allocation of funds for political 
expediency. In addition, unlike CDF funds, social protection is a national function, with cash 
transfers administered directly from the national level to the recipient. MPs therefore gain 
political mileage by promising increases when in Parliament to their constituents. While there 
have been reports of MPs making decisions on who gets on to the programme, a study of this 
was beyond the scope of this study.  
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Due to the growth of the programmes over the past years and the levels of public awareness, 
the political class has managed to gain political mileage from the programmes through 
attribution. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, financing of programmes has grown even 
with a change of government since 2002. The Jubilee government has however ‘claimed 
association’ with the programmes more than the previous governments. This has been done 
through rebranding the programmes as Jubilee projects and through multiple launches of the 
programmes, in particular the OPCT programme. These actions, according to the study, were 
techniques through which the Jubilee government was seeking attribution to the programmes. 
By continuously rebranding the programmes, the public associates the programmes more with 
Jubilee than previous administrations. For example, the OPCT has been relaunched several 
times since it started in 2008—in the last five years it has been launched twice. Unlike the other 
cash transfer programmes, the government and the political elite view the OPCT as a means of 
gaining political mileage for the elections in 2017 as older persons are considered a voting bloc 
by politicians.  
 
This study also found out that the perceived levels of corruption among the political class 
contributed to the acceptance of the programme among politicians. This was however not in 
relation to their control of the funds but the sense that cash transfer programmes created 
perceptions of “redistribution” to the poor, thereby deflecting attention from their corruption. 
As one of the civil society members observed:  
 
Another reason it [the adoption of cash transfers] does not cause an uproar is that 
politicians are corrupt, and they would rather take the money and use it as they wish. 
So essentially people would argue that would you rather your grandmother gets this 
money, or it goes through corruption to some politician (CSO_03, 12/2/2016). 
 
As captured by the sentiments of the above participant, perceptions around the provision of 
cash transfers were that if the money is not given the poor, it would be misused by politicians. 
Coupled with the client-patronage dynamic characterising the politics of Kenya, not only did 
perceptions of corruption provide acceptability within the political class but also with members 
of the public who according to the participant saw it as a form of redistribution. 
 
 
  
 
211 
9.4.2 Government Responsibility to Citizens 
Contrary to opinions that governments take on programmes solely for political mileage, a 
differing opinion that emerged from this study indicated that governments are responsible and 
are always seeking out ways to address socio-economic problems within the country. This view 
differed from others as it depicted government as responsible, which is often contrary to 
opinions expressed by civil society organisations and at times international organisations. As 
stated in his view a participant in the study asserted that: 
 
Governments have a desire to sort problems and this was one such problem. We are 
poor but contrary to the belief that African governments do not care about their people, 
this is not true, they think the government is and doesn’t care about us… which is not 
true. They [government] also want to try to help, they desire to respond to the needs of 
the people… they do care about the welfare of their people – they are looking for ways 
of alleviating problems and we as Africans are persuaded to take on a lot of things, 
some of them not so good, in order to address the plight of people. You cannot rule out 
the fact that when a carrot is dangled before us, we take it – we run for it. But I believe 
that genuinely a lot of our governments are trying to help, and they fall into a few traps 
here and there (CSO_05, 28/9/2016).  
 
This view of government as responsible, though not common, was expressed by a participant 
from civil society. The common view often expressed in relation to development work in 
developing countries portrays states in Africa as unconcerned with ending poverty and other 
ills that affect citizens. A look at the literature indicates that development work, especially that 
involving transnational actors, is often about replacing the government in service provision as 
the government is considered to be unresponsive and failing to meet the needs of its citizens. 
However, contrary to other findings and in line with these suggestions from the study, 
governments can prioritise social spending under certain circumstances, as was demonstrated 
during the period after independence.  
 
One of the factors that facilitated acceptability of the cash transfer programmes therefore 
emerged from government’s desire and responsibility for finding a solution to poverty, 
vulnerability and marginalisation in the country. And though there may be political pressure 
for adoption of cash transfers from donors, the sentiments reflect government responsibility in 
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seeking solutions to national problems. Following the discussion on government above, the 
next section examines the role of officials within government in the promotion of the 
programmes.  
 
9.5 Individuals/Champions  
While institutions matter for policy change, the mediational role of individuals remains largely 
unexplored. However, it emerged from the interviews that transnational actors relied on 
domestic actors and individuals to mediate the adoption of the two cash transfer programmes. 
Policy actors mentioned that individual politicians and bureaucrats influenced the policy 
process. Participants in the interviews repeatedly referred to them as champions of social 
protection. In the section below, I discuss the part played by political champions and 
bureaucrats in mediating the policy transfer process.  
 
9.5.1 Political Champions 
According to study participants from transnational organisations, it was crucial that the cash 
transfer programmes gain political support if they were to be adopted, which suggests that the 
idea of cash transfers was not axiomatic as a solution in the initial stages needing justification. 
For the CT-OVC, gaining political clout for acceptability was easy, as the Department of 
Children’s Services was situated within a Ministry headed by the Vice President. The Vice 
President, according to interviews, was influential in getting the programme’s accepted and 
those interviewed recalled his contribution to the adoption of the CT-OVC. Sentiments 
intimated that he assumed the role of champion and crusader for the programme within political 
circles and at the Cabinet level. His role as a policy champion was discussed by respondents in 
various instances. First, his role was to gather political support for the programme and then to 
mediate the inclusion of the cash transfer programme in the PEPFAR funding proposal. At 
political level, his contribution was discussed as follows:  
 
Vice President Moody Awori played a vital role in the adoption of the CT-OVC. There 
were too many children on the streets and there were no families to take them in. 
Support for those who were living at home was largely by grandparents who themselves 
were overwhelmed. Most of the older persons were poor and could not even engage in 
any business. It started as an experiment with KES 500 and we were amazed by the 
results (IOS_03, 13/3/2016). 
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Another respondent in the study remarked: 
There was the role that the Vice President at that time, Honourable Moody Awori. It 
was mostly not institutions but individual champions in institutions that promoted the 
programmes, like Moody Awori (MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016). 
 
According to interview sources, the Vice President was instrumental in pushing the agenda at 
cabinet level and also for the formation of the committee of OVC in parliament. In this regard, 
he set the tone for acceptability of the programme within his ministry, cabinet and in 
parliament. His role in brokering for the inclusion of the CT-OVC into the proposal by 
PEPFAR has been described in Chapter 7 of the study. Through his political office, he ensured 
the inclusion of the CT-OVC into the PEPFAR proposal even though funding for the 
programme was declining at the time.  
  
Within the HSNP, the Minister of Northern Kenya and Arid Areas was identified as the 
political champion for the programme. The minister, who was also a Member of Parliament 
from Northern Kenya, promoted the acceptability of the programme within the Cabinet and 
among the political class by presenting impact assessment data with colleagues within various 
parliamentary committees (MP_02, 27/9/2016). In advocacy for the programme, video clips 
were developed with the minister “championing” the programme, demonstrating the impact of 
the cash transfer scheme. However, one respondent stated that unlike the CT-OVC, the HSNP 
created only one champion. This may be attributed to the fact that in in the first phase of the 
programme there was no need for government financing, as DFID covered all the costs related 
to the programme. For the CT-OVC, proponents of the programme raised various champions 
of children within the parliamentary team, which may be credited for the fast adoption of the 
programme by members of parliament.  
 
9.5.2 Making of Bureaucratic Champions 
The bureaucratic role in policymaking is often hardly discussed beyond implementation, with 
scholarship on policy transfer discussions centring on the role of other actors, especially 
transnational actors. However, as discussed under the role of politicians in this chapter, 
government officials’ actions facilitated the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP, with 
research findings indicating that for some middle-level bureaucrats, their role went beyond 
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facilitating policy uptake to developing programmes that were later adopted by government. 
As explained by several of the participants in the study, the individuals who were important 
for the advancement of the social protection agenda were middle-level officials who formed 
the first line of contact with international organisations and members of epistemic 
communities. Two were specifically mentioned through the interviews, one being the Director 
of Children’s Services at the time, and the other the Deputy Director at the Department of 
Social Services. In explaining their mediational role, one study participant stated:  
Champions included individuals who were people with a vision and were ready to move 
with the vision; they were government officials and some of the Members of 
Parliament. The individuals were those who believed that the programme could work. 
They had been converted mostly through the trips to Brazil that targeted high officials 
in government. They supported and pushed the agenda and were able to drive political 
will, able to talk and articulate the matters clearly (MGCSD-01, 23/3/2016). 
 
As explained by the respondent, the champions were passionate about the programme. To 
motivate this passion, international organisations provided adequate technical and training 
opportunities for them. Influencing of preferences and desires was achieved through training 
of the identified champions which included numerous trips to countries where cash transfer 
programmes were under implementation, like Brazil and South Africa. Those regarded as 
champions were also close to ministers and Permanent Secretaries who they influenced for the 
uptake of the cash transfer programmes. Some of the characteristics that were considered 
important were their ability to influence politicians and other top civil servants, and their 
articulation and advocacy of the programmes. Through the various training sessions that were 
carried out, their skills were enhanced to enable them have the capacity to speak on the 
programmes and articulate them to convince other players. This was stated as follows by one 
of the participants: 
 
Individual relationships that we managed to develop also provided confidence in the 
programmes – most of the ways in which we did things and developed relationships 
was largely informal, but we managed to build relationships with individuals who 
helped to propel the cash transfer agenda (IOS_03, 13/3/2016). 
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International promoters built informal relations with the bureaucrats. Informal relations here 
included working directly with the persons and even provision of hardware material to 
incentivise their championship for the cash transfer programmes. Most bureaucratic 
“champions” were equipped with laptops, computers, and phones by international 
organisations to make their work easier.  
 
Individuals intimated that personal motivation and experience propelled champions to promote 
the cash transfer programmes. In an interview with one identified as a champion for the CT-
OVC, he stated that:  
 
There was also personal initiative after I had seen the situation of children. I went 
around the globe explaining to people about the programme, personal initiative from 
different people. As a head of department, it was my duty to grow the programme and 
to make sure it was adopted. There was also the role played by politicians particularly 
the VP Moody Awori at the time. The plight of OVCs could not be ignored. It was 
heart-breaking to see children suffer so much. One needs to have a passion for OVCs 
and seek to do things outside the box. I had to make sacrifices beyond me and my 
family. We at the department were passionate about helping the orphans and so we 
became fanatics to the programme. I had to provide leadership for the programme 
(MGSCD_02, 12/5/2016). 
 
In speaking about the passion to see the programme, particularly the OVC, growing, the 
champion underscored his interest in the promotion of the CT-OVC and suggested that there 
were personal reasons for his interest in the programme. But from previous discussions 
regarding the amount and targeting, the statement is symptomatic of the levels of poverty that 
have become accepted. Cash transfers in inadequate amounts cannot lead to transformation. In 
addition, the focus on cash transfers can most likely divert budget funds from other social 
programmes like education and health, therefore compromising the whole aspect of poverty 
reduction (Lavinas, 2013). Others mentioned as crusaders of the programmes included 
individuals from civil society organisations that championed social protection in general. As 
policy entrepreneurs, study participants described several characteristics that made the 
champions resourceful in the policy process. Some of these characteristics included their ability 
to work across sectors, enabling them to advocate and work with diverse groups ranging from 
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civil society to Members of Parliament who they were able to lobby as playing a facilitative 
role.  
 
As demonstrated in the section above, several factors mediated the adoption of the CT-OVC 
and the HSNP. However, study findings suggest that the following factors described below 
constrained to some extent the adoption and expansion of the programmes.   
 
9.6 Constraining Factors in Adoption  
Research findings indicate that there were constraining factors in the adoption of cash transfer 
schemes and social protection policies. Study participants indicated two barriers to the policy 
transfer process: perceptions of waste of funds and constrained financial resources. The two 
constraining factors are discussed below: 
 
9.6.1 Perceptions of Wastage of Funds 
The notion of giving cash to the poor continues to be debated as a social policy instrument 
choice in sub-Saharan Africa, as the idea of giving cash to the poor, no strings attached, is 
considered radical. Giving cash to people has sometimes been termed “throwing money down 
the drain” and it is these perceptions that constrained international agents’ promotion of social 
protection policies in Kenya. According to research findings, sceptical sentiments and doubts 
around the policy option arose particularly from politicians and bureaucrats at the Treasury. 
While the political elite facilitated the adoption of the programmes, on the one hand, 
participants in the study mentioned that in some circumstances they challenged the idea of 
“giving handouts” as a policy solution. Political inhibitions towards the idea of giving out cash 
were discussed in the following way by a participant in the study:  
 
In the US, they had started to challenge social protection, saying it was a waste 
of resources: needs to be rethought but at least it didn’t get to that point where 
it was seen as social welfare – making people lazy and all that. There is a plus 
in the sense that there is the basic framework. The challenge remains in 
expanding it to include all the vulnerable people (CSO_03, 12/2/2016). 
 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, technocrats within the Ministry of Finance were 
considered hindrances to the adoption of cash transfers based on the same statement above. 
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The idea that one could just give money to the poor was contested. Giving cash to the poor in 
Africa is viewed by some as a waste of money. While studies have shown the impact of the 
programmes on households and individuals, during the initial phases of the programme 
questions arose, with others worrying that “the poor will drink the money away”, or “will marry 
another wife”. Statements of wastage however as discussed by Ferguson (2015) emanate from 
neo-liberal and Marxian ideas of thought, where the previous sentiments held that social 
provision was achieved through work and thereafter wages could be used for access of goods.  
But in the case of Kenya, transfers were targeted at those unable to engage in any work to earn 
an income or wages. Moreover, as pointed out by several scholars, the changing dynamics of 
society means that a majority of even those that would wish to work, have no jobs as 
unemployment increasingly becomes part of Kenya’s economy. To debunk the “mindset of the 
poor wasting funds”, a participant in the study stated that proponents of the programmes 
enhanced ideational activities that involved changing perceptions through conferences, study 
tours and training sessions targeted at doubtful groups. For politicians, the prospect of gaining 
political mileage out of the programmes broke down their resistance to the programmes. 
 
9.6.2 Limited Financial Capacity of Government 
As mentioned in Chapter 8, government’s financial capacity to undertake a programme can 
hinder policy change. According to study participants, the adoption of the cash transfer 
schemes demanded extra financing from already-constrained government resources. Financial 
constraints hampered adoption and expansion efforts. Government structures, according to 
transnational actors who participated in the study, could not support the rapid expansion of 
programmes. Staff members were also not well equipped to administer the programmes. These 
challenges were more pronounced within the CT-OVC, which relied on government structures 
and funding for implementation.  
 
In regard to government laxity with regard to the HSNP, a participant from the government 
remarked “the HSNP is an expensive programme to run and government cannot take it on as it 
is” (MDP_01, 7/4/2016). The statement was made in reference to the sophistication of the 
programme, which requires different structures of operation from the other three programmes. 
Respondents mentioned the complicated payment mechanism and the use of the private sector 
in the implementation of the programme as costly compared to other programmes within 
government structures. The Member of Parliament suggested that a merger with the other 
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programmes may facilitate its adoption by government. The statement by the Member of 
Parliament offers insight into government thinking around the HSNP. Despite sentiments that 
government was interested in taking on the cash transfer, this remains questionable. Reluctance 
in funding by government and threats of withdrawal by DFID indicate that the programmes 
were not endogenous and that adoption occurred through pressure. In addition, it is indicative 
of earlier arguments that policy promoters manipulated and sometimes created conditions 
which others perceived as mediative in the adoption of cash transfers.  
 
The following section offers a conclusion to the chapter.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered the facilitative and the constraining factors to the adoption of 
social protection policies. Drawing from the CT-OVC and the HSNP, the study has found that 
national context, including policy compatibility, political bargaining and the role of “individual 
champions”, mediated the adoption of the programmes. Where there were similar policies to 
the one being transferred, it was easy for policy transfers to occur and the policies to be adopted. 
The Constitution of Kenya of 2010, the Children’s Act and the National Plan of Action for 
OVCs played a contingent role upon which policies related to cash transfer policies were built. 
Prevailing contextual socio-economic realities in Kenya like poverty and HIV and AIDS 
provided windows of opportunity for promotion of the two programmes as remedies to the 
long-standing effects of the problems of poverty, vulnerability, and marginalisation. In the 
chapter, I also examined individual agency in the policymaking process, citing politicians and 
civil servants as champions. Inasmuch as the context shaped the adoption of the policies, what 
is important is how policy proponents shaped and pitched their agenda around the factors 
discussed above.    
 
Besides the facilitative factors leading to the adoption of the programmes, I examined two 
factors that constrained the adoption and expansion of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. These 
factors as discussed during interviews are the perceptions surrounding cash transfer as a waste 
of funds and limited state resources as a constraint to expansion.  
 
The next chapter concludes the study by bringing together the findings to come up with a key 
summary of findings, implications, and contribution of the study.  
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this two-case study was to explore the processes of transfer and adoption of the 
CT-OVC and the HSNP programmes in Kenya. The conclusions from this study are linked to 
the research questions and centre around four main areas: (1) Power was pivotal in shaping  
interactions, interests, incentives and resources to bring policy change; (2) Policy change 
involved the creation of a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge and social 
construction; (3) The structural mechanism of policy transfer involved catalysing and enforcing 
conditionalities on financing; and (4) Manipulation of institutions and a creation of context—
social, political and economic dynamics—provided windows of opportunity and critical 
junctures to mediate and align with the transfer process. Below, I discuss the major findings 
and conclusions from this research. Thereafter I offer some recommendations regarding both 
practice and further research, followed by a final reflection on this study.  
 
10.2 Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions 
The main aims of this study were as follows: the first intention was to examine the role of 
actors, ideas, incentives and interests in the development of the CT-OVC and HSNP as social 
protection instruments in Kenya. The second was to examine the national context that mediated 
the policy transfer process. The study, through this examination, sought to provide a greater 
understanding into the dynamics, processes and mechanisms leading to the adoption of the 
social protection programmes in Kenya and other developing countries, particularly in Africa. 
To achieve this end, the study developed three research questions.  
1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and 
adoption of the CT-OVC and HSNP?  
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained 
the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP in Kenya? 
3. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer 
programmes in Kenya? 
Below I summarise the broad findings of the research questions. 
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10.2.1 Power was Pivotal in Policy Change: Power Relations in the Policy Process 
The first major finding of the study is that an asymmetrical exercise of power within the policy 
space was pivotal in the adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP. Social actors with different 
interests and sources of legitimacy, and possessing different resource bases in the policy space 
influenced each other to bring about policy uptake. International organisations, due to their 
resource base, in form of finances and knowledge, exercised greater power than other social 
agents. For example, they influenced the process in more ways in comparison with domestic 
civil society members whose influence lay in their proximity to the political elites. Politicians, 
on the other hand, as influential veto players and influential national actors in national 
policymaking processes, challenged decisions by transnational actors. Actors employed their 
resources as tools of power in the policy space.  
 
Through an exercise of power, transnational actors introduced and pressured the Government 
of Kenya to adopt cash transfers, thereby altering the social policy landscape in Kenya. As 
demonstrated, contrary to views that governments and national processes remain dominant in 
policy formulation and that the role of transnational actors is overestimated in policymaking 
(Béland, 2009; Deacon and Stubbs, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Hickey et al., 2018), this 
study concludes that transnational actors can force exogenous policies upon governments. 
Transnational actors relating to other social actors in pursuit of the adoption of CT-OVC and 
HSNP exercised power in three ways (Ouma and Adésínà, 2018). First, they exercised power 
by shaping the agenda. This was achieved, among other means by defining the problem to be 
addressed and providing a solution to it, and through decision-making processes. The second 
technique adopted by international organisations was constraining the options, actions and 
agency of other actors in the policy space. This was achieved largely through exclusion from 
and the inclusion of other agents in the advocacy network, and also by setting up parallel 
structures within which international organisations operated, thereby excluding other agents 
from the policy space. Thirdly, international organisations exercised power by influencing the 
preferences of other agents for policy acceptance through social learning and the transmission 
of norms and practices.  
 
A conclusion that can be drawn from this finding in line with authors’ views (Bache and Taylor, 
2003; Mkandawire, 2010; Peck, 2011; Prior and Barnes, 2011; Preece, 2013; Adésínà, 2014; 
Abdulai, 2019) is that power forms the underlying factor in policy transfer and policymaking 
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processes in circumstances where there is an asymmetrical relationship between the promoter 
and the recipient country. In this case, the promoter’s positionality is more powerful than the 
recipient based on their resource base, financial and knowledge, which they exercise to bring 
about policy change. In adoption of the CT-OVC and the HSNP the subtlety of the exercise of 
power was displayed in everyday processes and acts of policy transfer. However, it proved 
powerful in policy transfer processes and in shaping the implementation of the adopted 
policies. In addition, to buffer their resource base, international organisations formed 
partnerships with domestic organisations and actors within the policy space and even created 
organisations to promote their agenda. 
 
10.2.2 Power in Social Learning: Discursive Hegemony, Structure of Knowledge and 
Social Construction  
The second major finding of this study is that power in social learning involves the creation of 
a discursive hegemony and a structure of knowledge, and social construction to make ideas 
powerful for policy change. To understand how ideational mechanisms brought about policy 
change, the study went beyond a description of the learning activities employed and instead 
demonstrated how social learning mechanisms were made powerful enough to bring about 
change. While others portray policy learning as a benign rational process (Kpessa, 2010; Foli, 
2015), the findings of the study were that social learning was complex, involving competition, 
manipulation and contestation, as suggested by several other authors (Dobbin, Simmons and 
Garrett, 2007; Adésínà, 2011; Schmidt, 2011; Mkandawire, 2014; Petridou, 2014; Rodgers, 
2014). Ideational mechanisms were made powerful through the creation of a discursive 
hegemony. The influence of social learning, the sharing of knowledge, norms and practices 
through training, study tours and conferences, depended on who generated the knowledge, how 
it was generated and how it was used in the policy space. To further embolden ideational 
approaches, transnational actors and promoters of the cash transfer policies positively 
constructed the target groups of the CT-OVC and the HSNP and created persuasive policy 
narratives to bring about policy uptake. 
 
10.2.3 Structural Mechanisms of Policy Transfer Involved Catalysing and Enforcing 
Conditionalities on Financing 
Structural mechanisms of transfer involved soft power based on the provision of financial 
resources through catalysing and incentivising government financing. In the initial phases of 
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the transfer process, international organisations provided financing to the programmes to 
stimulate financing and government buy-in. In the later phase of adoption, following slow 
government uptake, donor organisations relied on a coercive funding model Programme for 
Results (P4R) to induce government financing to the programmes. Contrary to views that 
international organisations are policy proposers who prefer softer forms of policy transfers 
(Foli and Béland, 2014; Hernandez, 2017), this finding suggests that imposition of 
conditionalities still remains a significant mechanism of force by international organisations, 
as suggested by other authors (Easterly and Williamson, 2011; Peck, 2011; Molenaers, 
Dellepiane and Faust, 2015). Both structural mechanisms for financing bore mixed results. On 
the one hand, the government responded to the catalysing efforts by providing financing 
through budget allocation; on the other hand, it failed to increase financing resulting in the 
closure of programmes. The P4R, as demonstrated in the study, also produced mixed results, 
with the government falling short of meeting its targets.  
 
A conclusion that can be drawn is that financial provision involved an exercise of power 
through catalysing aid and enforcing conditions. Financing based on conditionalities formed 
the core mechanism of policy transfer mechanisms without which the Government of Kenya 
would not have adopted programmes.  
 
10.2.4 Power involved a Manipulation of Institutions and Context to Create Windows of 
Opportunity for Policy Transfer  
The fourth major finding is that though the national context mediated the transfer and adoption 
of cash transfer policies, actors create the context to provide windows of opportunity and 
critical junctures.  As suggested by other authors, mediative factors are often conditioned or 
manipulated to fit within the framework of the idea or policy solution (Schmidt, 2011). Political 
institutions in addition did not provide sufficient impetus for policy adoption. Recent studies 
explaining the adoption of social protection policies as a function of political institutions 
(Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2016, 2017) fail to consider first the constraining 
power of international organisations through depoliticisation of the policy space and second 
that some of the institutions are creations of international organisations or sediments of 
diffusion (Solingen, 2012). Political institutions, like electoral processes, are insufficient in 
explaining the adoption of social protection policies since social protection schemes are largely 
donor-funded and therefore are not high on campaign agendas yet.  
 
  
 
223 
10.3 Policy Recommendations 
Following the analyses in this study, the following recommendations are suggested to guide 
actors – both national and international – involved in policymaking processes. Policy processes 
are complex and complicated, rendering the process non-linear, and requiring great attention. 
First, transnational actors are advised to take on a more genuine approach in involving domestic 
actors in policy processes. Participation and the involvement of domestic actors need to move 
from the cosmetic rhetoric to an active role starting from the initial stages of policy processes. 
This level of involvement can be achieved two-fold. First, it can be achieved through enabling 
national actors who take the lead in policy formulation, especially in the agenda-setting stages. 
In so doing, national actors’ role is not relegated to implementation or “rubber-stamping” of 
policy recommendations.  
 
Second, domestic actors need to reclaim their space in national policymaking processes and 
take charge of making decision concerning policies. Despite the asymmetrical relationship that 
characterises policy transfer and those that are global in nature, space for policy engagement 
exists for national actors. Domestic policy actors therefore, based on their knowledge base and 
veto power, ought to demonstrate more agency in the policy space by creating their own spaces 
and taking advantage of their sources of legitimacy to shape policy processes. Due to 
globalisation forces and the need to learn from others, policy transfer processes will continue 
with powerful institutional actors like international organisations that developing countries 
depend on for aid continuing to influence policy outcomes. But with the changing aid landscape 
and the diminishing role of transnational actors in global processes, there is now greater room 
for domestic actors to exercise their agency within the policy space to a greater extent even in 
circumstances where transnational actors impose policy reforms through structural 
mechanisms.  
 
Following this recommendation, to increase local ownership of the programme, transnational 
actors ought to recognise the skills, context, knowledge, and the mandate of domestic actors in 
the policymaking process. Ideational approaches in policy transfer as discussed in the thesis 
aim at creating ownership among recipient countries to take over the programmes. Continuous 
and perpetual involvement and supervision by transnational actors therefore undermine 
ownership of transferred policies and crowds out local capacity. In addition, the creation of 
parallel structures outside of existing government structures and institutions harms the role of 
state agencies and perpetuates the need of international actors’ presence in the policy space. 
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Technical assistance by international organisations therefore needs to have a determined period 
of time after which domestic actors ought to take a leading role in policy implementation. 
 
Additionally, developing countries and in this particular case Kenya, need to break from 
tendencies of policy adoption based on donor prescriptions. Here a return to nationalistic 
policies that worked based on the principles of transformative social policy would provide 
policy options that have been tried, tested and proven. A return to the nationalistic policy era 
which contributed to a decrease in poverty levels with the adoption of broader policy 
instruments beyond the narrow policy instrumentation to selected populations is recommended.  
 
10.4 Limitations and Future Research 
The study has several limitations which we need to acknowledge. First, the study is a case 
selection of Kenya as one of the developing countries in Africa. While Kenya is similar to other 
countries in the region in that it is donor-dependent and continually struggles with poverty, it 
offers a different perspective following its lengthy history with donors and international 
organisations. A number of international organisations have their regional hubs in Nairobi. For 
this reason, Kenya is often receptive to donor influences, with little history of resisting policy 
prescriptions from the West. In addition, Kenya has continued to receive a substantive amount 
of aid from donor organisations and therefore is considered an easy country to work with in 
terms of policy adoption. Kenya offers a wide democratic space for actors to test ideas and 
policies, as has been recently demonstrated through technological advances like Mpesa. While 
Kenya offers a typical case for other countries in Africa, the factors mentioned above makes it 
different from others within the region and therefore its adoption trajectory and dynamics may 
differ from that of other countries. A gap therefore exists in studying the dynamics of the policy 
processes in late and resistant adopters like Uganda or early adopter but resistant countries like 
Zambia. 
 
Further areas of research involve a move away from studying the processes of adoption to 
implementation of the programmes. This study has focused on the process of adoption of the 
policy without examining the dynamics at the implementation level. Examining the 
implementation of adopted programmes may offer different perspectives regarding adoption. 
As indicated in the study, transnational actors are involved in the implementation of the 
programmes, thereby overlapping between and straddling policy adoption and implementation. 
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Further studies on implementation processes on transferred policies would enrich policy 
transfer and social protection studies. 
 
Another area that could be of interest in policy transfer is an examination of national agencies 
in developing countries in policy transfer processes. Studies on policy transfer and learning 
often focus on the role of the promoter of the policy to be transferred, particularly on that of 
transnational actors. However, as demonstrated in this study, bureaucratic agents and 
government officials played a significant role in policy adoption, acting as the point of 
centrality in regard to relationships.  The relationship between bureaucrats and other agencies 
within the social space and how it leads to policy adoption is important. Increasingly, 
bureaucrats are acting beyond their mandate as policy implementers of prescribed or defined 
policies by political elites and are engaging more as policy entrepreneurs. Bureaucrats, or 
policy champions as they were referred to in this study, are more than implementers and play 
a key role in policy uptake as the first contacts with whom transnational actors build 
relationships. A deeper study on individuals as champions in policymaking processes and as 
policy entrepreneurship especially in pro-poor policymaking would significantly enrich studies 
on policy development processes.  
 
Studies on social policy could be enriched through studies that explore the extent to which cash 
transfers in developing countries contribute to the functions of transformative social policy 
space. Further investigations on the role of cash transfers in promoting citizenship could be 
studied too.  
10.5 Conclusion 
This study has highlighted the processes, dynamics, and politics around policymaking, policy 
transfer and policy adoption of two social protection programmes in Kenya and the resultant 
outcome. The government adopted the two programmes largely through the influence of 
transnational actors. Social relations formed the basis upon which power was exercised within 
the policy space. Actors therefore formed alliances with each other depending on their resource 
base and their strength of influence to legitimise their involvement in the policymaking process.  
 
Beside using various mechanisms in the policy transfer processes ranging from voluntary 
learning to soft coercive mechanisms, the policy process was one imbued with power based on 
asymmetrical social relations of domestic and international actors contributed to uptake of the 
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policies. The two cases studied indicated that structural forces in the form of the Programme 
for Results to incentivise government were used to push forth the adoption and the government 
putting funds in the policy process. Ideational mechanisms comprising conferences, training 
and other norm-sharing activities comprised the means adopted by transnational actors in the 
process. The question the thesis answers is how they became powerful tools for policy 
adoption. The discussion around these centres on policy framing through a discursive 
hegemony on who produced the knowledge and the policy solution through the social 
construction of vulnerable groups and by creating powerful policy narratives. Social learning 
was therefore not a benign process but one imbued with power from the producers of the 
knowledge. 
 
In addition to the agency of actors, the national context shaped the policy processes, providing 
windows of opportunity and moments of critical juncture in the policy process. While 
international and transnational global policymaking was necessary for the uptake of social 
policy programmes in Kenya, they were not sufficient to drive policy uptake. Mediative factors 
like the country’s context mediated the actions of transnational actors in policy adoption. 
 
Lastly, the study demonstrates that the plurality of mechanisms of transfer, national context, 
institutional interest and power formed an intricately interwoven intersectionality in 
policymaking. The relationship between the variables is therefore important in understanding 
policy transfer processes and adoption of policies.  
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure 1: Schedule of interviews  
 
 Interviewee Locus of engagement Gender Date of 
interview 
1.  MGCSD_01 National bureaucracy Female 23/3/2016 
2.  MGCSD_02 National bureaucracy Male 12/5/2016 
3.  MGCSD_03 National bureaucracy Male 25/4/2016 
4.  CSO_01 National civil society  Female 6/4/2016 
5.  CSO_02 Regional civil society Male 25/1/2016 
6.  CSO_03 International civil society Male 12/2/2016 
7.  CSO_04 International civil society Male 13/5/2016 
8.  CSO_05 Regional civil society  Male 28/9/2016 
9.  CSO_06 National civil society Male 12/8/2016 
10.  CSO_07 National civil society  Female 16/3/2016 
11.  IOS_01 International organisation Male 13/3/2016 
12.  IOS_02 International organisation Male 24/3/2016 
13.  IOS_03 International organisation Male  13/3/2016 
14.  IOS_04 International organisation Male 12/4/2016 
15.  IOS_05 International organisation Female 28/9/2016 
16.  IOS_06 International organisation Male 18/8/2016 
17.  TT/C-01 Epistemic community  Female  1/4/2016 
18.  TT/C-02 Epistemic community  Male 14/8/2016 
19.  TT/C-03 Epistemic community  Male 26/1/2016 
20.  TT/C-04 Epistemic community  Male 13/4/2016 
21.  TT/C_05 Epistemic community Male 5/9/2016 
22.  MFP-01 National bureaucracy Female 22/4/2016 
23.  MFP-02 National bureaucracy Female 3/6/2016 
24.  MFP-03 National bureaucracy Male 29/7/2016 
25.  MDP-01 National bureaucracy Male 7/4/2016 
26.  MP_01 Member of Parliament Male 31/8/2016 
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27.  MP_02 Member of Parliament  Male 27/9/2016 
28.  ML-01 National bureaucracy  Male 4/5/2017 
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Annexure 3: In-Depth Interview Guides 
A. Interview Guide for Government Officials (Ministry of Labour, Social Security and 
Services, the National Treasury, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, HSNP and OVC-
CT Secretariat, and Members of Parliament)  
1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and 
adoption of the OVC-CT and HSNP?  
• What is the relationship between your Ministry/your department and donors? 
• Which agents played a significant role in the introduction of the programmes in the 
country?  
• What has been the role of the following actors in social protection sector in Kenya? 
o Donors 
o Government - bureaucrats, politicians 
o Non-governmental organizations  
• How did the OVC-CT/HSNP come about? What was the idea that led to the 
initiation of the programmes?   
• Was the adoption of the cash transfer programmes proposed by any of the donors? 
Why? 
• Among the donors, bureaucrats and politicians, which one is the most influential in 
the promotion of the programmes? Explain. 
• How were the decisions about the adoption of the OVC-CT/HSNP made? (Probe:  
Role of donors, politicians, bureaucrats and NGOs) 
• Has the adoption of the programmes been influenced by similar programmes in 
other countries? 
• Where there any requisites to the adoption of the programmes?  
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained 
the adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?  
• What were the factors that facilitated the adoption? (Probe for political, 
economic, institutional, cultural, organisational)  
• Which factors restrained the adoption?  (Probe for factors that have 
constrained: political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)  
• How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed changes and reforms (Probe 
for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors) 
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• How has your relationship with the donors and international organizations 
constrained or facilitated the adoption of the programmes  
3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations 
of the social policy regime in Kenya? 
• How has poverty been tackled in Kenya since independence?  
• What are the main issues of focus of policy on poverty reduction now?  
• How has the adoption of the cash transfers programmes changed the social 
policy landscape? (Probe: Based on roles of transformative social policy: 
production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and nation building 
• What are some of the notable impacts of the programmes?  
• What are some of the challenges? 
4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer 
programmes in Kenya?  
a. What lessons can be draw from the process of the adoption and implementation 
of the policy and programmes? 
b. What lessons can similar countries learn from the experience of Kenya? 
5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector 
B. Interview Guides with International Organizations (DFID, UNICEF, World Bank, 
Oxfam and HelpAge International) 
1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption 
of the OVC-CT and HSNP?  
• What is your relationship between your organization and with the government of 
Kenya in the social protection sector? How do you interact with the government? 
• What has been your role in the social protection sector? 
• Why was it necessary for the government of Kenya to adopt cash transfers as part 
of its social protection sector? 
• In regards to social protection what have been your proposals to the government of 
Kenya? 
• Among the donors, bureaucrats and politicians, which one is the most influential? 
Explain. 
• What has been the role of the following actors in the social protection sector: 
o Bureaucrats 
o Politicians 
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o Non-Governmental organizations   
o Donors 
• What are the capacities (strengths and gaps) of the domestic actors in the social 
protection sector? 
• How were the decisions to adopt the programmes made? (Probe: Role of 
international organizations, government officials, NGOs)  
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the 
adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?  
• What were the factors that facilitated the adoption? Why? (Probe for political, 
economic, institutional, cultural, organisational)  
• What are the factors that have constrained adoption? Why? (Probe for factors that 
have constrained: political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)  
• How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed programmes and changes (Probe 
for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors) 
• Are there any prerequisites for the country to adopt the social protection policies?  
• How has your relationship with the government of Kenya constrained or facilitated 
the adoption of the programmes? 
3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations of 
the social policy regime in Kenya? 
• How has the adoption of the programmes changed the social policy landscape? (Probe: 
Based on roles of transformative social policy: production, protection, redistribution, 
reproduction and nation building) 
4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes 
in Kenya?  
• What lessons can be drawn from the process of the adoption and implementation of the 
policy and programmes? 
• What lessons can similar countries learn from the experience of Kenya? 
5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector. 
 
C. Interview Guide for Implementing and Advocacy NGOs (APSP, KAACR, Social 
Protection Actors Forum and HelpAge International, Turkana)  
1. How did policy actors, ideas, incentives and interests shape the development and adoption 
of the OVC-CT and HSNP?  
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• What is the relationship between your organization, the Government of Kenya 
and the international organizations in regards to the OVC and the HSNP? 
• What is the role of your NGO in the social protection sector? 
• Which agents played a significant role in the introduction of these programmes 
(NGOs, donors, Ministries, politicians) 
• How were decisions about introduction of these programmes made – what role 
did different actors make? 
2. What institutional, administrative and political factors have facilitated or constrained the 
adoption of the OVC-CT and the HSNP in Kenya?  
• What were the factors that facilitated the adoption of the OVC-CT/HSNP? 
(Probe for political, economic, institutional, cultural, organisational)  
• What factors constrained the adoption? (Probe for factors that have constrained: 
political, economic, institutional, cultural, organizational)  
• What are some of the proposals that are not being implemented? Why? 
• How prepared is the country to adopt the proposed changes and reforms (Probe 
for: political, economic, cultural and organizational factors)? 
• How has your relationship with the government of Kenya constrained or 
facilitated the adoption of the programmes?  
3. To what extent has the transfer and adoption of the programmes led to transformations of 
the social policy regime in Kenya? 
• How has the adoption of the programmes changed the social policy landscape? 
(Probe: Based on roles of transformative social policy: production, protection, 
redistribution, reproduction and nation building 
• What are some of the notable impacts of the programmes?  
• What are some of the challenges? 
4. What lessons can be drawn from the transfer and adoption of the cash transfer programmes 
in Kenya?  
• What lessons can be draw from the process of the adoption and implementation 
of the policy and programmes? 
5. Any other comments in relation to the social protection sector. 
 
